

Iron Confederacies

IRON Confederacies

Southern Railways,

Klan Violence,

and Reconstruction

SCOTT REYNOLDS NELSON

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Iron Confederacies

INTRODUCTION

It was not a simple job helping Jefferson Davis, his family, and the Confederate cabinet flee from federal troops. Part of the trouble was the bulk of the fleeing party: some of the officers took their wives and children, a sizable contingent of navy cadets served as guards, and the Confederacy's treasury papers were a burden. The caravan teetered along at three or four miles an hour, laden with jewels and gold, with companies of guards camped on the tops of the cars.¹ Yet the greatest difficulty in the final, ill-starred voyage of the Confederate government may have been the very means by which they traveled: the transportation system, the southern railway.

In late March of 1865, Davis's wife and children began the journey south and west from Richmond. They were shortly joined up with the "treasure train" that carried the Confederacy's gold. The Davis family found sleeping in haylofts and dodging raiders tiresome, but their greatest hindrance was the state of the engine and the rails they traveled on. Less than a dozen miles south of Richmond the locomotive, the best in Richmond's yards, gave out on a slight grade. As rain dripped into the badly sealed compartment, Varina Davis consoled her children who now besides missing their father were soaked to the skin.

The sorry state of the rails proved the principal obstacle to a dignified escape. At many points the well-heeled refugees had to clamber off the cars and onto stages to bridge rail gaps or ford rivers and streams by foot. Traveling south of Charlotte, the first lady of the Confederacy had to follow the lights of the treasure train on foot while it passed over a difficult detour. She walked, she said, "five miles in the darkness in mud over my shoe tops, with my cheerful little baby in my arms."²

The Confederate cabinet followed behind them, and had even worse luck

with the railway apparatus. Judah P. Benjamin, Davis's stout secretary of state, shared the president's dream of escaping to the West or Mexico and regrouping to attack Federal forces. Whatever difficulties he might meet along the way, the heavy gentleman swore that he would never mount a horse. Abandoning his dignity shortly afterward, Benjamin peevishly steered his mount around the mud-coated sills and mangled bits of track that lay strewn along the roadbed. Even when the cars got moving again, the railroad intruded. As they sat in the leaking cars that creaked along those "horrible roads," as Varina Davis called them, Davis's cabinet could likely think of little else than the sorry state of the tracks that screeched and twisted beneath their feet.³

There is an irony in the defiant escape of a government committed to "states' rights" along an interstate railroad. To begin with, a Confederate railroad that stretched from Richmond into central Georgia seemed to deny the principle of state autonomy. Since the appearance of railroads in the South in 1830, southern states had sought to prevent a trunk line that would connect the southern states together. Southern state legislators worried that an interstate corridor would upset established trading patterns, develop the ports of other states, or worse, provide slaves with an escape route to the North. Indeed to many slaveholders, Davis included, a federally supported railroad system seemed to threaten the idea of state sovereignty.⁴

Resistance to interstate railway lines flagged in the 1850s, but it was war that had motivated Davis to connect eastern Virginia to the Georgia black belt. Thus the Confederate cabinet traveled over a railway corridor that they had fashioned, a corridor built over the objections of the several Confederate states. By the spring of 1865, this Confederate railway system must have seemed a weak foundation to support the dream of Confederacy. The final year of the conflict had reduced the Confederate backbone to an arthritic tangle. When General Sherman's men passed out of Atlanta on their march to the sea, they pulled up the rails of the Confederate corridor, heated them over campfires, and tied them into "neckties." The collapse of the Iron Confederacy, and the government that had conceived it, seemed nearly complete.

Yet the Iron Confederacy long outlived the Confederate nation. Despite wartime destruction, postwar alliances of southern planters and northern capitalists quickly stitched the corridor together again, first as the Seaboard Inland Air Line, joining Norfolk to Augusta, then as the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line, joining Richmond to Atlanta. Republican and Democratic politicians struggled to wrest control of this trunk line, both because rail-



Union soldiers posing on a crippled locomotive at the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad depot. (courtesy Library of Congress)

roads could generate state revenue, and because the economic growth that railroads promised might lend legitimacy to embattled governments.⁵

As the Iron Confederacy reemerged after the war it transformed the South, but also, in peculiar ways, preserved it. Davis's escape route marked the path along which the New South towns of Richmond, Danville, Greensboro, Charlotte, and Atlanta emerged. Yet this same corridor from Richmond to Atlanta is also where sociologists would identify the core of an intractable southern tradition of poverty, cheap labor, weak schools, and a racial caste system.⁶ I believe that rapid economic growth and a weakened, racist state are not opposites, that New South and Solid South are two parts of a common transformation, one that Jefferson Davis's railroad corridor

helped to foster. I will argue that this modern railway system helped limit the power of democratic institutions, to lock the region more deeply into the production of cotton and tobacco, and to preserve the power of white conservatives. This study is a history of the mark that a southern railway corridor made in the South from the years when promoters imagined it to its blossoming at the end of Reconstruction.

The method used here is an extension of labor history into the territory of business and political history. As labor history, this work highlights the continual constraints that human labor placed on the building of railway systems before the Civil War. It explores how plantation gangs built these systems; how forced labor under the Confederate government completed them; how the system's success fueled anxieties about black labor, inspiring conservatives to form Ku Klux Klans; and how institutional changes within the firm eliminated the Klan's threats to the railway system.

This work also considers the railroad firm as a *political* entity. Railroad corporations, after all, were chartered by states. Before the war, Southern states organized and funded railways to support political unification, and these states blocked interstate corridors that threatened to weaken their port cities. The formation of a truly regional railroad system awaited the political and military force of the Confederate government, a government that finally overrode the rivalries among individual states.

These southern railway corporations became no less political after the war, as they continued uniting the South in their own peculiar way. During Reconstruction, Northern capitalists and planter families together forged a railway corridor from Norfolk to Augusta and in doing so interfered with the prospects of a political Reconstruction managed in Washington. Air lines like the Seaboard Inland Air Line contributed to the rise of tenancy and the decline of seaboard merchants and seaboard towns. Indeed the political conflicts over the status of reconstructed states may have aided the air line in consolidating the region's trade under its own power.

Even competition among railroad corporations was political. The powerful Pennsylvania Railroad tried to buy up state stock in the railroads that formed this Confederate corridor. In response, the officers of the smaller Seaboard Air Line used Southern state houses as forums to deflect anger at railroad consolidation onto the invading Pennsylvania Railroad. The Seaboard Inland Air Line used the metaphors of railroad corruption, of “engines,” “machines,” and “rings,” supported by “corrupted” black voters against impoverished white farmers. Conservatives latched onto this criti-

cism, and declared that railroad corruption caused the decline of southern towns and cities. This rhetoric of railroad corruption boiled down complex changes in transportation, credit, and shipping technology into a simple, racist formula, and a powerful explanation for southern poverty.

The competition between these railroad companies had political ramifications far beyond the corridor from eastern Virginia to central Georgia. Two prominent railroad directors who opposed the Pennsylvania Railroad—Benjamin Hill and Josiah Turner—further extended this rhetoric of corruption, using it as a justification for violence against black voters. By 1868, these men became public intellectuals for the group of terrorist organizations known collectively as the Ku Klux Klan. While the Klan existed in many parts of the South, some of the most violent Klan raids took place near the repair shops and new construction sites along this railroad corridor. Two areas examined here in detail are the hills surrounding Company Shops (now Burlington) in Alamance County, North Carolina. This was “Bloody Alamance,” where a superior court judge counted “Twelve murders, 9 rapes, 14 arsons, [and] 7 mutilations” on the Klan’s behalf within ten months.⁷ It was here that the governor of North Carolina assembled four regiments to put down Klan violence. The “Kirk-Holden” war that followed led to the governor’s impeachment and the near-collapse of the Republican Party in the state. The other region examined here, near the tail of the railroad corridor, was that part of the South Carolina upcountry near Spartanburg. Though Klan violence exploded in many parts of the South, it was here that President Grant decided to use new executive powers to stop Klan violence. In 1871 he declared the cluster of counties in a state of insurrection, and called on federal troops and U.S. marshals to arrest hundreds of Klansmen, try them in federal court, and transport the convicted felons to Albany, New York.

Bloody Alamance and Spartanburg were not the only areas where Klan violence existed, nor did the new railroad corridor alone cause this violence. Rather, the place of the corridor affected how and why the violence occurred, and preserving the railroad corridor led state and federal governments to use extreme force to stop the attacks. Violence was more extreme along the railroad corridor because the burgeoning trade there helped to rearrange racial and gender borders, these changes helped black communities forge their own economic and political independence, and white conservatives sought to put a stop to it.

In part to control the growing social conflicts along this railway line, the

Pennsylvania Railroad Company formed a new kind of business institution in 1871—the holding company. The Southern Railway Security Company would be the first pure holding company in America. This new business form allowed capitalists in New York and Pennsylvania to defeat business competitors, to cultivate white conservatives, and to manage regional conflicts. Indeed the Southern Railway Security Company helped support the political movement we call Redemption, the counterrevolution that ended Reconstruction.

Thus this work attempts to join the increasingly disparate fields of labor, political, economic, cultural, and business history. To write about corporations as political entities, obsessed with labor needs, will likely draw volleys of buckshot from certain circles. While disciplinary border crossing may get me into trouble with professionals in each of these subfields, I hope the panoramic view I provide here is worth the risk of overstatements and misstatements that attend such imperial gestures.

As an interdisciplinary work, this book argues against two fundamental assumptions in the business and economic history of the South. The first is the assumption that postwar southern economic development was led by local capitalists, not outsiders. John Stover first made the case in *Railroads of the South* that local capitalists in the South acted on their own until after Reconstruction. Only in the 1880s were railroads bought out by northern capitalists. Most current histories of southern railroads, textile mills, and tobacco companies start with this premise, often because they do not see the trail of bonded debt that led back to London, Baltimore, and New York. There are many difficulties with this claim, but one of them is the assumption that the economic history of the Reconstruction South can be separated from the economic history of the Gilded Age. As this book will show, the European bond market and international changes in transportation explain much about fate of railroads and cotton economies in the period after the Civil War.⁸ Just as important, most of the critical actors in the drama of southern railroads were “off the map,” in Philadelphia, Harrisburg, and London. A related problem with the Stover paradigm is that it tends to inflate the reputation and power of southern business leaders, men whom other post-colonial regimes would label *compradores* or lackeys.

The other problem with the Stover thesis is that it separates the political history of Reconstruction and Redemption from the history of the emergence of the modern corporation. If, as Stover suggested, nothing changed in the management and operation of southern industries from the Civil War to

1877, then business innovation must have taken place in northern states first, and then gradually moved into the backward South. The crucial problem with this claim is that holding companies—the grandparents of multidivisional corporations—were first formed in 1870 as a way of managing the politically unstable railroads of the South. I argue here that Tom Scott formed the first holding company in the United States, the Southern Railway Security Company, to forge a kind of peace between violent, southern Democrats and international capitalists.

Historians who view the American North as the leading edge of change give us the familiar history of the backward South, which makes a long, slow, movement towards modernization. Edward Ayers's important synthesis, *The Promise of the New South*, provides just this picture, of a New South that emerged as southerners' desire for change competed with their longing for traditional folkways. This book provides a history of southern progress that begins a decade earlier. Rather than a hopeful story of southern development this work views development as a modern tragedy, complete with betrayals, false compromises, and political violence.

The other assumption that this book aims to undermine grows indirectly from the work of Robert Fogel. In 1964, Fogel claimed, in *Railroads and American Economic Growth*, that railroads were not nearly as important as historians have asserted. Had the capital invested in railroads been redirected into a decent system of interstate canals, the economy would hardly have been affected. Since Fogel's book, and the controversies that followed it, there have been few regional or national histories in which transportation has figured as a prominent institution.⁹

It is best to call Fogel's the neoclassical paradigm, partly because the claim follows from the assumptions of neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics limits the study of economic affairs to the measurable forces of supply and demand. According to this paradigm, as competition inevitably increases, profits and economic power dwindle to nothing.¹⁰ In the neoclassical paradigm, organizations like railroads and corporations can only be said to have power when they have a monopoly, and thus can singlehandedly limit the supply of some commodity. Fogel's is a kind of corollary to neoclassical reasoning: railroads *could* have been replaced by canals at a similar cost, and thus could not have been as important as historians made them.

Fogel's work was a helpful corrective to the breathless technological enthusiasm of older histories of the United States. But a crucial difficulty with the neoclassical paradigm is that it focuses on market activity while

ignoring institutions that constituted markets in the first place. There were many important, nonnegotiable decisions that traffic managers made about what goods would be transported. They did so by grading goods, making storage facilities available, creating through bills of lading, and thus facilitating credit. These choices profoundly affected what goods could reach a national market and be exchanged for other goods and services.¹¹ I argue here that the railway corridor helped shape the production and distribution of staple commodities like cotton and tobacco and limited alternative forms of production.¹²

Rather than focus on southern business leaders, as the Stover thesis might suggest, or the capitalist firm, as the neoclassical paradigm would encompass it, this book looks directly at the corporate bodies that sought to manage the tracks along the southern railway corridor. This book examines the entities, part corporation and part state, that emerged to manage traffic and trade in the region. I have used terms like “specter” and “ghost” to describe these entities. Nineteenth-century critics added images of monsters, giants, mammoths, skeletons, and vampires.¹³ The use of these terms called attention to the peculiar way that antebellum institutions had been redefined during and after the war.¹⁴

Before the war, most corporations partook of the medieval fiction that they were a body politic and held a piece of the power of the sovereign. In their case, of course, the sovereign was the state, not the king. Their piece of the sovereign’s power, which took the form of a state charter, gave them the right of eminent domain—the right to condemn private land for sale, buy the land, and then build upon it. Equally important, the charter gave them the right to sell bonds under the state seal and thus raise money. On the other hand, states appointed many of the railroad directors, controlled the path of the lines, and took a share of revenues to support public schools. Corporations, in the language of statecraft, were “creatures” of the state.

The question of sovereignty—who had it and who did not—was serious business in the nineteenth century. And the position of the corporation became all the more confused when the Civil War began. At first, one of the central questions of the war was whether states were truly and indissolubly sovereign. Did a state have a separate existence from the federal government that could be severed? Republicans said no. Southern Democrats said yes. A civil war determined not only that slavery would come to an end but also that states had no separate sovereignty.

During and after the war, the sovereignty that had underlay corporations

changed radically. Corporations were still tethered to states, but during the war the national government began to appropriate state powers. In the Union, the National Banking Act, national railroad appropriations, national conscription of soldiers, and federal taxes on income, all diminished state capacities. The Confederacy, too, took power from the states. The Confederacy issued its own currency, conscripted its soldiers directly, even built up its own railroad system.¹⁵ The end of the war, then, posed a question: where did these state-conceived corporations reside, and who owned the railroads built by the Confederacy, now that that federation was gone?

This is the problem of the Iron Confederacy. Like Frankenstein's monster, the Confederate railway system was assembled out of the parts of other "bodies," other corporations. After the war the builder no longer existed and the new system continued on its own. Just as Frankenstein's monster roamed across Europe in the track of Napoleon,¹⁶ a southern traffic system ranged across the track left by Jefferson Davis. Like specters, new institutions tried to inhabit, possess, or control the track. Both the Seaboard Inland Air Line and the Southern Railway Security Company competed to master the corridor from Virginia to the middle of Georgia. As freedmen forged working-class movements along the track of the Confederate corridor, Confederate soldiers, pretending to be the ghosts of the Confederate dead, formed a "White Brotherhood" in Alamance County, North Carolina, and an "Invisible Empire" around Spartanburg County, South Carolina. They attacked black railroad workers who were the most near and most vulnerable beneficiaries of the interstate system of trading that the railroad corridor had created.

As Klansmen made the railroad corridor increasingly unstable, only one of the two competing corporate institutions could succeed. The Southern Railway Security Company did, I argue, not simply because it was the best able to defeat its adversaries in traditional business competition, but because it was the most incorporeal, untouchable presence. The Southern posed as the inheritor of the Confederate state by putting up former Confederates as officers of the individual companies, recruiting the very Klansmen who were destabilizing the region to be its employees, and supporting the end of Reconstruction, which finally ended state control over the individual railroads that had made up the Iron Confederacy. The Southern mastered the "ghosts" of the Confederacy by becoming a ghost of the Confederacy itself.

A final reason for studying this corridor is to attempt to understand the odd blend of economic radicalism and racial scapegoating that the Demo-

cratic Party and the Ku Klux Klan created after 1868. My sense is that this period, and Reconstruction in particular, was critical in the formation of a white racial ideology, profoundly shaping white southern men's conception of themselves and constraining black men and women's prospects for the future.¹⁷ I believe that the system of railways on which Davis escaped brought more profound economic changes—and troubles—to the Reconstruction South than historians have recognized. The Iron Confederacy that remained after Confederate defeat rearranged race and gender in ways that southern white men found unsettling. Prominent racist intellectuals like Josiah Turner and Benjamin Hill helped shape white men's sense of why the world was turned upside down. They suggested that white, southern men's economic problems were a result of corruption, and that black people were responsible for it, because they were criminals at heart. It is a way of thinking about the world that is still common. Indeed, these racial views form their own kind of Iron Confederacy, confederate in its racial politics, iron in lasting power. It is the spectral voices of those dead men that we should begin to exorcise.

CHAPTER ONE

Forcing Nature

An Iron Confederacy

Surveyed and Graded

In 1848 James Henry Hammond, planter and politician from upcountry South Carolina, put his finger on the problem. Railway projects had begun all over the South after 1847, and no one could put a stop to them. Hammond wrote a series of anonymous articles titled “The Railroad Mania” for the *Charleston Mercury*, in which he catalogued the ills that railroads would bring to southern states. He bound the articles into a pamphlet and circulated it among his friends, mostly planters and agricultural reformers in the Southeast. Hammond hoped to warn his readers about the future of southern states, given their “deplorable excitement” over railroads. He noted a disturbing configuration of power and influence that seemed to join railroad promoters, southern planters, and state legislatures. This “artificial and hot-bed system of forcing nature” would put railroads all over the South, but these publicly financed railway lines would only destroy the standing and credit of the states that sponsored them.

Hammond used the metaphor of seduction, pregnancy, and abomination to represent his fears for the dangerous mingling of public debt and private capital that state-supported railroads represented. South Carolina would be “seduced, betrayed, and forced into extended and profitless expenditures” just as it had in the 1830s.¹ When speculators ravished the state then, the product had been the infant South Carolina Railroad in 1833. Conceived in a “fit of Internal Improvement monomania,” the SCRR had brought nothing

but trouble and shame to the state, for the state had lost money and the stock still traded below par.² While Hammond concurred that trade and agriculture in the rest of the Western world had been “developed” by railroads, Hammond distrusted “development” altogether. He wondered aloud if these railroad lines did not simply divert existing trade from canals and turnpikes.³ Promoters of the system would debauch the state, according to Hammond. The product of the union would be an entity “which on a small scale may be pardoned or commended as an elegant amusement or curious experiment, when applied on a wide surface, involving vast expenditures and affecting important interests, becomes unwise, dangerous, and destructive.”⁴

Hammond’s sense of the unnaturalness of southern railroad corporations was not simply a projection of his fantasies and fears.⁵ Southern railroads had a peculiar organizational structure, a kind of structure that allowed them to grow exponentially after 1848. To Hammond, these institutions could easily turn upon their hosts and destroy them.

Mania is an appropriate term to describe railroad building in the South after 1847. Railroad building had surged briefly in the 1830s, after Andrew Jackson vetoed the Second Bank of the United States and diverted its funds to the so-called pet banks in the individual states. The flush of capital ignited a number of state railroad projects. The South Carolina Railroad was the most successful; most were stillborn. After the Panic of 1837, there were again some timid signs of life. Some lines sprouted along the coast between Richmond and Wilmington, while the state of Georgia indebted itself to build the Western & Atlantic, a railroad that crossed the mountains into Chattanooga.⁶ But by 1847, railroads were being projected all over the South. Thousands of slaves and Irishmen felled trees and dug through hillsides to lay the lines out along old trading routes. Between 1855 and 1865, more than 375 miles of track were laid each year in the southern states.⁷ The trading routes of the recently dispossessed Cherokee were covered with track, the Trail of Tears closely followed by rivulets of iron. It was a wonder to everyone.

Part of the wonder was that railroads could thrive in a world of plantations and thinly scattered farms. Railroads could only be successful, wrote Hammond, in densely populated regions like England and the North, where it was too expensive for most gentlemen to own horses. In England, it was easier to shift the “elements” of capital into railway lines. But in poor regions like South Carolina, Hammond claimed, railroads would have to “create the elements” before they could divert them.⁸ The existing state improve-

ments in South Carolina, which passed through the most populous parts of the state, succeeded in nothing more than “cutting up valuable lands, and breeding pestilences.”⁹ The proposed roads, he felt, would spread these troubles throughout the state.

If Hammond was wrong about the South’s poverty,¹⁰ he was right to worry about whether railroads made sense in slave states. Put simply, southern plantations needed outlets for staples like cotton, but they needed few consumer commodities to come in the other direction. With limited inbound traffic to carry, many Southern railroads would continually struggle to pay back investors.

The difficulty with demand began with slavery. Slaves received no profits from their labor and were not consumers in a traditional sense.¹¹ Slaves near railway lines received cheap, ready-made brogans and precut clothing, but planters bought and dispensed them only once a year.¹² Indeed, to make full use of slave labor during agricultural lulls, masters had slaves manufacture many of the goods needed to operate plantations.¹³ As a result, the broad categories of saleable goods that filled railway cars in other regions were rare in the South. Stores with varied stocks of goods were common in Cincinnati and Cleveland, but plantations more often relied on itinerant peddlers and coastal factors for the limited variety of goods they needed.¹⁴

When railways finally did reach plantation regions, few variety shops and groceries emerged to keep railroad traffic managers busy. Warehouse inventories in southern cities changed surprisingly little with the coming of railroads. Trains delivered a small and uniform array of luxury goods from river towns like Richmond or Augusta. Combs, hose, collars, silk hats, and violins traveled with some larger crates of Puerto Rican sugar, spices, and sides of bacon.¹⁵ Railroads may have inspired a “Market Revolution” in the states clustered around the Great Lakes, but southern railroads could not radically alter consumption patterns within plantation households.¹⁶ Richmond merchant houses, for example, hardly altered their stocks at all in the 1840s, adding only yarns and sole leather to their inventories.¹⁷ With only small crates of violins and suspenders shipped to the interior, locomotives that hauled cotton to eastern ports had little to carry back to plantations.¹⁸

This limited market for goods going toward plantation regions continued to hobble railroads after they were built. Most railroads south of Maryland had serious problems with backhaul, or freight going into the South. Of the larger railroads in the Southeast, only two sent significant tonnage back to the interior: the Central of Georgia and the Richmond & Danville. Com-

pany presidents throughout the South envied the Georgia Central's Savannah-to-Macon run, which brought back a half ton of freight for every ton it shipped down to port. In 1859 the ratio neared the impossible mark of 1 to 1. The unique position of the Georgia Central allowed it to complement the Mississippi River. Thus Alabama plantations sent their cotton downriver to Mobile, but because upriver journeys were expensive, they shipped goods in from the east over the Georgia Central.¹⁹ The Richmond & Danville likewise reaped a small windfall in back freight in 1856. In that year it reached Danville and allowed Richmond merchants to sell manufactured goods to planters who shipped their tobacco down the Dan River.²⁰ But most roads fared like the Charlotte & South Carolina, whose fortunes rose and fell with cotton shipments.²¹ When railroads ran plantation goods out and brought empty cars back to plantation regions, this "dead weight" drove their costs up considerably.²²

It was not only the limited demands of plantations that hobbled southern railroads. Railroads in staple-producing regions also depended on the unstable international prices of tobacco and cotton to maintain operations. In 1854 the Richmond & Danville had to stop construction on its final stretch to Danville because the bill for iron was due in a year in which Virginia corn and tobacco crops were short.²³ Two years later the Columbia & South Carolina Railroad noticed a poor cotton harvest in the area. In that year freight revenues dropped more than 20 percent, which forced the directors to stop paying into the repair fund.²⁴ Only the Central of Georgia, which had preceded other railways by a number of years and owned a bank, seemed immune to the fits and starts of world commodity prices.²⁵ As Hammond noted, the relative prices of cotton and iron affected when railroads were built. When cotton prices were high, promoters swarmed the region.²⁶

If railroads seemed poorly suited to a plantation society because of the weakness of demand on plantations, the mechanics of getting a railroad built there made the initial venture seem all the more treacherous. Finding labor and capital to build railroad lines was a logistical problem everywhere. But southern railroads innovated after 1848, forging partnerships with southern states in a way that disturbed Hammond considerably.

Southern promoters' innovations after 1848 grew out of problems common to railway promoters everywhere: railroads were costly and only paid for themselves over time. How could a fledgling railroad company pay workers to build a railroad line when the railroad only made money after construction was complete? How could one person or group of people buy hun-

dreds of thousands of dollars worth of iron track and tens of thousands worth of locomotives and rolling stock before they moved a single cotton bale? Elsewhere in the United States and Europe, promoters formed corporations to resolve this problem. If a railroad incorporated, thousands of people in the towns touched by the line could sign up to buy capital stock. They would pay in installments, which the company would apply to the hiring of workers. These stockholders could elect directors to guard their interests, and most stockholders understood that dividends would not come immediately.²⁷ Directors bought heavy equipment from distant suppliers with “bonds,” or notes signed by the company president and bonded with a company seal. Ironmongers and managers of locomotive works usually resold these bonds to bankers or merchants.²⁸ Bonds, like stocks, had long pay horizons, but unlike stocks they had fixed payoffs, usually in twenty years. As a system for absorbing capital and deferring payment, the structure of corporate capitalism has changed little since it emerged this way in the early nineteenth century. But in southern states before 1848 there were two problems with the system: few people in the region would buy the stock, and few outside the region would take the bonds.

Southern railroads resolved these financial difficulties in some interesting ways. Promoters tied their fortunes to planters and southern legislatures, by using slaves’ labor and state bonds to build their lines. At a time when northern corporations were gradually separating from state power and local interests, southern promoters lashed themselves all the more tightly to peculiarly southern institutions.²⁹ Promoters perfected the marriage of railroad, plantation, and state in the late 1840s. The products—which Hammond called abomination—were the state railways that emerged all over the South after 1848.

Southern promoters had serious problems generating interest. The problem with finding stockholders to pay for workers was often exasperating for railroads, but this was particularly true in the South. Just getting the company started was difficult, because state charters mandated that state-supported railroads needed significant stock subscriptions before construction began. In the scattered plantations and farms of the South, getting this initial subscription was difficult. The Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston railroad had so much trouble getting itself incorporated that it used legal chicanery to do the job. It offered to buy the already-incorporated South Carolina Railroad for \$2.4 million, on the condition that the South Carolina Railroad would in turn subscribe for \$2 million in LCC stock. The \$2 million

that came back—money that the railroad gave itself—allowed the LCC to formally incorporate, buy the South Carolina Railroad, and begin operation.³⁰ The Richmond & Danville's story was more pathetic. Along the proposed line, promoter Whitmell P. Tunstall arranged town meetings repeatedly in the 1830s and 1840s. Having little luck, he kept returning to Richmond to request more time to leave the subscription books open. Richmonders called the proposed railway “Tunstall's folly,” and made fun of his long-winded disquisitions on all the benefits of railroads: “civil or religious, moral, intellectual or physical.” Tunstall got his corporate charter when some of his closest friends and relatives signed up for stock, to keep him from further embarrassing himself.³¹

Few of the planters who would benefit from railroads cared to buy railroad stock. The prosperous Judge Ruffin of North Carolina told his neighbors that it was foolish to buy stock before a railroad was built, because one could always buy stock afterward at fifty cents on the dollar. Giles Mebane, patriarch of Mebanesville, let the North Carolina Railroad run through his property, but flatly refused to invest capital in it.³² Planters' unwillingness to buy stock seems peculiar, especially for those planters in the eastern piedmont whose land lay sandwiched between western mountains and coastal pine barrens. Railroads here seemed most necessary.³³ It is also difficult to believe that planters would avoid the *risks* of railroad stock, given all the legends about planter fortunes lost to blooded horses, gamecocks, and games of “bragg” on riverboats.³⁴ Yet for many of the largest planters on the eastern seaboard, there were other games afoot. Even those Carolina planters who became large stockholders—Paul Cameron, John D. Hawkins, and Franklin Elmore, for instance—probably expended more capital transplanting slaves to Louisiana and Mississippi cotton fields. With much of their capital invested in slaves, selling their slaves at low, East Coast prices to buy new issues of railroad stock likely seemed ridiculous to them.³⁵


But by 1848 new institutions emerged to draw the slaves and capital of the largest planters into the building of an Iron Confederacy. Railroads found new ways of drawing on the assets of slaveholders. Directors skipped two steps in the established process of subscribing and building railways. Rather than selling stock to pay railroad workers, many railroads contracted out sections of the construction directly to slaveowning planters, and paid planters for their slaves' work with railroad stock.³⁶ Along the Richmond & Danville, the president had no end of troubles before he did this. In 1849, a cholera epidemic in Richmond made it impossible to lure northern laborers to the

South.³⁷ When he finally acquired sufficient laborers, the president reported another disease, of the monetary variety, that “deranged and embarrassed our operation.”³⁸ By 1854, the railroad had inoculated itself against all such fevers by paying slave-owning contractors along the line with railroad stock. When tobacco prices slumped, Virginia planters appeared in railway offices to lease their slaves for railroad building.³⁹ Seeing slaves as cheap capital, the directors of the proposed Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad were positively sanguine about their prospects. “[B]y the application of slave labor to the performance of almost the entire work,” they wrote in 1848, “railroads in the southern states are built more cheaply than in any other portion of the Union.”⁴⁰ On the North Carolina Railroad, when cotton or tobacco prices were low, planters fought for the chance to bring their mules, horses, and slaves out to railroad sections to commence operations.⁴¹

By the late 1840s, planters neatly folded the structure of plantation labor into the hierarchy of southern railway construction. After surveying the North Carolina Railroad in 1852, the chief engineer divided the huge project into four sections.⁴² He assigned a division assistant to each section, and gave him railroad stock to pay section overseers. Section overseers—either slave-owners or their overseers—contracted to grade the section with a “company” of thirty to fifty slaves.⁴³ The initial grading of the roadbed took place at more than twenty sites at once.⁴⁴

Like tracklaying in Europe and the northern states, the technology was primitive and labor intensive.⁴⁵ Surveyors laid out the line with stakes that were notched to indicate how far above or below the ideal grade they were.⁴⁶ Workers used shovels and wheelbarrows to build up or break down the earth so that it would “make the grade” and to form a flat foundation for the crossties. Grading the roadbed was the longest and most onerous part of railway building. To clear away rock, slaves dug small holes with picks, packed the holes with gunpowder, and blasted the rock into pieces before digging with picks and shovels.⁴⁷ Tracklaying started over a year later, with companies of slaves beginning at each end. Mules carried ties and rails to the setup, where slaves laid the rails.⁴⁸ When laying track, workers in gangs of five or more sang songs to help them time and spread out their exertions. At the end of a phrase, all the men on the line would hammer in the rail at the same time. This ensured that the rail hewed evenly to the crossties.⁴⁹

Railroads did not always buy slaves with railroad stock. In some cases, generally after construction was complete, railroads rented slaves directly. Officers of the line offered slaveholders a price for a gang of slaves for an entire



Slaves at work on the North Carolina Railroad, circa 1848. Rails and timber were carried in by carriage. Slaves planted explosives to blast away rock and carried away hundreds of cubic feet of dirt to make a level surface for railway lines and depots.
(courtesy North Carolina Division of Archives and History)

year, sometimes returning them for the harvest season.⁵⁰ At the beginning of the year, railroads contracted with established customers by mail, sending them "hand-hire bonds." These contracts stipulated that the railroad would be fully responsible for the holder's slaves, and provided railroad stock after the slaves served a year. Most contracts also specified that trackmen would receive food and medical care, two pairs of shoes, one hat, and one blanket.⁵¹ Most letters that planters sent to railroads praised the system. "I found my boys vastly improved," wrote one slaveowner, "and in such a thriving condition."⁵² Far from grumbling about the dangers of using slaves for nonagricultural work, slaveowners competed to rent slaves to the railroad, and they publicly accused one another of gouging the railroad for labor costs.⁵³

This is not to say that railroad construction was not dangerous to workers. Disease may have been the most serious problem. In the relatively isolated agricultural regions along the North Carolina Railroad, construction crews contracted new and rare diseases. Two white residents of Alamance

County who worked as overseers on the railroad contracted eye diseases shortly after beginning work. “Each one of them,” wrote a local resident, “have lost their right eyes.”⁵⁴ Between the laying of the roadbed in 1852 and the laying of the track in 1855, diseases swept rural counties close to construction sites, especially the “flux” and scarlet fever.⁵⁵ Scarlet fever, in an age before penicillin, could become rheumatic fever and infect the heart with chronic valve disease.

Indeed, for slaves, diseases once contracted on railroad sites were hard to recover from because of the level of exertion demanded to grade roadbed and lay track. “Charles,” a slave hired by Joel McLean, “had a sick [breast?] for two or three days” in September of 1853, McLean stated later. Still, McLean put him back to work. The next month he had “a hollow sounding cough,” but McLean worked him until Christmas. Only then did the overseer send the slave home in a wagon. Charles’s owner quickly tried to sell him and he died soon afterward.⁵⁶

Grading the roadbed was dangerous, too. The North Carolina piedmont, composed of disintegrated granite, required blasts of gunpowder to make an even surface. “[B]y this slow but sure process,” wrote a correspondent for the Greensboro newspaper, “have the workmen mined their way through many a weary hill.”⁵⁷ But weary hills were not the only things damaged by gunpowder blasting. In Hillsboro, two slaves were directed to drive a deeper hole into a hillside after the charge in the hole had failed. One held the iron drill and the other struck at it with a sledgehammer. “Two or three blows only were struck,” wrote a correspondent for the Hillsboro paper, “when an explosion took place, blowing the drill out of the hole and taking with it the little finger of the boy who held it, the eye of the other was injured by a [sic] gravel, which seems to have sunk into the [eye]ball.”⁵⁸

Despite these dangers, many slaveholders were eager to take railroad stock for the labor of their slaves. This integration of railroad and plantation at times gave the railroads a rather dynastic appearance. At first the North Carolina Railroad began as a project of ex-governors and former state treasurers, with scarcely a planter among its early subscribers.⁵⁹ But as the road began accepting roadwork for its railway stocks—a policy first adopted by railroads farther south—the largest planters along the line gradually became the company’s largest shareholders. Through the 1850s, plantation squires like Paul Cameron, Jacob Holt, and George W. Mordecai began to join the lists.⁶⁰ In Virginia, some slaveowners even superintended construction of the railway spurs that passed through their land.⁶¹

It was the integration of railroads and states, however, that most disturbed James Henry Hammond. This was the second way in which southern railroads innovated after 1848. If planters began to take stock from railroads to do the work of road building, getting cash to pay for bridges, engines, and other expenses was a dicier proposition. For a much longer period of time than in the North and West, southern railways relied on states to fund and support them. Through a financial procedure called “hypothection,” southern states acted as entrepreneurs for southern railways. Northern critics referred to these state-managed companies as “close corporations.”⁶²

This special relationship between states and railroads grew out of the failures of road building in the late 1830s. Particularly in the old Southwest, capital for railroad construction had been circulated through southern “land banks.”⁶³ Unlike traditional banks, land banks seldom took deposits. Rather, state legislatures formed them, often expressly to fund particular railway projects. These banks traded their shares with local planters for liens on land, crops, and slaves.⁶⁴ The bank then sold bank bonds (bonded with state seals) on national markets and in England. Some of these banks existed solely as capital reserves for risky railways and canals.⁶⁵ The largest purchasers of these bank bonds were English country banks, which often sold them to large landowners in the north of England. English landowners invested in these American “banks,” though few may have known that they were backed only by liens on plantations.⁶⁶ The extent of state indebtedness for railway construction, directly and through land banks, was considerable.⁶⁷ This entire edifice came crashing down with the Panic of 1837. While the Panic had many causes, English investors blamed the so-called wildcat banks that had supported railroad enterprises. After many states defaulted on their bank bonds, many British investors refused to consider buying bank bonds, particularly from the South and West.⁶⁸

Remembering the failures of 1837, promoters scoured the halls of Southern legislatures for a more secure financial instrument. By 1848, southeastern states had discovered it. Following the lead of Virginia, southeastern states placed themselves as intermediaries between railways and English lenders by the process of hypothecation. Though the word now means any kind of pledge, after 1848 it referred to a state’s practice of guaranteeing railroad stock to make it marketable abroad. Generally only people along a railway line bought a railway’s stock, because they could attend stockholders’ meetings and collect the dividends at the terminal. Only securities, “bonds” in American parlance, could travel across the Atlantic, because bonds had a

fixed rate of return that European agents could forward to bondholders. But given the thinness of available capital in the South, promoters persuaded southern states to hypothecate, that is, to buy railroad stock with state bonds.⁶⁹ In other cases southern states simply pressed their state seals on railway stocks. Railway presidents could then sell these state bonds abroad. In return for converting railway stocks into state bonds, a state got voting rights as a stockholder and sometimes a mortgage on some portion of the railroad's iron.

For southern railways, transforming their railroad stocks into state bonds gave directors access to European capital markets, especially after 1848. London and Manchester had not stood still from the 1830s to the late 1840s. Transplanted Yankees like Baring and Morgan had begun selling northern securities by advertising them publicly in English financial magazines.⁷⁰ (The English term for this kind of banker was "investment banker," which by all accounts looked better on a business card.) By cycling state bonds through investment bankers, southern railroads could compete with Yankee railroads, using the skills of investment bankers to promote their bonds. Mostly though, the Revolutions of 1848 did their work for them. English capitalists were eager to sink their capital in places without barricades.⁷¹

Hypothecation gave southern railways a critical edge in borrowing capital from England. Southern roads, with their limited backhaul and their reliance on a single crop, were otherwise poor bidders for British capital. But the seal of a southern state provided an apparent solidity that allowed "hypothecated" southern railway stocks to sell for more. Indeed, some conservative investors outside the South would only accept railway stocks with state seals on them.⁷² Northern railroad securities were weaker; British investors did not even call the guaranteed security of a railway company a *bond* at all.⁷³ A bond had originally meant a promise made by nobles to which they would affix their royal seals, pledging their name and realm. A bond from an artificial person—a corporation—was an impossibility, or perhaps an elaborate American joke.

Hypothecation became the funding method of choice in the years after 1848, a part of the portfolio of nearly every respectable southern railway.⁷⁴ While there are few comprehensive figures, the amount of state debt committed directly to railways increased rapidly after 1848. By 1857 Georgia had traded \$6 million worth of its bonds for railway stocks and was contemplating turning out \$5 million more.⁷⁵ Virginia's Board of Public Works kept Richmond's state press quite busy, spending more than \$40 million in sup-

port of railways, though part of this sum was for direct construction.⁷⁶ South Carolina directly hypothecated \$4.7 million by 1861 and bought another \$4.5 million.⁷⁷ North Carolina slightly topped that with a \$10 million commitment.⁷⁸

Southern railway promotion through state hypothecation had two important features. First, and this may have been unintentional, it made British investment in southern railways invisible to most people. When we look at securities traded in London, only the largest northern railway lines are immediately visible.⁷⁹ This may be why historians have asserted that British investment in southern railways was negligible.⁸⁰ But southern stocks were of course disguised by their state hypothecation. If we count southern state bonds, southern railroad investors were thick in England, and scattered about in Germany and Holland. In fact, although European investment periodicals discussed northern railroad securities at length, foreign investors favored state securities, which they considered safer investments. While European and English investors held only a quarter of U.S. railway bonds in 1853, they stockpiled anywhere from 38 to as much as 59 percent of state bonds.⁸¹

Here was one of the pivots of Hammond's complaint, and why he considered these railways to be abominations: hypothecation made for a peculiar relationship between English investors, southern states, and railways. Southern states were the entrepreneurs in this situation. They offered a fixed rate of return (with a bond) and took in exchange a risky financial instrument (a stock). The state had voting rights on the railways it hypothecated and was thus the risk taker. *It* gambled that the railway would succeed, having borrowed at a fixed rate. The state mortgaged its name, its future as a state, ultimately, to English investors. These foreign investors had no voting power, only the substantial capital that allowed the state to take risks. British capital relied upon state entrepreneurship which in turn relied upon the railway to make its fortune. Following this reckless script, antebellum southern railway systems emerged from the ebb and flow of staple prices into the full flourish of construction, funding, and debt.

But who held the strings? Railroad promoters had discovered that eastern slaveholders would take railroad stock in exchange for their slaves' labor. They learned, too, that states and cities would trade their future revenue for the chance to support (and manage) railroad systems. But monetary support could not fix the rigidities of a plantation economy. Slave laborers and southern bonds could work wonders, but they could not boost the demand for

commodities or even out staple prices. More important, southern planters and southern states constrained the growing power of southern railroads. The Iron Confederacy of rails that promoters hoped to build proved a rather pale and sickly abomination after all.

Large landowners were perhaps the most important characters to restrain the reach of southern railroad systems, stalling the formation of interstate systems.⁸² On the Richmond & Danville system, for instance, the state of Virginia allowed local landowners in the southeastern part of Virginia to give vent to their distrust of the railroad. Southsiders had long profited by carrying North Carolina's trade by stage and opposed a railroad that would bypass them. When state assessors condemned portions of their land for rail lines, they estimated the price at sums which Tunstall said wryly "would not be valued at more . . . if condemned for a graveyard." The assessors hinted to Tunstall that his difficulties would end if he chartered the route in an east-west direction, and left regional trade in the hands of the older trading families.⁸³ In North Carolina, the road fared even worse. When the R&D asked for a "bare" (unfunded) charter to pass a rail line through the center of the state, eastern planters choked the bill on the floor of the General Assembly.⁸⁴

Indeed, Hammond may have criticized the railway mania in South Carolina because of his own vested interests. It is likely that he chose to write the articles anonymously because the South Carolina Railroad had devalued his land along the Savannah River. Before the railroad came, Hammond wrote, "Sixteen or eighteen steamboats once plied on the Savannah River, greatly to the convenience and advantage of those whose property was situated there." But in 1833 the SCRR began to sap the trade of the river, and "[l]ands and houses have been depreciated, industries checked, and many honest citizens deprived in a measure of their livelihood."⁸⁵ In South Carolina, a different coalition of antirailroad planters and the SCRR itself stifled further development of competing railroads in the state.⁸⁶

In Georgia, too, the hostility to new interstate railroads came from railroads and vested interests already on the ground. A naive Jonathan Norcross chartered a railroad from Atlanta north and east to the South Carolina border called the Southern Railroad Company. Lobbyists for the Georgia Central decided to support the unlikely railroad (which connected to no river port or existing railroad) as a way of killing a third railroad that threatened to siphon off Georgia Central traffic. The Georgia Central lobbyists asserted that Norcross's proposed road made the third railroad unnecessary. When

the third railroad failed, the Georgia Central turned its attention to destroying Norcross's project as well.⁸⁷

Hostility to new trading patterns was common among merchants and farmers everywhere, but in Philadelphia and Baltimore, for instance, merchants fought each other by building railroads rather than by gutting competing projects.⁸⁸ Northeastern railroad battles, however haphazard and costly, etched a railroad grid across much of New England and the middle states.⁸⁹ Southern railroads continued to rely on southern states as principals. The future of southern railroads thus lived and died in state legislatures, but this dependence tended to shorten the reach of railroads.

State legislators, naturally enough, served state interests when they funded construction. They were not ignorant of the possibilities of an interstate railway network; they were positively averse to it. Indeed, many legislators saw other states' railroads much the way farmers viewed foxes, as unwanted invaders. Virginia merchants were jealous of the Erie system, which had siphoned off trade from the Ohio and the northern part of the Mississippi River. The southern commercial promoter De Bow quoted a respected civil engineer who was worried that these northern railroads would siphon Mississippi River traffic and spoil New Orleans's status as a port city. "New Orleans," he said in 1852, "is sleeping in purple pomp, with the deadly aspic at her bosom." Such pleadings were somewhat belated by 1852. Virginia capitalists with state funding had already resolved to breed an aspic of their own to pull the traffic from eastern Tennessee and northern Alabama.⁹⁰

After Virginia capitalists threatened to build feeder lines into central (piedmont) North Carolina in the 1840s, that state started a rail network that paralleled but never touched Virginia's proposed east-west system. Otherwise, felt the eastern legislators of North Carolina, piedmont growers would ship their goods northward through Virginia, making their state embarrassed, in "bondage" to other states.⁹¹ North Carolina merchants who wanted to ship through Virginia had to make their connections across state borders prudently informal, such as the line of post-coaches that ran from Greensboro to Virginia's Danville.⁹²

North Carolina's chief model for state building by railroad was Georgia, which had earlier sought to protect its unsuspecting upcountry and piedmont farmers from the "foreign" incursions of South Carolina railroads in the 1830s.⁹³ Thankfully, Georgia built a rail system that sent traffic on a long, patriotic sojourn south and east to Georgia ports.⁹⁴ In Alabama and Missis-

sippi, more north-south track was laid to connect lines in the first three years of the Civil War (to support the Confederate military) than in the previous two decades.⁹⁵

Thus while state railroad projects abounded after 1848, the most potentially valuable interstate systems floundered. The Memphis and Charleston had serious difficulties funding construction from the start, finding that few cities, besides the expectant Memphis, and no states would provide bonds to buy the company's stock. Interstate systems in southern states also ran aground on the shoals of competing states. The Memphis & Charleston stalled in part because Mississippi, with a nascent railway system along the Mississippi River, delayed granting a right-of-way.⁹⁶ The ill-fated Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston faced stout opposition from legislators in Kentucky.⁹⁷ The Richmond & Danville dispensed with opposition in Virginia's state legislature only after a bitter battle. Western legislators called the railroad "Tunstall's folly," and feared that it would interfere with their plans for a canal to the Ohio River.⁹⁸

Thus for railroad promoters in the Southeast, east-west traffic that stayed within a single state's lines proved profitable and politic. Successful southern entrepreneurs were those who made peace with established planters, merchants and legislatures and limited their ambitions to helping producers get staples to their markets. Tunstall fussed about the state impediments to his Richmond & Danville, which headed west and south from Richmond. Patriotic east-west railroads got millions of dollars pledged to them "while we stagger beneath the weight of *one hundred thousand*."⁹⁹

Besides preventing citizens from trading outside their borders, legislators also used railroads to build political alliances within state borders. In both North Carolina and Georgia, legislators hoped that improved commerce and mutual dependence would bring political upstarts in the intractable upcountry and the piedmont back into the fold. "It behooves us," warned the Whigish *Wilmington Journal*, "to keep both eyes and ears open, if we would, in *fact* be a state and not a mere strip of land."¹⁰⁰ The threat was that railroads would hinder state power and engender other allegiances, local and national. Likewise in Virginia, from 1849 until the Civil War, Democratic candidates for governor understood that their success with western voters depended on constant infusions of capital into railroad lines that led West.¹⁰¹

Thus while Hammond feared that railroads would ravish states, both parties traded intimacies with equal abandon. Many southern states used railroads to extend and reinforce staple-based traffic and to foster statewide

political allegiances. As Hammond suggested, most southerners dropped their commitment to laissez-faire economics when they arrived at the state house. Southern Democrats disliked *federal* investment in internal improvements because they feared federal intervention in slavery. But at the state level, southern states hypothecated themselves into entrepreneurs and supported railroads with generous subsidies. State investment and control nurtured southern railroads, but it also prevented the emergence of a common railroad corridor to bind the states together. As east-west trading patterns predominated, merchants in port towns of Richmond, Petersburg, Wilmington, Charleston, Augusta, and Savannah further entrenched themselves. When consolidation came later, grass would grow on their streets.

If railroads were intimate with states, they also drew closer to certain planters. In trading railroad stock for the work of slaves, planters found themselves increasingly drawn to the possibilities of control over regional markets. As slaves laid the tracks that stitched states together, planters became stockholders, directors, even railway presidents. After slavery ended, the planter-stockholders seduced by railroad schemes discovered that their dalliance in railroads furnished them with power to reshape the regional economy.

In the end, these hybrid institutions were probably never as effective as railways elsewhere. Slavery prevented a two-way stream of railway traffic, and southern railways' reliance on states ironically constrained their ability to bind southern states together. In a sense, Hammond's warning came too soon. For the problems of state indebtedness, and the growing power of railroad corporations, were decades ahead. An Iron Confederacy was only in its infancy, and it awaited a Civil War and Reconstruction to bring abomination to life.

CHAPTER TWO

The Confederacy Serves the South(ern)

The South,” or “the southland” or “southern states,” were understandable abstractions before the Civil War, often used by railway promoters in construction projects that were “nearly complete.” Promoters saw the “South” as a region that could be bound together by railroads, and given access to the West. In 1837 the chairman of the Knoxville Convention wrote that the ill-fated Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston would “break down the mountain barriers which now separate two entire sections of our common country, making the inhabitants of those regions almost strangers and aliens to each other; to lay open the great west to the commerce of the South; connect the western waters and their tributary streams . . . to mould into one common Brotherhood the now estranged and alienated inhabitants of our widely extended republic.”¹ The message was nationalistic, but the referents were southern. “South” was capitalized and discrete, while “west” was lowercase and (it was hoped) “tributary.” Every southern commercial convention in the 1840s and 1850s promised a southern railway system that could match the territorial ambitions of the Baltimore and Ohio or the massive Pennsylvania.²

But as late as 1861, such a “common Brotherhood” still seemed out of reach. The ambitious Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston had foundered before it got out of South Carolina in 1840. The Western & Atlantic went as far west as Chattanooga in 1850, while the “Atlantic” part of the name was fulfilled when Marthasville obligingly changed its name to Atlanta.³ Most lines were small, parallel connections to ports. Railroad lines that did con-

nect, in Richmond or Atlanta, were often separated by four or five downtown blocks or by lines of a different gauge.⁴

The merchants who used this railway system prevented further consolidation and stalled the formation of a southern region. Well into the 1850s, southern railroads were largely adjuncts to canals, rivers, and sailing ships. Legislators wrote charters that prevented railroad officers from forwarding goods to other railroads or steamships. Many charters allowed city councils to define where railroads had right of way and thus allowed town merchants to choose the location of railroad junctions and company wharves. These charter restrictions ensured that gaps between railroads were large enough for merchants to take advantage of breaks in transit.⁵ Forwarding agents, commission merchants, and omnibus drivers stood between planters and northern merchandisers. They provided planters with long-term credit, but their unique position in the transport net made them nearly indispensable. In part this was because much of the initial funding for southern railroads came from seaport or river cities, their merchants, and a small group of lawyers and planter families in the countryside.⁶

Inland cities owed their existence to this dispersed and ungainly system of trade. Breaks in transit ensured that such cities would be the processing centers for upcountry products. Thus every year between September and April, planters in central Georgia sent their cotton over the Georgia Central Railroad to Savannah commission merchants called factors. As agents for cotton planters, factors had the cotton pressed and stored in Savannah warehouses, where it waited for the best prices. In the off-season for cotton sales, wheat—nearly 13,000 tons of it in 1855—would make the same journey from Macon to Savannah. Savannah millers provided flour for merchants to sell in regional markets.⁷ Likewise Virginia and Carolina tobacco was sold in the auction houses of Danville. Manufacturers in Danville boxed tobacco for shipment to Richmond where merchants would then reship to Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, and northern cities. In the off-season, winter wheat rolled into Richmond manufactories to be re-exported by ship to South America and the Caribbean.⁸

Because southern railroads relied so heavily on individual states, a “South” simply did not cohere before the Civil War. The railroad system that laid over it was designed to carry people or goods from upland cities to the nearest coast or river port in their state. To travel from one city to another within the South often required considerable ingenuity, particularly for the railroad’s less distinguished customers. In 1862, when railroad engineer J. J.

Thomas wrote for his wife Francis and son to come from Cass County, Georgia, through Atlanta to visit him north of Mobile, his directions had to be quite explicit:

When you start take the Train [from Atlanta] and go to *Rome*, and the *stage* to *Jacksonville* [Ala.] or to the *Alabama and Tennessee River Rail Road*. And then take the Cars from there to *Selma* and then take Cars from there to *Demopolas* [sic] and then take Boat there to *McDowels Landing* which is only fore [sic] miles and then take the Cars from there to *Bennetts Stations*. You leave *Rome* the first Tuesday after the fifteenth and I will try and meat [sic] you at *Demopolis*. If you leave *Rome* on Tuesday you will get to *Demopolis* on Thursday if you miss no connection.

Frances missed her first connection in Atlanta.⁹

For the nonperishable staples of the southern states, the haphazard-looking and independently managed lines of track were acceptable. Cotton did not care if it traveled by bateaux or boxcar or some promiscuous combination of the two. Nobody much cared until war came. To Confederate generals, set on drawing defensible peripheries with internal lines of supply, the southern transportation network was a nightmare. Suddenly the “common Brotherhood” built on iron rails was sorely missed. The James, the Savannah, the Chattahoochee, and Mississippi Rivers, with the little gashes of rail lines that reached them here and there, made it easy to enter the South from nearly any point. “There are so many points to attack, and so little means to meet them on water,” wrote Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, “that there is but little rest.”¹⁰ Without an interstate web of railways, Lee could not maintain internal supply lines except with coaches and wagons. As the war progressed, quartermasters had to order Atlanta beef weeks in advance and wait for the cars to make a long, slow trek across rail lines of different gauge. Breaks within cities meant that teamsters or boatmen had to load and unload many times. Stops were frequent; as late as 1863, most Georgia roads stopped freight travel on Sundays.¹¹

It should not be surprising, then, that the Confederacy—in defending what it called state autonomy—proved to be the most important force in making interstate railroad traffic possible. The Confederacy, in seeking the political independence of slave states during the war, made them economically dependent on one another after it. During the war, there was hardly a “South” to speak of: Lee’s army seldom moved out of Virginia; each state claimed the right to decide who would fight and who would stay behind; the

Confederate Congress could hardly agree on the articles in the Confederate Constitution or the colors in the flag. Yet by the end of the war, an interstate railway tied together the states of the Southeast.

The very disunity of the new Confederacy explains in part the lack of coherent railway policy in the first two years of the war and the radicalism of the remaining years. The War Department scrambled to make up for lost time. In attempting to create a defensible “South,” activism bounced from one branch of government to another. The Confederate Congress helped charter, and then the War Department helped build, three important links between inland state railroads, partly by uprooting smaller, weaker lines. The new Confederacy also patronized and strengthened a new organization that would make use of it—the Southern Express Company. These railway connections would be vital in making possible the interstate railroad systems later known as air lines. And just as the border between corporation and Confederate state became blurred as the war progressed, so also would the reaches of this growth, this inchoate railway system, define a “South” long after the Confederacy that conceived it had perished.

The most important governmental agencies in this story are the War Department, formed under the executive branch, and the Confederate Congress. The War Department operated under the war powers provision of the Confederate constitution, while Congress controlled railways as they touched on issues of interstate commerce. In the first few years of war, both agencies operated under the peculiar constraints of wartime mobilization and their notions of the meaning of the Confederacy. Though the need for a southeastern railway system presented itself early, and though leaving the roads under local control created even more problems, both branches opposed centralized control. This created tremendous problems for the War Department. By the middle of 1862, the War Department would begin to build a railway network with Confederate-controlled men and materials.

The decision to locate the capital of the Confederacy in Richmond, whatever its strategic advantages, placed great demands on the newly created offices of the quartermaster-general and commissary-general. Both offices reported to the secretary of war, and the frequent criticism of their performance would turn this secretariat into a revolving door as the war progressed.¹² The commissary-general could purchase food from all over the southern states, but resources dictated that his central source of supply would be the states of Georgia and Tennessee. Before the losses in Nashville, Huntsville, and Shiloh in early 1862, most beef and pork came from Ten-

nessee.¹³ Thereafter, Georgia would be the only reliable source of food. Lee's army and the Confederate capital were both in Virginia, but less than 20 percent of the goods required could be bought within that state's borders.¹⁴ Moving goods over long distances was a harsh necessity if Richmond were to be the capital of the Confederacy. The quartermaster-general faced a similar predicament. Responsible for everything the army needed besides weapons and food, he would also need constant trade with Georgia and the West for everything from horses to tents and blankets.¹⁵

Two serviceable routes ran in the direction of Atlanta from Richmond, but neither one was suited to protracted war. The eastern or coastal route, which crossed over seven different rail lines and numerous transfers, was too easy a prey for attack by Union gunboats and troop ships. The other route was west of the Appalachians, which would have served well had the Confederacy been popular in the hill and mountain country. But as they quickly learned, officers with gray uniforms on railway cars made ready targets for upcountry snipers. Confederate troops had to be posted along the mountain counties in Tennessee to overcome this "spirit of Lincolnism" there. Even worse, Unionists removed rails to stall Confederate troop movements.¹⁶

As a matter of necessity, Confederate officers soon took a personal interest in building a rail supply line that would cross through the southern piedmont. This hilly region between the Appalachian Mountains and the coast could form the backbone that Richmond needed to get supplies out of Georgia and the Southeast. Without it, the Confederacy might not succeed. Robert E. Lee, in reporting on his difficulty assembling an army in 1861, stated that "[t]he assembly of men . . . was not the most difficult operation," but that transportation problems were the most vexing.¹⁷ To some political leaders, an inland rail network was just the tonic for the nascent ambitions of a southern Confederacy. An interstate piedmont railroad, said Jefferson Davis in his inaugural speech, "would give us a through route from North to South in the interior of the Confederate States, and give us access to a population and to military resources from which we are now in great measure debarred."¹⁸

But confederacies are not built in a day. In the same month that Davis read his speech, the Provisional Confederate Congress was drafting a new constitution. While the provisional constitution had been drafted as a minor revision of the U.S. Constitution, South Carolina and Florida legislators in particular aimed to make the official document a radical proclamation of "state's rights." After removing all suggestions that the central government

had inherent powers, they went on to pluck powers from Congress. The Confederate Congress had the power to “regulate commerce” of course, but

neither this, nor any other clause contained in the Constitution, shall ever be construed to delegate the power to Congress to appropriate money for any internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce; except for the purpose of furnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and other aids to navigation upon the coasts, and the improvement of harbors and the removing of obstructions in river navigation.¹⁹

This was not laissez-faire economics. South Carolina and Florida spent millions supporting rail facilities. It was simply a restatement of federalistic principle: railroads were state instruments for state development of state resources. Not only was the president denied the power to build railroads, the Confederate Congress explicitly denied the power to itself. Only under the war powers provision (preserved in this constitution) could the president act. The rather touchy demand to move forward on internal improvements would require an ingenious broadening of the war powers of the president.

So the quartermaster-general and the commissary-general faced not just emotional opposition to centralization but a constitutional barrier against the construction of the most rudimentary regional transportation system. The hyphenated generals of the War Department carried on through 1861 in trying to create a South, even if facilities to transport new goods were not fully in place. Construction proceeded on new mines and smelters in Alabama, salt mines in western Virginia and Georgia, and rerolling mills for iron in Atlanta, all under the relatively broad authority of the War Powers Act.²⁰ The following year the cracks in the “state’s rights” opposition appeared. A committee appointed by the Provisional Congress to examine the Confederacy’s “failure” to invade Washington after its victory at First Manassas concluded that “every legitimate means should be used to increase the capacity” of the railroad transportation division. “Great delay, inconvenience, and expense is caused by the numerous unconnected tracks,” wrote the committee. If these tracks were “joined by links, short in distance, [it] would not only increase the facilities for transportation and the capacity of the roads, but would save much time, labor, and expense in transferring troops and freight.”²¹ Changes in the script seemed in the offing, and Act 1 had barely started.

The effect of unjoined links was recognized throughout the army, but

most of all in the provisioning departments. There were roundabout routes to get goods from supply centers in Georgia and Alabama to Virginia, but the large shipments of troops and material required by the Army of Northern Virginia quickly overburdened local connections. Commissary-General Lucius B. Northrop complained frequently of his inability to “provide for the wants of General Lee’s Army.” Carloads of meat, corn, and bread from the Southwest rotted at inland junctions like Gaston and Raleigh in North Carolina.²² The frequent shortages of food on the front made Northrop “the most cussed and vilified man in the Confederacy.”²³

The slowness of these links led senior officers in the field to bypass the War Department and take matters into their own hands. If carloads on their way to Lee from Georgia were delayed more than a few days, they were often sidetracked and commandeered by armies in other theaters, their cars made into private storehouses.²⁴ In one spectacular instance in 1863, nearly ninety thousand bushels (about thirty-six carloads) of corn disappeared between Columbia, South Carolina, and Richmond.²⁵ This sidetracking of provisions made the roads even less efficient, because fewer cars were left to do the remaining work.

The diminished rolling stock, compounded with shortages of materials to repair them, made the lines increasingly unstable and dangerous. Local railroad companies, unwilling to pool supplies or exchange cars, quickly collapsed. In 1861 and 1862, locomotive breakdowns were frequent, usually because of broken wheels or engines.²⁶ With little or no coordination between the independently run locomotives of separate lines, a breakdown might be shortly followed by a violent accident. Nearly every month in 1861 and 1862 saw a violent collision on the roads in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, usually precipitated by a late train.²⁷ As few southern railroads possessed telegraphs for operations along the line, or even reliable automatic signals, engineers often had to guess if an engine due from the opposite direction was safely sidetracked or just delayed.²⁸

By the end of 1861, the importance of an efficient, centrally controlled railway network was recognized in the corridors of power in both Union and Confederate armies. But unlike Confederate operations, northern armies would centralize operations under private railway directors. In January 1862 the federal Congress gave President Lincoln the authority to manage any railroad he saw fit when “public safety” was at issue. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton mostly used this authority as a threat to persuade railroad directors to give him broad powers over the order of shipments. Administration,



Railway workers ditching and filling track near Murfreesboro, Tennessee, after the battle of Stone's River, January 1863. Black workers who repaired and rebuilt track for the Union army were called "Pioneers." (courtesy Library of Congress)

planning, and transport were left largely in their hands. However, in regions taken over from the Confederacy, the secretary gave himself very broad powers. In February he created the U.S. Military Rail Roads, which centrally controlled all captured railroad facilities.²⁹

This quasi-public railway organization was critical to the support of Union troops. Herman Haupt, formerly of the Pennsylvania Railroad, acted as its regional coordinator. He remained untitled and uncommissioned, though he detailed workers and newly freed slaves in the rebuilding of a vast array of war-damaged lines. But construction was not his only responsibility. Haupt set through schedules for all the trains that could be countermanded only by direct orders from a brigadier general.³⁰

The Confederacy, however, lacked the faith in directors to pursue Lincoln's course in nonmilitary zones and lacked the unity of purpose to pursue Lincoln's course on the battlefield. Centralized control, suggested as early as the winter of 1861, was rejected by those who would seem to benefit the most from it. The first quartermaster-general, A. C. Myers, opposed military possession, arguing that the "officers and employes of said roads would promptly resign" and leave the army with less transport resources than they had.³¹ The Richmond quartermaster agreed that government interference in railroads was dangerous. "It is not at all unusual," he said, "for persons to suppose that they can manage railroads with much more ability than those who have them in charge."³² This opposition to control by leading figures in the Quartermaster's Department seems peculiar, but it may have been the smarter move politically. Northrup, the commissary-general, complained more frequently about railway problems and tried to use shared railway facilities to undercut profiteering. When he fought with farmers in northern Virginia over wheat prices, he reportedly pointed to the flour mills in Richmond and said, "Here are my magazines; I will bring those gentlemen to terms."³³ As economic policy, hoarding grain to lower prices may have been sound, but it aroused state officials and railway directors alike because it used central powers to introduce competition among the merchants of southern states.³⁴

The Union's Secretary of War Stanton used voluntary compliance, but with the threat of federal force behind it; the Confederate War Department was relatively powerless. The Confederate Railroad Bureau (a part of the quartermaster-general's office) could make requests of railroads only for the provision of cars and spare track for redeployment to other lines.³⁵ William Wadley, appointed assistant adjutant-general and supervisor of transportation, called a meeting of railroad directors across the South in December 1862. He asked them to arrange through schedules and make agreements for the interchange of freight cars. Instead, they took advantage of the occasion to agree to jointly raise the price of freight.³⁶ Wadley, himself a railroad director, was finally so exasperated by the intransigence of southern directors that he recommended that the secretary of war centralize control of the railroads. His chief aim was less coordinating than drafting: he wanted to use the military to impress rolling stock for reapportionment to the central lines.³⁷

But Wadley's enemies were not just quartermasters and railroad directors. When Wadley finally got the support of the Congress to create an agency that could direct roads and seize engines, the Senate Military Affairs Committee

removed him from the position and replaced him with a director whose attachment to “state’s rights” would keep him from enforcing those powers.³⁸ Wadley even lacked the support of the chief executive. The head of the Bureau of War wrote in his diary that his boss, Secretary of War James Seddon, had taken the unique step of drafting a bill for the Confederate Congress that would place railroads under the strict governmental supervision of the quartermaster-general. He complained that Seddon had spent considerable effort trying to allay Davis’s constitutional objections to the bill, but the president was nevertheless sure to weaken it considerably.³⁹

Most Confederate officials were unwilling to view railroads as resources, viewing them instead as either state entities or independent companies. But the problem may have been a deeper one, having to do with the nature of the Confederacy itself. The Confederacy’s professed argument against the federal government was that it asserted powers that it did not have: dictating how territories came into the Union and determining the status of bound slaves when they crossed state lines. In contrast, the Confederacy claimed to be a union of states only. To interfere with states or their principal organs—railroads—was akin to treason against the confederacy of states. The dilemma was best stated by Jefferson Davis himself in his message to Congress in December 1863 in which he criticized a Confederate judge in Virginia for asserting that the Confederacy had absolute power.

This war was commenced to maintain State rights; it has been prosecuted to perpetuate them; but this decision overthrows the noble doctrine. . . . If this opinion be right, and be acted upon hereafter, then our whole railroad system may at any moment be set aside; the lines established by the State be torn up; the rails taken to build other roads in or out of the State; the faith of the State plighted to corporations violated without redress; the State’s own interest in the roads disregarded . . . any system [may] be established to make one State tributary to another.⁴⁰

While the Union army introduced centralized organization in railroad distribution, reconstruction (in war zones), and maintenance, the Confederacy was hamstrung by this image of itself as a union of states.

This dilemma explains in part the peculiar course of congressional and War Department activism in which the Congress acted first and the War Department second. Rather than providing powers to the executive, the Congress resorted to charters and grants of funds to railroads to expand certain facilities in 1861 and 1862. No activities were centrally managed. But

by the middle of 1862, the commissary- and quartermaster-generals were stymied. With the losses of their large reserves near Nashville and of the east-west railway link at Corinth, Mississippi, they faced collapse.⁴¹ Secretary of War George Wythe Randolph—appointed in March of 1862—inaugurated the policy of using soldiers and drafted slaves to build the railway network that Congress had hoped railway leaders would build alone. The men Randolph appointed in the War Department, an elite group of cosmopolitan and highly educated professionals, inaugurated the policy of subsidy and support for a southern railway network, which they slipped by the defenders of state's rights in the Confederate government.⁴²

Because there was no effective inland route from the cornfields of the old southwest to the battlefields of the southeast, the Confederacy constructed the route out of the fragments of railroads nearby. The inland borders between Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and between northern Georgia and Alabama, proved the weakest links. Congress chartered or subsidized three new corporations. It gave each the legal and financial support of the War Department, and used the rationale of military necessity to surmount the opposition of individual states.

The road from Richmond south through North Carolina received highest priority. In November 1861, Davis asked the Confederate Congress for the authority to build proper connections between the two states.⁴³ He was initially turned down, but the idea had its supporters. The Richmond & Danville, for instance, with headquarters in Richmond, had wanted a line into North Carolina since the 1850s. Beginning the day the Confederate capital moved to Richmond, the president of the Richmond & Danville began conferring with the secretary of war and the commissary-general about “systematising the transportation over all the railroad lines within [the Confederacy's] limits.”⁴⁴ When Davis tried again in February, Congress relented. It appropriated \$1 million in Confederate bonds to aid construction of a new entity—the Piedmont Railroad—from Danville, Virginia, to Greensboro, North Carolina.⁴⁵ The irony of a Confederacy founded on the notion of state's rights supporting corporations that crossed state lines was not lost on the *Charleston Mercury*'s correspondent in Richmond, who closely watched changes that might harm Charleston interests.

Only the exigencies of war can justify a departure from the established principle of our Government, which distinctly repudiates the class legislation of the old system [the federal government]. From all I can gather,

there is a disposition in Congress to yield to the imperious necessity of military requirements, but to yield no more than is necessary, and to guard against precedents.⁴⁶

The executive and the War Department took up the mantle laid before the feet of railway directors. Over the next two months Richmond pressured the North Carolina state convention into approving Virginia's railroad charter, as North Carolina had to approve any line that went through its own state.⁴⁷ And Davis's government did not need to act alone. The R&D was in a position to take advantage of the Confederacy's delicate political situation as an indirect promoter of internal improvements. The R&D officially purchased the stock in the Piedmont and hired the contractors itself. It paid contractors with the Confederate bonds that Congress had appropriated and left a million dollars in its own bonds for the use of the Confederate Treasury. Some time afterward, the Confederate bonds were returned to the government and R&D bonds were given to the contractors. This transfer may have taken place after the war to disguise the Confederacy's construction of the road, and thus prevent the U.S. government from impounding the railroad. In any event, this complicated procedure allowed the provisionally independent Piedmont Railroad to become a wholly owned part of the R&D. By 1865, the commissary-general referred to the two lines as the Danville & Piedmont Railroad.⁴⁸

But bullying a proposal through a state legislature did not in itself get a railroad built. A supply of iron was the most immediate problem. Though iron rails made up less than 25 percent of the cost of a railroad in the 1850s, they were manufactured nowhere in the South.⁴⁹ With the Union blockade of southern ports, bulky items like railroad iron were no longer available from Britain. There were small stockpiles of iron, but they were often owned by the better-paying, more powerful railroad lines.⁵⁰ Rather than interfere with functioning railways, the War Department impressed iron from those railways that blockade or occupation had rendered unworkable and thus bypassed opposition in the Congress.

The War Department used navy requisitions to mislead the Congress and the public about the use of railway supplies. In its addendum to the "inter-state commerce" clause of the Constitution, Congress had shown its affection for its own ports by preventing support of internal improvements, except the improvement of harbors and rivers. Water commerce was sacred to southern merchants. Any extra effort expended by the War Department

on waterways would be greeted by the Confederate Congress like an invitation to a barbecue. To the public, waterways suggested support for commercial sailors who ran Union blockades to bring food and weapons back to the Confederacy.

Thus in January 1863, Secretary of War Seddon issued a special order authorizing three men—William Wadley, the chief of the Niter and Mining Bureau, and a naval officer—to take iron from railroads that provided services nonessential to the war and forward it for use in building ironclads. Any excess iron that ended up near a railroad might be turned out for their purposes as well.⁵¹ Railroads in Florida and eastern Virginia were quickly impounded and cannibalized for the core roads of the Confederacy.⁵² The policy worked at first, though state supreme courts quickly limited the application of these measures.⁵³ Before the end of the war, Jefferson Davis had personally written to those governors who protested the tearing up of their states' smaller, less central lines.⁵⁴

The navy, of course, got rather short shrift in the process of reclaiming iron. The Niter and Mining Bureau, which got the iron from the older railroads, was part of the Confederate army, and the navy had to fight hard to get any iron at all. Despite the secretary of the navy's frequent telegrams of complaint to the secretary of war and to Jefferson Davis, the navy got very little iron from the arrangement.⁵⁵ Thus by February 1863, the locomotives, rolling stock, and track iron of small railroads in central and southern Virginia were effectively "harvested" for the construction of the Piedmont Railroad.⁵⁶

While iron was difficult to acquire, the most costly part of building a railway was preparing the right-of-way. Grading, leveling, and laying crossties—dirty and deadly work done mostly by slaves in the South—comprised almost half of the cost of any construction project before the war.⁵⁷ It was here that the War Department could be the most effective. The secretary of war provided "rations, tools, horses, carts &c" at cost to speed the project along at first.⁵⁸ By 1864, after considerable criticism of the project's slowness, the quartermaster-general provided free hauling, while the Engineer Department provided axes to complete the "great work of internal improvement."⁵⁹

Of course, most of the cost of construction was labor. The Confederate army was able to provide forced labor to keep the project going. Mounted patrols were detailed to oversee the construction carried on by slave workers. The Virginia legislature used its constitutional right of impressment to draft the slaves after they had been asked to do so by the Confederate gov-

ernment. The Confederacy then directly guaranteed payment for slaves who escaped or died. The Richmond & Danville bought seventy-one slaves outright for work on the Piedmont Railroad.⁶⁰ More than eight hundred were hired from local Virginia slaveowners, with a lease of four hundred more planned in November of 1862. The secretaries of war (Randolph and later Seddon) made the project of labor recruitment a priority, repeatedly asking North Carolina's governor, Zebulon Vance, to draft slaves and mules from the surrounding region for the building of the Piedmont. They promised Vance that the risk of escape would be minimized. If slaves did get away, their owners would be fully reimbursed.⁶¹

Drafts of slave labor by the Confederacy to develop interstate railroads were not greeted everywhere with support. Vance refused to allow such a draft in his state, not because runaways—one of every three workers—were shot or maimed in recapture, but because eastern slaveowners feared that the rail route through the piedmont was part of an attempt by General Lee to abandon North Carolina's coast to the Union army. It seemed to them that Lee might be building this railway corridor as a line of retreat through the piedmont. Other North Carolinians opposed the project because they worried that it would hurt North Carolina ports.⁶² As a result of the state's intransigence, the directors had to advertise for slaves from as far away as Charleston.⁶³

But the War Department had considerable resources for building regional supply lines, even if state governors directly opposed the project. Its principal source of power was the use of military exemptions. On the North Carolina Railroad, whose western end could be fashioned into a bridge between southern Virginia and South Carolina, exemptions from conscription were granted to farmers who supplied wood and labor for the reinforcement of the line.⁶⁴ The Confederacy's delay in turning its resources toward the Iron Confederacy had its costs, however. The Confederacy had lost many engineers and machinists to army enlistment early in the war. Hundreds of shopmen had been decimated by 1862.⁶⁵ But because the Confederate draft of that year exempted hundreds of railroad laborers, the condition of the roadbeds could be greatly improved. When heavy war traffic wore out railway sections between the fall of 1862 and the spring of 1863, the quartermaster-general called in "liberal details" of soldiers to build up the road.⁶⁶ In addition, the War Department allowed the core lines to draft slaves to monitor the road to the extent of "one man per mile."⁶⁷ By the close of the war the condition of the road was deemed excellent by the railroad's president, the chief engineer, and the committee of inspection.⁶⁸

South Carolina proved more receptive to the labor needs of the Confederacy, though few slaveholders may have known that railroad construction would be a crucial part of the work that drafted slaves performed. Upon receiving a special request from the Confederate government, the legislature authorized slaves to be drafted into service “for coast defense.” But the legislature left the actual place of work open, specifying only that slaves “liable to road duty” were those most fit for the work, and that slaves needed to be taken “to the [railroad] depot nearest the owner’s residence” to be detailed. Using the same constitutional dodge of disguising railroad labor drafts as naval requests, the Confederacy joined the army’s Corps of Engineers with parts of the Naval Corps. The Confederate army could thus use coastal defense drafts to acquire a mobile body of railway maintenance workers that they could then apply to the most critical supply lines on whichever roads or regions of the state they were needed.⁶⁹

The Confederacy’s need to reinforce supply lines was most skillfully exploited by William Johnston, the director of the line that connected the North Carolina Railroad to South Carolina. This was the site of the second important gap in the southern railroad system. Johnston had not been able to extend his line, the Charlotte & Columbia Railroad, south through Georgia in the 1850s, partly because of opposition from the South Carolina Railroad and some Charleston merchants and partly because contractors were slow in finding funding for the project.⁷⁰ As the war progressed and the Confederate army was forced farther south and east, Johnston found an opportunity. The secretary of war had earlier allowed him to personally exempt from fighting up to forty contractors who would apply themselves to building his road to Augusta. Each grading contractor had to own or bring at least twenty-five slaves to qualify for exemption. By October 1863, Johnston had assembled a force of forty contractors and nearly six hundred slaves to grade and lay track between Columbia and Augusta. In a letter of 27 December 1864 to the secretary of war, he cannily demonstrated how his interests and those of the Confederacy converged: “The occupation of Savannah by the Federals as well as Port Royal with a portion of the Savannah River, place the Charleston and Savannah as well as the South Carolina Railroads in their reach. . . . The urgent necessity of a more interior line has doubtless presented itself to your mind.” Johnston did not allow the opportunity to go by. He had already lobbied the South Carolina legislature to support his road. “The great desire of this company now is to subserve the military purposes of the Government,” Johnston concluded, “and [we] request that the War

Department would authorize the detail or exemption while at work of not exceeding sixty contractors and laborers.” Johnston also asked for more of the slaves detailed to coast defense, for reduced government rates on transportation of supplies, and for the iron of the Charleston & Savannah, the South Carolina Railroad and the Union & Spartanburg. After a quick review by the Engineer Bureau, the secretary of war approved the requests.⁷¹

If Johnston showed a peculiar knack for finding associations between his own interstate ambitions and those of the Confederacy, he was not alone. Johnston’s railroad was apparently closely tied to the Southern Express Company, a company that charged a premium for fast service, as it transferred its own specially marked cars over many routes in the South. This company, so closely tied to the Confederacy, would become a familiar institution in the South through the war and after.⁷²

Formed from the southern wing of the Adams Express Company, the express was a northern company that had expanded into the South in the 1850s by using steamships to send goods between New Orleans, Augusta, and Mobile. The Southern was formed as a separate organization on the day that Mr. Adams of Adams Express viewed the firing on Fort Sumter. As he watched from the Battery nearby, Adams resolved that the southern part of the company could still function under the ownership of its former southern supervisor, Henry B. Plant. Plant, though originally from New England, nevertheless quickly gained the confidence of crucial members of the Confederate Quartermaster’s Corps and the support of Jefferson Davis.⁷³ In 1862 the adjutant and inspector general ordered that all government funds were to be transmitted exclusively by the Southern Express.⁷⁴

The staff of the Confederate army and the express blurred considerably as the war progressed. Many of the “bright young men” of the express corps were eagerly sought by local conscription committees, presumably for their experience in shipping, but also, surely, for their training in the systematic practices and regulations of this profitable and popular company. One former employee went from the Southern Express to service as a regional quartermaster in the Confederacy.⁷⁵ So taxed by these drafts before it got a special dispensation from Jefferson Davis, the Southern Express found replacement employees by employing disabled soldiers. These men, taken as express agents and telegraph officers, were men “more or less seriously dismembered in the bloody war.”⁷⁶ This overlapping of personnel—express and commissary, corporation and state—continued after the war. Joseph E. Johnston, quartermaster-general of the U.S. army before the war and a field gen-

eral for the Confederacy during the war, went on to become one of the principal representatives of the Southern Express after Appomattox.⁷⁷ Others went from company to state politics, such as regional director Rufus Bullock, soon to become the Republican governor of Georgia.⁷⁸

The Southern Express Company's services were quite unique. Its workers would follow shipments given to them over the haphazardly arranged lines of the South. Special arrangements with railroads allowed them to ride in the engine car with engineers. When they arrived at the next rail station, they bargained with the superintendent of transportation over "the consist," or cars and goods selected, for the next train going out. As a result, the private shipments given to the express company arrived at a destination considerably quicker. To cement allegiances with local newspapers, and because they could spare the space, express agents brought along newspapers from other Confederate cities. This greatly sped up the spread of news of the war, a favor for which newspapers always thanked local agents.⁷⁹

The Southern Express was not without its critics, who saw it as taking the proper place of the Confederate government. The "transportation controlled by this company [the Southern Express]," wrote the Confederate commissary of subsistence, "is greatly beyond what they are legitimately entitled to."⁸⁰ Based in Augusta, and with all southern ports blocked by federal ships, the Southern Express Company haltingly traversed the unfamiliar internal lines of the dying Confederacy.⁸¹ Agents had traveled mostly by steamship before the war, but the company's reach during the war moved slowly inward along rail lines just as the Confederacy itself found western Virginia, the Mississippi River, northern Virginia, and Tennessee increasingly indefensible. The express company's official historian noted that the regional director, like the Confederacy, had to keep retreating from advancing Union troops, and "he could not (like the trolling fisherman) draw his lines after him." By 1863, the path of the Southern Express Company's agents and cars very nearly marked the paths of the southern railway systems later named the "Seaboard Inland Air Line" and the "Atlanta & Richmond Air Line." The Southern Express and the Atlanta and Richmond formed the nucleus of what would become the Southern Railway. This communication corridor for the South would last long after the imagined South of the Confederacy was surrendered.⁸²

In the final years of the war, as the Union blockade tightened, food shortages became an increasing problem. As so much of the grain and meat that supported the eastern armies came from the Southwest, a dependable south-

western route across the Appalachians became a more urgent priority. Existing routes were ill-suited to the task. Georgia, the earliest adopter of railroads, had built its lines to connect the center of the state to the coast.⁸³ No road cut the corner of the state to connect the southern piedmont with the rich fields of northern Alabama and Louisiana—none, that is, until the Confederacy began to build one. As early as 1862, Jefferson Davis asked for support in connecting Blue Mountain (in northern Alabama) with Rome, Georgia, to the east. This one line would connect Chattanooga—west of the Appalachians—and Atlanta—east of the Appalachians—with southern Alabama and western Mississippi. Armies in Tennessee and Virginia could be fed from some of the most fertile parts of the South. With a little more than a million dollars in Confederate bonds, the captain of the Confederate Corps of Engineers was authorized to make the necessary contracts to build it.⁸⁴ Rails were “harvested” from the Gainesville branch of the Alabama Great Southern Railroad. This immense project took longer than expected, and track had not been fully laid before the end of the war.⁸⁵ Still, a considerable amount of grading for the expensive mountain railroad was done, and the line was moving goods by the end of the decade.⁸⁶ Perhaps because its original builder, the Confederacy, no longer existed after the war, its status and ownership were somewhat confused. It was named the Alabama & Tennessee by railroad maps and the Selma, Rome & Dalton by legal title.⁸⁷

By 1865 the bonds and bayonets of the Confederate Congress and the War Department had worked a magic that promoters could only dream of. The very opposition to centralized control of corporate facilities meant that the Confederate government granted and built, rather than directed. Delays were inevitable, and the work was finished too late to be useful for the prosecution of war. By the end of the war, and for the first time, inland railroads bridged North Carolina with Virginia, South Carolina with Georgia, and Georgia with Alabama. City-crossing track had also been laid in Richmond, Savannah, and Charleston.⁸⁸ Few roads were in good shape, to be sure; the roads’ ballasting (dirt packed underneath rails) was uneven, and many roads had rotting ties. More serious, both advancing and retreating armies had used ingenuity and fire to tear up rail lines and tie them in knots, burn bridges and warehouses, and drive engines over embankments.⁸⁹

But the states of the Southeast, from Virginia around the Appalachians to Alabama, were within a year of full connection. A mail run from Atlanta to Richmond took more than seven days before the war and less than three days after it. Huge drafts of labor would be required to keep the lines run-

ning, but the Confederacy's forcible unification of the region had succeeded in time for surrender. Despite the constant defections of slaves, despite the opposition of southern states, the South now had a railroad backbone. The Southern Express served as its nerve center, passing capital, information, and orders back and forth between the states. The legal barriers to interstate incorporation had been surmounted, if only because chartered companies now crossed important state borders. Many physical barriers had been crossed as well. The Confederate state used labor drafts and not a little chicanery to coerce planters into yielding slaves to the work of railway construction. The Confederate state was more direct in using armed force to coerce the slaves who blasted through the rock and graded the roadbed of this Iron Confederacy. If the statistics for North Carolina are any indication, hundreds escaped, while nearly a third were killed or wounded as they left. The corporations, once they were chartered and had their lines built, could not be dissolved by reconstructed states. Taken together, this network of routes cultivated by the Confederacy may have been the rebellion's most lasting geographical and physical legacy. And in a few short years these corporations *would* be taken together by a railroad company whose painted engines would spread over the tracks of the vanished Confederate army and outlive the failing grip of its earliest patron.

CHAPTER THREE

Connections

Political Reconstruction and the Public Fiction of the Air Line, 1865–1871

Economic development is not a sort of ventriloquist with the rest of history as its dummy.—Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire* (1987)

Reconstruction raised again the question of how states related to the nation, and how southern states might rejoin the federal union. Yet because Reconstruction was economic as well as political, the Confederacy's interstate railway system remained an important, if little understood, party to the Reconstruction process. After the war, the first private institution to coordinate traffic over this system was a rather shadowy company called the Seaboard Inland Air Line.¹ As states grew weaker, this company began to reorganize railway traffic and cheapen interstate transportation. In so doing, the air line bypassed many of the merchants and landowners who had used state control over railroads to profit from local trade. In the tracks of the Iron Confederacy, another kind of South was in the making.

The diminution of the power of southern states was not a foregone conclusion. In deciding what to do with the states that had seceded, three positions on reconstruction emerged; each compared states to persons. Andrew Johnson and many Democrats compared the Confederate states to chastened adults. States had foolishly seceded, but they were still sovereign. “The States attempting to secede,” wrote Andrew Johnson in his annual message, “placed themselves in a condition where their vitality was impaired, but not extinguished—their functions suspended, but not destroyed.”²

Reconstruction should thus be a kind of extended bed rest for southern states. Under Johnson's plan, the president would appoint a provisional governor who would determine which state citizens had recovered from their addling illness. These state citizens would take loyalty oaths and then choose delegates for a state constitutional convention. The state delegates would then repudiate secession, draw up a new constitution, and petition to be readmitted to the Union. Reconstruction of states meant a simple recuperation of powers.³

Moderate and many Radical Republicans considered states as prodigal teenagers: untrustworthy, in need of reform, but still separate and fully formed. George Julian of the Radicals referred to Reconstruction as a period of "probationary training," where southern states had "to prove their fitness for civil government and independent states." These states had to be thoroughly reorganized by state convention, might be expected to adopt certain measures (black suffrage for instance), and then had to be closely watched for recidivism. Moderate and Radical Republicans in this school differed upon how many conditions Congress could expect states to abide by: civil rights for freedmen, equal access to education, permanent disfranchisement of ex-Confederates.⁴

Finally, some Radical Republicans and some freed people in the South—the so-called *ex nihilo* faction in many of the state conventions—saw the state as a corpse, a person who had destroyed himself by secession, and was in need of drastic reconstruction, even resurrection. Thaddeus Stevens was this faction's most consistent proponent in Congress. He asserted that states could not try citizens for treason because the states *themselves* were treasonous. The peculiar institution of slavery had infected state institutions and made the "rebellion" possible. Such bodies could not easily recover. Their democratic traditions had been poisoned; their former leaders needed decades of learning how "to practice justice to all men, and accustom themselves to make and obey equal laws."⁵

The insight of the *ex nihilos* may have been more prescient than they knew. For if the states were poisoned, what of the institutions that states and large planters had brought into being, the iron railways of the vanished confederacy? Two corollaries flowed from the corpse theory, both of which might have proved dangerous to the growing power of a southern railway system. If the state were dead, titles and charters might be void, and thus public corporations reconstituted and private land redistributed. Freed people might take the land they had cleared and improved, and become formal

owners of this property. This was a prospect that haunted white landowners and not a few northern capitalists.⁶ Secondly, state destruction meant hundreds of millions in state debt, committed largely to railroad projects, could safely be repudiated. The *ex nihilos* consistently favored public education, and regarded antebellum railroad debts as a costly nuisance. The Radicals of this stripe were a small cohort among whites. In North Carolina, the faction was connected to the Loyal Republican League, an organization that resisted joining the more conservative Union League. They never prevailed in Congress or in southern states.⁷

In the first year after the war, during Presidential Reconstruction, President Johnson's claim of state adulthood seemed to prevail. He claimed that the Constitution gave *him* the power to reconstruct states, which were not themselves at fault for secession. A "small portion" in those states—Confederate officers, wealthy planters, and the like—had brought the war about. They could not hold state office without directly asking him for amnesty. Their claims for amnesty would be examined and forwarded at the discretion of his provisional governors. He further worried that the many southern railroads, as creatures of the state, might act as havens for these "oligarchs," allowing them to indirectly regain state power. His provisional governor in North Carolina thus mandated that the oligarchs President Johnson had excluded from voting in state elections also be excluded from voting as stockholders in any of the railroads that passed through the state.⁸

Despite his efforts to block the reemergence of large planters and secessionists, Johnson was hobbled by a thoroughgoing conservatism. His desire to prevent substantial changes in race relations or the states' sovereign powers gave him few brickbats to keep the old birds from returning to their roosts. In most states Presidential Reconstruction was hardly a reconstruction at all. Many southern conservatives cultivated the favor of Johnson's inexperienced provisional governors, and thus returned to power.⁹ Even the most independent of Johnson's provisional governors—in Texas, North Carolina, and Tennessee—were still unprepared for a thorough reconstruction. They opposed freed peoples' voting, and hoped to build their constituencies by shopping for white majorities among ex-Confederates. By the end of 1865, most of Johnson's provisional governors had given public positions to the most hardened secessionists. While some of the new state constitutions allowed direct election of judges and sought to diminish the influence of older squires, many more endorsed punitive "black codes" designed to force freed people back to plantations.¹⁰



Conflict over Reconstruction portrayed as a railroad accident. Andrew Johnson of the engine "President" is depicted here after a collision with Thaddeus Stevens of the engine "Congress." Each wants the other to step aside. (courtesy Library of Congress)

When Congress convened in March 1866, they began to question Johnson's prognosis for southern states. The Congress pointed to the black codes as evidence that rebellion was still eating at the heart of southern states. Challenging Johnson's metaphor for reconstruction, a majority of the Congress embraced the metaphor of state delinquency. After Congress delayed the seating of southern congressmen, a group of conservative and Radical Republicans joined together to claim that Congress alone had the power to reconstruct southern states. The Constitution, they asserted, gave the national government the power to "guarantee every State . . . a Republican


Form of Government.” Conservative Republican Lyman Trumbull thus moved two bills through Congress, one to extend the Freedman’s Bureau and another guaranteeing African Americans “civil rights,” a term that conservative Republicans coined to suggest all the rights of citizenship *except* the right to vote. Johnson’s veto of both bills solidified this bloc in Congress, and in March 1867, Congressional Reconstruction began.

Congressional Reconstruction threatened but never abolished state power. Under Congressional Reconstruction, the South was divided into five, multistate, military districts. Wartime agencies like the Freedman’s Bureau and the Internal Revenue Office were given expanded powers; so, too, were older federal institutions like the Treasury Department and the federal circuit court system. Labor contracts, taxes, banks and interstate commerce thus fell into a semiregulated netherworld between state and federal power.¹¹ Over time, Congress also drew up the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which reconstructed states would have to endorse in order to rejoin the Union.

Still, for all of Congress’s seeming radicalism, it never fully appreciated what arsenals of power lay buried among the several southern states. Their conception of states as individuals, as separable entities conceived by constitution, left them unprepared to cope with the dreaming confederacy that slept just beneath the surface. For the Iron Confederacy that these states had nurtured and restrained after 1848, which had expanded in the care of the Confederacy, stood ready to emerge on its own.

Congress, more than Johnson, left this railway system untouched. Congress asked no loyalty oaths of southern railway directors, and the Confederate-built connecting track was turned over to those railroad directors who claimed to be its “rightful owners.”¹² In his own way, Andrew Johnson noted the danger of ignoring railroads in his brief attempt at reconstructing the South. In his pugnacious attack on the Civil Rights Act, he wrote that if states could not determine who citizens were, then a state’s power to “distinguish . . . between artificial persons called corporations and natural persons” was also in doubt.¹³ Confusion over the nature of corporations marked the next decade, and railway directors would use it to their advantage.

While Congress took the bold decision to promise civil rights—and then suffrage—to newly freed people, it failed to legislate on the status of newly freed railroads and so missed a crucial part of reconstruction. In failing to recognize southern railroads, or by choosing to ignore them, Congress allowed the railroad systems of the South to emerge at the interstices of state



The U.S. Military Railroad Construction Corps, probably in 1863, widening an embankment on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. White workers are digging near the train. Herman Haupt, pictured in a suit on the right, stands in front of black workers who are digging higher up on the embankment. Improvements made by the U.S. Military Railroad between Norfolk and the Carolinas helped create the route that became the Seaboard Inland Air Line. In the 1870s, Haupt completed the railway corridor for Thomas A. Scott's company, the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. (courtesy Library of Congress)

and national power.¹⁴ The Seaboard Inland Air Line was one such institution, expressly designed to *escape* the notice of state legislators, lawyers, farmers, and field hands. During the first few years of Congressional Reconstruction, railroad directors A. B. Andrews and Moncure Robinson were the principal architects of one of these new corporate forms on the southeastern seaboard. They transformed an ungainly system of independent state railroads and competing commercial authorities into the Seaboard Inland Air Line, a railway system that connected the Georgia and South Carolina Black Belt to one of the largest deepwater ports in the world at Portsmouth, Virginia.

Andrews and Robinson's use of family connections, informal alliances with merchants, new technologies, and the through bill of lading joined

southern states together for the first time. As inheritors of the Confederacy's iron legacy, the Seaboard Inland Air Line helped reshape the southern economy. The air line linked tobacco in the Upper South to cotton in the Lower South and made possible a new kind of South: a unified region in which entrepreneurs could find raw materials, a market, and low-wage workers to manufacture tobacco and weave cloth out of cotton. The less visible effect of the air line was to bind the South more strongly to the rest of the country, particularly sources of capital in the Northeast. Large overland rail systems served as the locus for the development of country stores, commercial agriculture, and the system that bound them together: tenant farming. The South that these railroads reconstructed was more unified, but also more directly dependent on commercial centers in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York.

Alexander Boyd Andrews and Moncure Robinson were in the best position to see opportunities during Congressional Reconstruction. Andrews was owner of an innovative ferrying business and had political influence within North Carolina's Reconstruction legislature. More important, however, was Andrews's status among the large planters of North Carolina, his influence in the lower Piedmont, and his success in hiring black workers. Robinson had different strengths: ambition, capital, and a grasp of technologies that might redirect railroad traffic patterns. Robinson used new transport technologies and integrated railroad operations with freight-based steamboat companies. Together they built relationships between their families and a number of companies after the war, dividing among themselves the labor required to create an interstate railroad organization. Robinson handled finances. Andrews and his uncle William Hawkins mastered the politically delicate work of using family alliances to push North and South Carolina traffic toward Virginia ports. Once these alliances were forged, they then fashioned an organization that could profit from the region's economic Reconstruction.

Andrews operated a ferry across the Roanoke River immediately after the war, while also speculating in turpentine plantations on the coast.¹⁵ The ferry, an important link between North Carolina and Virginia, was in an area he knew well. His cavalry company had defended the bridge there against federal attack during the war, and the bridge was connected at the southern end to the Raleigh & Gaston Railroad, managed by his uncle. With bridge reconstruction almost a year away, Andrews bought boats used by the Rebel government for carrying forage and found an overseer and freedmen to oper-

ate the ferry. He took the unique step of allowing railroad agents for the connecting rail lines to sell “through tickets” for a combination railroad and boat shipment.¹⁶ Shippers in Raleigh could thus consign goods all the way to the Portsmouth wharf.¹⁷

Before the war, merchants at the border would have crushed Andrews’s clever attempt to bypass the inland town of Gaston, which bordered North Carolina and Virginia. Because Andrews’s combination tickets prevented Gaston merchants from forwarding or ferrying the goods across state lines, town merchants and the state-licensed ferry sued him, and then attacked him with memorials to the North Carolina General Assembly. But Andrews knew that North Carolina’s new constitution made it easier to incorporate transportation companies. He quickly formed the Roanoke Batteau Transportation Company, which limited his liability in the lawsuit. He then successfully defeated attempts to invalidate his new corporate charter.¹⁸ Once the new bridge was built over the river, Andrews became superintendent of the Raleigh & Gaston Railroad, the link between Raleigh and the massive port of Portsmouth. His ferry service was no longer necessary, but Andrews was master of the new situation.

As a member of a prominent planter family, Andrews had other assets besides quick wits. Before the war, railroad superintendents who managed the offices, repair shops, and roadbeds of southern railroads were little known in the social scene. The large landowners and lawyers of the Cameron, Holt, Mebane, Morehead, Hawkins, and Saunders families in North Carolina made appearances on boards of directors but seldom took positions on railroads that would keep them from their important work on plantations or in the statehouse.¹⁹ They left the administration of railroads to English and Irish immigrants or children of the merchant class.²⁰ Indeed, after the war, when station agents positions became vacant, most local residents assumed that the positions would go to veterans who had lost limbs in the war and thus could not farm.²¹ But Andrews was a new breed of railroad operative. As a new kind of professional, he traveled in both planter and railroad circles. His father was a merchant who died when he was eleven, but Andrews lived the remainder of his boyhood in the prominent social circle of his mother’s family. The Hawkinses were the planters who dominated Franklin County.²²

As a wounded Confederate officer, Andrews also had considerable political capital among white conservatives throughout the lower Piedmont. He often told war stories at gatherings of veterans and had them printed in local

journals like the *Confederate Veteran*, the *North Carolina University Magazine*, and *Dixie*.²³ Through the use of the family's lawyers, he also had direct influence in Raleigh, North Carolina's capital.²⁴ But his circuit of power extended much farther than the state legislature. After the war he married the daughter of William Johnston, president of both the Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad and the Columbia & Augusta Railroad. When Andrews sat at the massive dining room table of the Hawkins family estate, he could see the principal owners of a massive railway network: his father-in-law, William Johnston; his uncle William (director of the Raleigh & Gaston and a large stockholder in the North Carolina Railroad); and his aunts—all major stockholders in the Raleigh & Gaston. Together they represented a railway line that ran nearly 500 miles from Weldon, North Carolina, to Augusta, Georgia. He maintained that circuit by direct involvement in the political and economic affairs of the region for the rest of his life.²⁵

Andrews's membership in a prominent family and his regional political clout could be added to his ability to work with freed workers, a rare skill in the South after the war. In 1868, after the popular Albert Johnson left the Raleigh & Gaston for a prestigious position on the North Carolina Railroad and when Johnson's successor failed in a scheme to attract immigrant workers, Andrews stepped in.²⁶ Andrews had superintended free black workers before the war and, after the war, had made successful postwar contracts with freed people on his grandmother's plantation in Henderson, in the turpentine forests on the Carolina coast, and on his ferry across the Roanoke River.²⁷ Other southern employers, accustomed to a permanent slave force, were frustrated when freed workers left their positions for better wages, better working conditions, or simply to test the borders of freedom.²⁸ Andrews, whose investments shifted almost monthly to follow new markets, was likely more nonchalant about such movements. Still, it is hard to say exactly what Andrews's labor-hiring talents were. He may have been more tactful with workers, better at planning for labor shortages, or more able to write ironclad contracts that were unassailable by freedmen or the Freedman's Bureau.²⁹ In any case, his previous successes made him an obvious choice for reorganizing the workplace to the competing demands of capital and freed labor.³⁰ A. B. Andrews's legal, cultural, and political influence would be critical to the success of the air line in the Carolinas.³¹

Though Andrews's influence reached across the Carolinas and through northern Georgia, it stretched no farther. His patron at the Virginia end of this railroad system was Moncure Robinson, who acted through his son,

John Moncure Robinson.³² As a child, the elder Robinson had been a prodigy. He graduated from the College of William and Mary before his sixteenth birthday and then worked as a railroad surveyor in Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia in the 1820s. He was said to “cut his coat according to his cloth,” designing an inexpensive trellis bridge used throughout the United States and Europe before the Civil War. He retired to Philadelphia at the age of forty-five to devote himself to railroad investment. During the war he remained in Philadelphia while his son traveled abroad buying iron for Confederate railroad companies. His son, a Virginia railroad director before the war, saw the conflict as an opportunity to “bring things to a proper state of productiveness” by forcibly consolidating the management of eastern Virginia railroads.³³ The major stockholders in the Seaboard & Roanoke, the Robinson family had long sought a “metropolitan” line from the southern cities of Charlotte and Augusta to Baltimore.³⁴ After the war, the father and son’s immense fortune gave them a much larger cloth, from which they accordingly cut a swathe across the South. They began by greatly improving Portsmouth’s deep-water docking facilities and then tightening their hold on the steamboat companies on the coast before beginning to establish through traffic.

The Robinsons first streamlined access to the waterfront on the deep-water ports of Portsmouth and Norfolk. The two towns lay immediately west and east of the Elizabeth River near the water basin called Hampton Roads. In 1866 the Seaboard & Roanoke, with John Moncure as president, bought or leased most of the dock and wharf space owned by the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth. All the docks were a short distance from the railroad’s warehouses. On the Portsmouth side the wharf was a massive 480 feet. Probably following the design of the U.S. Military Railroads, which refashioned many Virginia wharves during occupation, the Robinsons also placed shelters over the tracks and ran the lines parallel to the waterfront, greatly shortening the distance that goods had to travel to be loaded onto ships.³⁵ For freight, father and son used new steamships, with screw propellers rather than sidewheels, and bought a steam tug, which they dedicated to ferrying freight from the wharves of Portsmouth to ships in Norfolk. Both innovations worked together: the doors of the railway cars opened directly onto the steam tug.³⁶

Purchasing steamboat lines, which directly connected to the railroads, was the next order of business. In 1866 the Robinsons moved decisively. John Moncure was appointed president of the Baltimore Steam Packet Com-

pany after the family gained majority control. In 1867 the Robinsons bought out the line's competitor, a startup firm run by the Leary Brothers, paying an unprecedented quarter of a million dollars for a single steamship. With the newer steamships acquired from Leary and with those they had bought from the U.S. Navy after the war, they devoted part of their huge fleet of steamships to the railroad's freight traffic. Never before had an American coastal steamboat company dedicated a steamboat exclusively to the freight traffic of a railroad.³⁷ Tightly integrating steamer and steam locomotive in Norfolk and Portsmouth, the Robinson family cut costs to the bone while competing railroads had to cope with rivertown merchants and antiquated riverboats.


Family bonds and political alliances were the ties that joined the Robinsons and the Hawkinses. In 1868, John Moncure and one of A. B. Andrews's uncles became incorporators of the North Carolina Iron and Steel Rail Company. This organization was chartered to buy up to fifty thousand acres of land for the mining and manufacturing of iron rails. Also brought into the group was the state-appointed Republican director of the North Carolina Railroad, William A. Smith.³⁸ Smith's support was vital for the trunk line that the Hawkinses and Robinsons sought.³⁹ In the same month as the incorporation, President Smith signed a five-year contract between the NCRR and the Raleigh & Gaston to push through freight in the direction of the Portsmouth harbor.⁴⁰

Farther south, Andrews's father-in-law, William Johnston, who had benefited so greatly from the largesse of the Confederacy before the war, was completing the southwestern part of the route by building a trunk line from Columbia, South Carolina, to Augusta, Georgia.⁴¹ He benefited from the fact that the competing line—the South Carolina Railroad—had delayed rebuilding its line into the South Carolina Piedmont until the middle of 1866.⁴² Of course, the South Carolina Railroad understood the threat that Robinson, Andrews, and Johnston posed. The South Carolina first tried using injunctions to stop Johnston's line from grabbing Augusta and Columbia traffic and sending it off to the Norfolk/Portsmouth harbors. In 1867 its anxious directors even had a steam locomotive posted across the right-of-way of Johnston's line to stop roadhands from building past Columbia.⁴³ But Johnston prevailed through court injunctions and family alliances. He first brought suit in the South Carolina courts. Then, while the case was still in court, he had the city's police convince the SCRR agent to remove the obstruction. Johnston also needed capital to keep his roadhands working quickly

while the case was being decided. He applied to more northerly railroad companies to help him in “annihilating time and distance” between the North and southern cities by using his through route rather than the South Carolina’s route through Charleston. When his daughter married Colonel Andrews, Johnston won the favor of the powerful Hawkins family.⁴⁴

Andrews stood at the center of the system. With the aid of his father-in-law’s southern line, his uncle’s capital, and his allies in the Robinsons’ port and stepline, he was able to consolidate traffic from Georgia through to Virginia. The instrument for this new kind of consolidation was a fast-freight company, called the Seaboard Inland Air Line (see Map 1). As freight manager for the air line, an organization patterned on a transportation company, but owned by railroad companies, Andrews used through bills of lading and a pool of railway cars to operate a continuous railway line over a multitude of seemingly independent railroads. Different from transportation companies in numerous ways, the air line used aggressive agencies in major cities in the Northeast but was discreet about its operations in the South. This unique structure had numerous advantages.

Andrews probably took the idea for the air line in 1865 when he located a receipt from a new organization called the Southern Transportation Company. This company shipped goods on a combination of steamboats and railway cars, sending cotton from places like western Mississippi to eastern Virginia under a single bill of lading.⁴⁵ An ordinary bill of lading is a note signed by the master of a vessel or the agent of a carrier which says that 100 bales of cotton, for example, have been received in good order and that they will be delivered at some point along the master or agent’s line. A bill of lading from a transportation company guarantees that agents will follow the goods across multiple carriers. For the year or so that it lasted, the Southern Transportation Company ran a railroad car with high-cost goods over a combination of railroads. Each railroad or steamship was paid a yearly fee to guarantee “safe carriage” of the express car or express goods—everything but corpses and milk—on passenger trains or passenger ships. The goods were accompanied by an agent. For railroads, the passenger division of the company also ran luxury passenger cars.⁴⁶ Connecting distant cities and towns by express often depended on containers of varying sizes, run over a dizzying combination of boats and railroad cars. Transport was expensive but largely invisible to sender and recipient, grower and buyer, merchant and storeowner. All of the parts of the trip were sealed by a single contract, a bill of lading, which could be traded like cash while the goods were in transit.⁴⁷



Map 1. Core Railway Lines from Atlanta to Richmond, 1868

Andrews learned the details of the organization's operations when his ferry service contracted with both the Southern Transportation Company and the Southern Express Company in the same year.⁴⁸

Transport companies had their enemies as well: mostly railroad stockholders. During the Civil War, transport companies made tremendous profits, but paid relatively little to their member railroad companies. Often transport companies paid railroad officials under the table to keep their concession.⁴⁹ When Andrews took over the superintendency of the Raleigh & Gaston, he put together the Seaboard Inland Air Line as a *railway-owned* transport company, one of the first in the South.⁵⁰ These interstate air lines were difficult to regulate, provided credits that acted as money in the credit-poor South, and greatly facilitated financial ties to wholesalers and buyers in the North.

To a shipper the only difference between an air line and the older transport companies was that air lines provided a *through* bill of lading. The Raleigh & Gaston would have given out bills of lading before the war, guaranteeing passage of goods between Raleigh and the depot in Gaston. During the war the Southern Express Company, which had previously transported expensive goods like bonds or gold over very long distances, had begun to use their agents to follow much larger quantities of goods—corn, carloads of bread, or iron bars—from railway station to railway station, making sure that no one stole them and that the goods got quickly from one line to another. They issued their own bills of lading between points that were not joined by any single railroad or steamship and then determined the cheapest and fastest route to get there. The prices were exorbitant, more than double the already high rates of the local railroads, and the goods always contained waivers like “the dangers of land and water transportation excepted.” Still, planters and governments used them, even for very bulky goods like cotton.⁵¹

The *through* bill of lading was an organizational innovation that revolutionized railway traffic in the late 1860s, and made interstate organizations like the Seaboard possible. The through bill relied first on an organizational name, like the Raleigh & Augusta Air-Line or the Seaboard Inland Air Line or the Green Line. These names were gotten usually by taking defunct railroad charters and applying to a pliant legislature to change the name and run it as a transport company. A single car or group of cars that were stenciled with the name or logo of this company would be detailed for shipments on through bills.⁵²

Railway companies turned over these cars to the air line with which they

contracted, and allowed the cars to pass through their routes. An agent of Andrews's Seaboard Inland Air Line in Charlotte would accept cotton there which was bound for New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or Boston. The agent would give the buyer or planter a note guaranteeing that the goods would arrive at a certain time and in good condition. In Charlotte once the car bound for a city was full, it would be locked and the company's logo imprinted over it with wax.⁵³

The cars often traveled differently from other freight. Rather than going with the freight engine, they traveled on the faster and more powerful through trains that carried U.S. mail or passengers, just like the express car did. At the next substantial break in traffic, either a railway junction where the line was a different gauge or a river crossing like Andrews's near Weldon, an *air line* forwarding agent would unlock the car, move the goods to a new car, reseal it, and adjust his copy of the way bills, marking when and where they had arrived. The documents and keys traveled separately by mail or express. At a junction between one company and another where the gauge was the same, the car or cars would be disconnected from the engine and reconnected to the next company's engine.⁵⁴

Internally, the air line differed from the older express companies in three ways. First, no one had to follow the freight. The local copy of the through bill of lading—called the waybill—would tell agents of the company where the goods were. If a waybill waited too long at a junction, the forwarding agent would telegraph back to the master of transportation or send someone back to report on the difficulties.⁵⁵

Second, the transport company did not exist in the traditional sense of a railway. The Seaboard Inland Air Line existed as an agreement to post forwarding agents at crucial connection points and an agreement (later a contract) to split the proceeds of the company between the individual railway companies—North Carolina Railroad, Raleigh & Gaston, Seaboard & Roanoke—based on their mileage and strategic position. Compared to the concretely *real* nature of railway companies, the transport company was a logo, a stencil, a form, and a handshake.

This very evanescence was critical in the period after the war as southern states sought to crush the radical impact of air lines. As with the lawsuits against Andrews's river-crossing business, a visible person was a fat target for cities and merchants who wanted traffic to travel the way it had before the war. Railroads were an even easier target. With a state charter and potentially hostile competitors, legal action or (worse) an injunction could be disas-

trous. Virginia legislators, who saw these changes earlier than most, mandated in 1867 that railroads were not common carriers and thus could not rent out their tonnage to other companies. They promised a \$100 fine per infraction. They also stipulated that express and fast-freight companies on Virginia railroads had to deposit \$50,000 in Virginia bonds with the state treasurer, a preemptive measure designed to stop the circulation of through bills and the creation of through lines of which the legislature did not approve.⁵⁶

The air line was thus best advised to take the part of Stoneman's Raiders and disappear into the air when conflict came. An air line could be charged for lost freight, but a *fictional* railroad company—without track or station or trains—could not be legally punished by the requirements of the old charters of the individual companies that made it up. Old companies like the Raleigh & Gaston had laws that limited the ownership of their stock outside the state and set maximum fares. These new companies were so elusive that in North Carolina it was difficult for opponents of the road to find the proper person on whom to serve a subpoena.⁵⁷ When Governor Worth of North Carolina tried to force the North Carolina Railroad's traffic to go by way of Goldsboro and out North Carolina seaports, he confessed that he could not understand who or how the railroad's freight agreement worked or what held the North Carolina in the "thrall" of the Raleigh & Gaston and the ports of Virginia.⁵⁸

The problem that the Virginia legislature had with the through bill and the transport company is a key to the third, and perhaps most interesting, feature of the air line. The through bill of lading acted as money, or more properly as a financial instrument. A through bill from a reputable company could be sold in Baltimore or Philadelphia or New York long before the goods had arrived. That is, the bill of lading was legal title to the cotton in transit. Throughout the period until at least 1900, the through bill of lading was traded as a financial instrument between planters and banks, between banks and insurance companies, between merchants and wholesalers. Just as the transport company was a *fictional* railway company, a bill of lading for cotton was *fictional* cotton, a promise of delivery at a certain date and time.⁵⁹

The waybill, or through bill of lading, and the public fiction of the air line were not just efficient devices; they were weapons that groups of railway companies used to crush competing lines and bring southern merchants to heel. They facilitated the reach of northeastern credit into the South by aggressively soliciting the business of northern wholesalers and merchants.

While it aggressively pursued customers in New York, the air line was quite discreet in the South, quietly drawing in southern merchants who were kith and kin. The people who knew and used it were thus New York wholesalers with goods to consign, northern buyers of southern staples, and families connected directly with the air line. These three parties were crucial in replacing the fractured merchant-controlled system of seaport and riverbound railroads with an air line that crossed over the heads of local merchants.

H. S. Haines, general superintendent of the tiny Atlantic & Gulf Railroad and a direct competitor to Andrews's operations, explained how the New York agencies of air lines operated. Each air line kept an agency in the commercial district of New York, which solicited through business. The agency posted bills throughout New York City advertising inexpensive rates for shipping between New York and cities along this group of railway lines. The New York agent of Haines's line was paid \$5,000 a year to solicit business for the firm, and he kept several clerks to locate freight and soliciting agents to take orders. Robinson's agent, Haines suggested darkly, was probably paid more. The agents' offices were placed in the parts of the city—on Broadway or Wall Street—closest to the wholesale merchants, insurance offices and the Custom house. Robinson's Norfolk line, for example, paid a princely \$7,000 a year in rent. Rate cards and bills were printed in New York, and "Bill Posters" were paid to post the rates in the city.⁶⁰ When asked to describe the value of the agencies to his employer, Haines wrote, "It is impossible for me to state in figures what profits have been derived from this Agency. As the through freighting business is now conducted, a New York Agency is a necessity to any line that offers for such business." The agency allowed strategic pricing: "Through the New York Agency we are kept advised of changes in through rates (which are always made in New York) and of any efforts made by rival lines to influence business by improper means. Through this Agency such efforts are promptly counterattacked."⁶¹

A proper counterattack required, according to Haines, an independent agent and an independent agency. Sharing an agency with other lines meant the possibility of one of the agent's being personally influenced by one of the competing carriers. Each line had to pay for its own New York office, with a staff to promote the business, "as long as competing lines may choose to do the same." Because even agents in private agencies had been known to accept money from competing lines to press traffic in a different direction, agents had to be "confidential" as well as "trustworthy and competent."⁶²

Solicitation expanded the reach of the air line, and so expanded the reach of capital into the center of the South. The air line's agents and bill posters attracted the familiar crowd of cotton buyers and tobacco wholesalers. The air line also attracted metropolitan merchants who specialized in wholesale hardware, groceries, clothing, shoes, and drugs. In short order they could consign goods directly to small towns touched by iron rails, directly servicing the greenest country merchants. By the 1880s, one of the hallmarks of the New South became the country store with its uneven roof and potbellied stove, packed with Yankee "notions."

Northern wholesalers could map this new South as a vast market. In later years they would use Dun and Bradstreet reports to pinpoint the credit history of the smallest country store in the most remote locations. The South became a definable entity, its customers open to such lures as Rebel Girl Tobacco, Dixie flour, or Aunt Jemimah syrup.⁶³ And southerners, constantly surrounded with marketed images of themselves, came to define their own regional identity through this world of Yankee commodities.⁶⁴ Biscuits, print dresses, overalls, and hair tonics, all bought from country stores, came to be seen as uniquely southern. Even the past was contestable, as drummers (wholesale salesmen) who traveled through the dry-goods stores of the South—often veterans of "The Conflict" themselves—began to redefine the South in stories of valiant, ill-starred heroism.⁶⁵

Assertive with wholesalers in northern cities, the air line was discreet in print and in the South. Perhaps because it was largely invisible, Andrews's Seaboard Inland Air Line was not a completely trusted commodity. From 1866 to 1871, the line did not advertise in the *New York Times* with other shippers. Though the name Seaboard Inland Air Line was used by members of the group before 1870, histories of the company start with the date 1889, when they began formally advertising in the South.⁶⁶ Consigning goods to or receiving goods from the Seaboard Inland Air Line meant trusting them to deliver, and that meant understanding the general superintendents and directors of the associated lines had an agreement, an agreement that was necessarily secret. In many ways the Seaboard Inland Air Line in the years before 1871 was a public corporation, but it was also a kind of family pact, built by literal connections of iron rail, by handshakes and written agreements, and by blood. It is not surprising that the associated families would be the first to use these connections.

Andrews's organization gave him considerable power in his relationship with merchants. While he competed with other freight organizations and

railroads for the trade of merchants in a well-placed town like Raleigh or Columbia, in many areas he had considerable ambit to charge what the traffic would bear. Rates on the air line were set on a weekly basis and were unregulated, because no charter set absolute ceilings on what could be charged for freight or how it could be classified. Thus Andrews and Robinson made the critical decision after 1866 to move cotton from a second-class commodity to fourth class, drastically undercutting other competitors for cotton transport from as far away as Alabama.⁶⁷ Yet even at these reduced rates, Andrews had considerable leeway in choosing whom to give “drawbacks” or rebates.⁶⁸

The power of setting rates let Andrews and Robinson choose winners and losers in the piedmont, and they made those decisions carefully for the benefit of the firm. They made New South merchants who suited their purposes and unmade others. Family members relied on Andrews for special consideration and set up commission firms in Baltimore to take advantage of the firm’s support. This competitive advantage was probably crucial in generating startup capital for many of the piedmont banks that Andrews’s uncles and business partners erected in the 1870s. And this family-controlled enterprise could provide corrections as well as inducements. Just as Andrews had dispensed with Gaston merchants with a state charter and Johnston had dispensed with South Carolina Railroad sponsors with capital and restraining orders, the air line swiftly dealt with opponents like seaport merchants, powerful families, and state and city governments. In North Carolina, opposition from an alliance of the state’s governor and wealthy families with land in the east was checked with slick financial maneuvers. In Portsmouth, general-purpose merchants who opposed the air line were stopped by a secret ally in the town’s most powerful banking firm.

The family who made the most use of the air line was Andrews’s mother’s family, the Hawkinses. Dr. Hawkins, president of the Raleigh & Gaston, set up his son Colin—then twenty-two years old—and two other men in a grocery, cotton, and commission business in Baltimore in 1867. The firm’s other major partner, twenty-nine-year-old Bailey P. Williamson, had made his money during the war manufacturing ordnance and agricultural equipment for the Confederacy. As a drummer for a Baltimore dry-goods house, he likely possessed business contacts with wholesalers as well as some capital of his own. As a director of the newly formed North Carolina Iron and Steel Rail Company, he was party to the agreements of the Hawkinses and Robinsons. The last member of the group—the eldest at thirty-six—was Captain

James J. Thomas, a former assistant division quartermaster for Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and an experienced wholesale dealer before the war. It is possible that Williamson and Thomas knew each other as seller and buyer for the Confederate government. Hawkins and Williamson were well acquainted, having tried to start a wholesale and retail grocery in Raleigh the year before. Thomas provided the organization, Williamson the capital and contacts. What Hawkins could provide, through his energetic nephew Alexander, was connections.⁶⁹

Hawkins, Williamson and Company, operating in Baltimore, organized their trade through the direct use of the air line. The firm first used their limited capital reserves and their contacts to get goods from the dry-goods wholesalers and manufacturers of Baltimore. In 1865 they would have gotten it on short credit, perhaps four months. The Hawkinses, as a well-established family in North Carolina, knew people around Raleigh who would be willing to start or restart antebellum stores. These North Carolina stores would carry a large range of general merchandise, which they would offer for cash or credit to local farmers, planters, and sharecroppers. At regular intervals they would send cash to cancel their credits with the Hawkinses. At cotton harvest time merchants would take baled cotton from growers, sending the bales with a bill of lading to the Hawkinses in Baltimore to further cancel credits given to them by the Baltimore firm. Store owners would be remunerated based on the current Raleigh price of the bales. The Hawkins firm would get the bill of lading by mail or express and immediately sell the bills to cotton buyers. These buyers would then determine the final disposition of the goods when they arrived in Baltimore. Because the buyers now held the bill of lading, they could pick up the goods at the air line's warehouse on the wharves of Baltimore.⁷⁰

This arrangement was an elegant replacement for the weak geographic system of exchange constructed by antebellum merchants and planters. The air line and its favored merchants facilitated the "metropolitanization" of credit, provided from banks in Baltimore, as well as in New York and Philadelphia. Those merchants or factors who moved farther inland and played agent to a powerful firm like the Hawkinses could stand to benefit. Those who stayed on the coast or fall-line river town faced the prospect of shrinking credit and vigorous competition from cities with better access to capital markets and goods. And competitive position paid well: by the 1870s no less than four major banks in North Carolina were started by members of this business partnership.⁷¹

The air line had enemies, too. The powerful lawyer and landowner John Motley Morehead had donated some of the land for Morehead City, a town supported by the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad. The director of the road dubbed the little hamlet, apparently without irony, the “City of the Sea.” Western newspaper editors in turn dubbed the railroad “the Mullet Road,” because they could imagine little else the sleepy eastern town could ship west besides the ugly, gray fish. Since the 1850s Morehead wanted a system of roads that stretched from Morehead City to the mountains of the west and resented the funneling of traffic over the Raleigh & Gaston to eastern Virginia.⁷² North Carolina’s Democratic governor Jonathan Worth also wanted to force the NCRR to ship goods all the way east to Goldsboro, instead of branching off northeast toward Virginia, to give the “City of the Sea” a chance to compete for eastbound traffic.⁷³

But Morehead and Worth’s hopes were dashed by the air line’s audacity. Governor Worth had appointed a patriotic North Carolinian to the presidency of the North Carolina Railroad to press NCRR traffic to Morehead City.⁷⁴ But the air line quickly matched the move. Before Worth’s appointee arrived, the NCRR’s board of directors voted to take traffic decisions out of the hands of the president and give it to the superintendent.⁷⁵ Shortly afterward, the NCRR signed a contract with the air line’s key road, the Raleigh & Gaston, specifying that no road in the Seaboard Inland Air Line would alter prices in a way that would hinder another member. To sweeten the deal, the financially shaky NCRR received bonds from another member of the air line. Breaking the contract meant losing the bonds. Andrews and the air line had played a powerful trump against the machinations of Morehead and the state of North Carolina.⁷⁶

The aggressive policy of the air line also aggrieved the merchants of Portsmouth and Norfolk. If Robinson’s rail and steamship connections were so smooth that goods passed through Portsmouth without pause, then goods left the city with little benefit to the merchants who populated Portsmouth. In 1867 Portsmouth merchants requested that the city council prevent the locomotives of the Seaboard & Roanoke from entering the city.⁷⁷ In a controversial report, the Committee of Ordinances—headed by George W. Grice, director of the Bank of Portsmouth—asserted that the railroad’s charter did, indeed, allow it to use “machines, wagons, vehicles and carriages of every description.” This was true even if a steam tug loading goods straight out of the cars at Portsmouth may have been impossible to imagine at the time.⁷⁸ The city’s further progress, Grice asserted, was in the hands of the Seaboard

& Roanoke. “The Seaboard Road,” Grice wrote, “has now perfected connections with all of North and South Carolina and a large part of Georgia, and the surplus productions of those states, which heretofore sought markets elsewhere, are now being brought to our doors. . . . Petersburg, Richmond, Newbern, Wilmington and now Charleston are the rivals of this city for this trade and travel.”⁷⁹

Grice threw the responsibility for finding ways to benefit the city back in the face of its merchants. “Years ago,” he wrote, “the Councils of Richmond and Petersburg refused to permit connections by rail with the roads terminating in their cities; they now find, too late for their interest, that it was a *blundering* policy.” How could merchants complain, Grice asserted, when “[t]he Seaboard Road brings these rich productions *to our doors*; if our people are unable to purchase them for profit, speculation, or shipment, that is no fault of the roads, but our own misfortune or want of enterprise.”⁸⁰ Grice argued that merchants had to find some other way to make a profit. Of course it is not clear what that other way might be as the “doors” of the railway cars with all their “rich productions” emptied their goods directly from the wharf onto the railroad’s steam tug, leaving merchants little to do but watch it float out to Baltimore or New York. Grice’s personal solution was apparent, however. At the time of his pronouncement, his most important depositor was the Seaboard & Roanoke. His bank later held funds in transit for members of the Seaboard Inland Air Line.⁸¹ “Enterprise” did win out, as Grice and his son were made senior officers and directors in the following years.⁸²

The Seaboard Inland Air Line was as effective in bringing merchants to heel as it was in joining previously disconnected railroads. Its status as a railroad company without railroad tracks—as a public fiction—made it elusive and effective. Its aggressive policy of eliminating transfers, cheapening connections, and integrating newer, faster steamboats brought the air line impressive gains. Its political might assured that no one would stand in its way. In 1869, the Seaboard & Roanoke carried 6½ times the tonnage it carried in 1860. Cotton as far away as Georgia passed through Virginia’s ports on the Chesapeake. Bales from northern Georgia and the piedmont regions of North and South Carolina—all regions that *had* once been tributary to Charleston’s port—traveled through Portsmouth harbors onto the Robinson’s massive steamships.⁸³ City growth was also transformed. After the air line’s arrangements were finalized in 1867, port cities that competed with Norfolk/Portsmouth grew sluggishly, while the paired Virginia port cities boomed.

Starting in 1866 and blossoming in the years before 1871, the Seaboard Inland Air Line weathered the transformations of war and played a vital role in the development of the pattern of traffic and trade we associate with the postwar South. The barriers erected by merchants, rival families, towns, and state governments who sought to preserve older patterns of trade collapsed. The Iron Confederacy of the air line, almost invisible to the leaders of state governments and almost unknown to local citizens, built by agreements between directors, families, and superintendents, was able to crush opponents by aggressively soliciting the business of Yankee wholesalers through its New York agencies. Its loyal merchants in the South built trading networks that placed wholesalers within reach of country merchants.

It is easy to see these economic and organizational changes as independent from the tangled political history of Reconstruction. Yet the process of corporate reconstruction depended in part on the relative weakness of southern states, states that had helped bring southern railways into being. As we shall see, merchants who had dominated trade before the war pursued peacetime trade in a region where credit markets had become more straitened, more sophisticated, and more reliant on these new technologies of transport. In the tangle of Reconstruction politics, where state and federal authority were in flux, they found it difficult to deploy state power against competitors. Andrews was one of the kind of men they feared and loathed, men situated to take advantage of the disruption of state power and of these new technologies. Andrews and his cohorts may have been little prepared, however, for the changes that railroad reconstruction would bring to white urbanites and upcountry farmers. For these people saw the awakening leviathan—and the men who brought it to life—with quite different eyes.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Pennsylvania Railroad's Consolidation and the Return of the Confederacy

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please. . . .

Just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language.

—Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon” (1852)

Captain Samuel Hill was an impostor. He traveled by train from one working-class district to another in the southern states, posing as a Confederate officer down on his luck. In Lynchburg he settled among the operatives in a rolling mill. His easy manner, and perhaps a few hair-raising stories, made him a favorite among “the young ladies of the neighborhood.” He shortly borrowed money from “nearly all” of the men at the works. Then in the summer of 1870 he stole a suit of clothes from a fellow boarder at his boardinghouse and fled on a railway car south of town. Dispatches were sent to Richmond, Baltimore, and Philadelphia to find the man and return him to the city “to be tried for the various offences alleged against him.”¹ At about the same time, ex-General Lee was serenaded by a marching band of volunteer firemen in Charleston. He was introduced to their chief and the Board of Firemasters, but the firemen in the band refused to leave his

apartment until he addressed them. They chanted, “Just one word,” until he came out, thanked them for their attention, and returned to his room.²

The kind attention that Confederate officers, even bogus ones, got from working-class white southerners in 1870 stands in marked contrast to the war years. In 1862, the Confederate Congress authorized a nationwide draft, and then exempted militia officers, professionals, and men with twenty or more slaves.³ Embittered confederate soldiers began calling the conflict a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight. Desertions from Lee’s army skyrocketed, numbering perhaps 100,000 by the middle of 1863.⁴ In the same year, bread riots erupted throughout the Confederacy. In Richmond, white women from the Oregon Hill neighborhood rioted on Cary Street, breaking into stores and carrying off bread, shoes, and government beef. Their defiance of Confederate authority ended when Jefferson Davis ordered the public guard to begin firing into the crowd.⁵ Finally in April 1865, when Davis’s railway car raced out of Richmond, white citizens in the working-class districts jeered and cursed the guards who stayed behind to defend Davis’s retreat.⁶

Yet after the war, Confederate officers seemed much beloved. There have been many explanations for how defeat enhanced the reputation of the Confederacy. It has been suggested that some white southerners expressed their anger about the end of slavery by venerating the Confederacy.⁷ Other scholars have emphasized the importance of ceremony: of a memorial culture among whites that emphasized grief and self-sacrifice.⁸ The violent language of southern Democrats, which grew increasingly combative in the 1870s, must have also contributed to an awakening of Confederate sentiment.⁹ When Democratic gun clubs played Confederate tunes and paraded through city streets, it became both a spectacle for attracting white voters, and for threatening black ones.¹⁰

As we shall see, the growing respect for things Confederate also had something to do with an anger at regional changes over which white southerners felt they had little control. In this sense, neo-Confederate sympathies expressed a kind of moral outrage at the many political and economic changes that were reshaping the South. Between 1867 and 1870, when Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad sought to take control of the Confederate railroad corridor between Virginia and Georgia, he helped this neo-Confederate reaction. By 1870, Scott and the Pennsylvania Railroad became gripping abbreviations for the otherwise complicated technological and political changes that swept through the South.¹¹ Democratic newspapers in Richmond and Atlanta, in rather different ways, resuscitated the

language of Confederacy as they complained of the growing power of northern corporations and railroad rings. They further claimed that black politicians were the primary beneficiaries of this scheme to consolidate the Iron Confederacy.

Yet however solid was the anger at Yankee corporations, the time-honored costume of the Confederacy was, like Captain Hill's performance, quite slippery. In Richmond, merchants' anger at the changes in the geography of transportation could lead them into a multiracial movement that stalled northern consolidation of southern railways. In Atlanta, Democrats used Confederate language to attack both black legislators and white Republicans with ties to the Pennsylvania Railroad. By 1870, the Pennsylvania Railroad's plans seemed in shambles. Democrats and the business opponents of the Pennsylvania Railroad had apparently mastered the time-honored disguise and borrowed language of the Confederacy, and had briefly stalled the Pennsylvania's plans for consolidation.

The Pennsylvania Railroad's first foray into the South began late in the 1860s, in the wake of Moncure Robinson. Robinson had folded the family alliances of A. B. Andrews into the business structure of the Seaboard Inland Air Line, building an informal through line from Norfolk through Charlotte to Augusta, Georgia.¹² Tom Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad was a competitor with few of Robinson's initial advantages. The son of a hotel keeper, Scott was a railway financier whose fortune and power had grown with the ascendancy of two antebellum institutions: the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Republican Party. A math prodigy in his youth, Scott had started his ascent twenty years earlier as station agent, then lobbyist, for the Pennsylvania Railroad in Harrisburg. Scott represented midwestern railroads that had helped build the Republican Party. Backdoor maneuvers in the Republican national convention made him assistant secretary of war under President Lincoln in 1861. Scott's skill was in straddling politics and business. He possessed the rare quality of being both an able administrator and a spoilsman of the highest caliber. During the war, for example, he earned high praise from Lincoln's cabinet while making a fortune for himself and his young associate, the telegrapher Andrew Carnegie.¹³ The war had shown Scott the strategic problems of the Confederacy, particularly its difficulties in consolidating railroads to form supply lines.¹⁴

By 1868, Tom Scott, then forty-five, had the ability, capital, and political connections to seize the southern railway corridor that the Confederacy had built. His first attempt, which ultimately failed, suggests Scott's ambition and



Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Scott sought to extend the Confederate corridor so that it stretched from Washington through Atlanta to the West. Wendell Phillips allegedly said of Scott that when he “trailed his garments across the country, the members of twenty legislatures trembled like dry leaves in a winter’s wind.”

(courtesy Library of Congress)

his indiscretion. Scott’s allies in Congress proposed a bill to extend a southern air line from Washington to Atlanta to make a federal route for mail and freight. Scott’s audacious plan was a “Grand Trunk Line” that stretched “from New York and the East to Mobile, New Orleans, Vicksburg,” and ultimately southern California.¹⁵ Unlike the route built by the Confederacy, which passed from Charlotte south toward Columbia and Augusta, Scott’s Grand Trunk Line turned southwest at Charlotte. It would hug the Appalachian mountains,



Thomas A. Scott's Union Station. The Baltimore & Potomac Railroad station stood at 6th Street and Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C. This station was the centerpiece of Thomas Scott's national railroad strategy. In 1867, Scott planned connections from here to Richmond, Greensboro, Charlotte, Atlanta, and westward along the 32d parallel to San Diego. This photograph appears to have been taken in the 1880s. The present Union Station in Washington was built in the 1920s. (courtesy Library of Congress)

climb the foothills of the mostly white upcountry, and enter the overgrown towns of Gastonia, Spartanburg, and Atlanta.¹⁶ The bill claimed that this railway corridor would bolster national power by “penetrating almost every section of the Southern States.” The U.S. government, by chartering the road and signing the air line’s bonds, would get a mail-and-supply route to southern cities that would be safe from foreign invasion. While Atlanta bankers began buying land in the area north of their city, the “Georgia and South Carolina Air Line” started issuing bonds for the southern portion of the “air line trunk.” Both groups expectantly awaited the arrival of federal funds.¹⁷

The proposed air line from Richmond to Atlanta was a small part of a national strategy that made the nation’s capital the terminus of a national railroad. By the beginning of 1867 the Pennsylvania Railroad had secured a

charter to connect its Baltimore terminal to the capital city.¹⁸ Of course before the war Robert W. Garrett of the Baltimore & Ohio had sought a similar terminus in Washington.¹⁹ But Scott, the Pennsylvania Republican, had better connections in Congress. By the summer of 1870 Scott had won an exclusive contract to bridge the Potomac River. The following year he contracted to build the nation's Union Station in Washington.²⁰ These connections were the linchpin of Scott's southern strategy, for they blocked the Baltimore & Ohio from connecting through to the city of Washington. Garrett fumed. Southern traffic into the capital would have to cross the Potomac, and the Potomac belonged to the Pennsylvania.²¹

But controlling Washington did not guarantee a route to Atlanta. When the federal subsidy for the Grand Trunk Line failed in Congress, Scott determined to use private capital and state subsidies to complete a corridor into Atlanta. Scott had future land grants in mind. During the war, Congress had created a Senate Committee on the Pacific Railroad and gave it the authority to oversee land grants to lines that touched the Pacific Ocean. Scott trusted that once he finished the line into Atlanta, that southerners returning to Congress would demand subsidies for a southern line to the Pacific.²² If Scott controlled all the southern outlets that crossed the Appalachians, he could dictate terms to any southern line to the west. At stake in the control of a southwestern line were hundreds of millions in federal bond guarantees and an incredible 26 million-acre land grant, an area larger than Kentucky.²³ The proposed line, called the South Pacific in 1867, was renamed the Texas & Pacific in 1871.²⁴ The plan was visible as early as 1867. A national railway system would extend from Washington City in two directions: north to New York and west across the forty-ninth parallel to Seattle, south to Atlanta, and west across the thirty-second parallel to San Diego. Ironically, it was a southern route to the West had first been laid out by Jefferson Davis, when Davis was U.S. secretary of war in 1855.²⁵

Not everyone welcomed Scott's plan to forge a national railroad out of Confederate and Union tracks. A critic of Scott's proposed system wrote his parody as a poem. In it, George W. Cass, president of Scott's northern line, sings the praises of railroads in the barren lands of the extreme north and south:

If poor basis for bonds, our road and land,
Men *sick of Texas* are his contract band!
My route runs near the British bound'ry line,
His course is through the ancient Aztec clime.

From my domain the Savage will away,
On his parch'd plains the Spaniard could not stay;
Line "forty-nine" has *Russian steppes and bears*.
"Thirty-two" has *fever and earthquake scares*.²⁶

Getting congressional subsidy for such unlikely latitudes meant controlling the southern railroads along the Confederate corridor, railroads partially managed by states. Scott had some important early successes between 1867 and 1870.

Richmond, the former Confederate capital, was a crucial cornerstone. Scott was close to Governor Pierpont of Virginia, who had made the unpopular decision in 1865 to appoint state assemblyman A. S. Buford as president of the Richmond & Danville.²⁷ At some point between 1865 and 1867, the Penn established close relations with the Richmond & Danville. Buford, a Danville native, could make Scott's activities appear homegrown.²⁸ By 1870, so Richmonders understood, the Pennsylvania Railroad controlled the public and private railroad stock of the Richmond & Danville.²⁹

Farther south, Scott found controlling state governments more complicated. Georgia's Republican governor in 1868 was an ally who proved effective at first. Rufus Bullock, originally from Albion, New York, had spent a nearly decade working along the Confederate corridor. Before coming south, he had worked as a telegrapher for some of Scott's closest associates.³⁰ In 1859, Adams Express had sent Bullock down to Augusta as an assistant to the director. When the Southern Express separated from the Adams Express a year later, Bullock recruited workers, hired slaves, and managed regional operations. While superintending the express, Bullock also became an acting assistant quartermaster for the Confederacy. In 1863 Bullock established the first telegraph line from Richmond to Atlanta. This may have been the first survey of what would become Scott's air line.³¹

Bullock's Unionist politics and his familiarity with traffic and trade in Georgia placed him in an excellent position to administer the state after the war. After figuring prominently in Georgia's Constitutional Convention of 1867–68, Bullock became the Georgia's Republican candidate for governor. He endorsed freedmen's voting rights, the continued disfranchisement of former Confederates, and public support for Scott's project to connect Georgia to the rest of the South. The Pennsylvania Railroad may have been less thrilled about the other planks of his platform, including homestead exemptions and statewide debt relief. Bullock took his cues from two impor-

tant interests in the state: Southern Express manager Edward Hurlbert and wartime governor Joseph Brown.³²

The two men ensured Bullock's election. As manager of the Southern Express, Hurlbert and his agents had free travel throughout the state. This unusual mobility must have impelled the district's military commander to appoint him registrar of elections. Hurlbert put the registrar's office next to his office at the express, making his headquarters the political and economic nerve center of Georgia.³³ Former Confederate governor Joseph Brown also helped ensure Bullock's early success. Brown had declared early that he would "connect with whatever national party shows the most disposition to act upon just and true principles and to aid us in developing our section."³⁴ Brown found the party of "Bullock, Relief and Reconstruction" amenable in part because he hoped reconstruction would be primarily economic. Thus the conservative Brown endorsed the Fourteenth Amendment, believing it would dispose Congress to quickly readmit Georgia into the Union. A clever politician, Brown claimed that the amendment gave freedmen the right to vote, but not necessarily the right to hold office. As a stump speaker popular with farmers, Brown could deliver votes from the state's yeoman strongholds. In return for their support, Brown and Hurlbert had few requirements: Brown wanted a seat in Congress, Hurlbert wanted Georgia to support railroad construction for Tom Scott's railroad to Atlanta.³⁵

The construction company that would build Scott's line was the newly formed Grant, Alexander and Company. Though based in Atlanta, its principal—John T. Grant—was extremely close to J. Edgar Thomson, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad.³⁶ After the war, the firm won the contract to build the Georgia portion of Tom Scott's air line, but what Grant lacked was labor. Here a governor could be helpful. In Georgia, the governor had access to an entirely new, extremely mobile labor force. Under the new state constitution, the governor could contract out the state's convicts for public works. In 1868 Bullock turned over a few hundred convicts to Grant's firm. Later, in June 1869, at the further urging of Hurlbert, Bullock leased the entire penitentiary to Grant, Alexander and Company at no cost. By the first day of 1870, 393 convicts were at work on the contracts. In less than two years convicts built the line fifty-five miles north of Atlanta through the punishing hill country of north-central Georgia. In those years convicts worked under deplorable conditions. A state investigation later determined that while contractors distributed food and clothing, they sometimes ignored pardons and

whipped convicts nude for minor offenses.³⁷ By 1870, Scott could be assured that the road north from Atlanta would be built with brutal efficiency.

In South Carolina, Scott faced the politically powerful, partly state-owned South Carolina Railroad. Scott sent his representative, lawyer and newspaper editor Alexander K. McClure, to organize a syndicate. Using prominent South Carolinians as buyers, the syndicate acquired a large interest in the two upcountry railroads that fed traffic to the South Carolina Railroad: the Spartanburg & Union and the Blue Ridge Railroad. Then in 1870, syndicate lobbyists persuaded the legislature to make a private sale of the state's interest in the two roads, and then to consolidate the two lines under a single charter. The syndicate's influence in the legislature was considerable. An early provision in the consolidation bill granted the new corporation *exclusive* rights to mine phosphate for fertilizer in the state of South Carolina. After criticism from radical Republicans in Charleston—coupled with Democratic threats to expose the lobby—the Pennsylvania took the phosphate provision out of the bill. Democrats and Republicans then passed the measure together.³⁸

The upcountry lines in South Carolina served a dual purpose for Scott. Because both systems had been built as feeder lines to the South Carolina Railroad, which ended in Charleston, Scott could alter rates to put pressure on the older railroad. More immediately, they gave Scott an avenue to deliver explosives, iron rails, and locomotives to the upcountry so that work on his Charlotte-to-Atlanta run could be completed cheaply.³⁹ By 1872 construction cars were running over most of the length of the new Charlotte-to-Atlanta line, making the feeders unnecessary. By then, the South Carolina Railroad had regained control of the upcountry lines.⁴⁰

But in North Carolina, Scott faced Moncure Robinson and the Seaboard Inland Air Line. The state-owned North Carolina Railroad was under the sway of the Robinson dynasty through most of the late 1860s. Scott's only advantage was that the Confederacy had built a fork in the North Carolina Railroad at Greensboro, connecting the Carolinas to Richmond via the Richmond & Danville.⁴¹ Robinson had many more advantages. His influence in North Carolina ensured that freight schedules favored his junction at Norfolk. More difficult for Scott was the difference in gauge between the North Carolina Railroad and his Richmond & Danville.⁴² Colonel Buford of the Richmond & Danville wrote that until he could establish more “unrestrained relations” with North Carolina, he would have to keep men at work loading and unloading cars at the massive depots in Greensboro.⁴³ Scott first

tried to get control of the North Carolina Railroad in November 1869, by sending his man McClure to Raleigh to lease the line, then in financial trouble. McClure offered an unprecedented \$265,000 per year for the property, but the directors of the North Carolina line feared losing the traffic that went to Moncure Robinson's system.⁴⁴

Throughout the late 1860s, there was an uneasy peace, as Tom Scott and Moncure Robinson shared the route between Richmond and Washington.⁴⁵ But by 1870, their relations broke down, apparently over Tom Scott's continued use of southern "front" men. Since the fall of 1866, Scott had been buying up antebellum railway charters in southern states, altering the charters to allow consolidation, and then placing southerners as nominal directors. Two companies in the proposed trunk line suggest this deception. On the Alexandria & Fredericksburg, the Penn kept an office in Alexandria between 1867 and 1868. It refused subscriptions and generally transacted no business while Scott built depots elsewhere. The clerk of the line testified later that the office was kept open for appearances: "Mr. Johnson gave me to understand that [the Virginia stockholders] were not entitled to the stock," the clerk said "but were allowed to control the vote. They wanted somebody in Virginia that would give the company a standing, and they pitched on Mr. Slaughter, of Fredericksburg, and elected him a director."⁴⁶ Scott's strategy was to keep the paternity of the road a secret, so that the company could apply to states and cities for aid.


Between Georgia and North Carolina, the Pennsylvania syndicate used national banks as fronts. Alfred Austell, a Georgia merchant, had organized the Atlanta National Bank in 1865. Two years later, Rufus Yancey McAden, speaker of the North Carolina house, left state politics to form the newly incorporated First National Bank of Charlotte. At first, the banks did little more than hold Pennsylvania Railroad funds for the payment of contractors and employees. These front men were important for appearances. After the Pennsylvania Railroad pitched Colonel Buford as president of Scott's "Georgia and South Carolina Air Line," the Penn turned bank directors Austell and McAden into vice presidents.⁴⁷ By using local men as directors, and funneling Pennsylvania funds through the banks, Scott could make the organization appear to be indigenous.⁴⁸ "I don't [know] enough of our Road to tell you any of the particulars," Austell complained to Buford in 1871, though he closely followed the activities of the Georgia legislature. The two traded gossip about what the actual directors were doing with other rail-

roads.⁴⁹ The ruse worked perfectly in Atlanta. The city contributed \$300,000 and the state \$240,000 to the air line.⁵⁰

Scott's use of national banks made his trunk line more stable, and his financial control less obvious. Scott ensured control of component lines by having the lines give up their first mortgage to the parent company in exchange for a small amount of rolling stock and construction equipment. Each line quickly became bottom-heavy, with negligible value in stock, and huge bonded debts. Outside control was almost invisible.⁵¹ If the nominal directors departed from the wishes of the bondholders, the child company could be quickly foreclosed, and federal circuit courts would deliver the company to a receiver who was acceptable to bondholders.⁵² Practically, however, the southern directors took orders from the traffic managers, contractors, and engineers and kept their heads down.⁵³ This strategy worked flawlessly on the Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line, which historians have continued to believe was a local venture by southern capitalists.⁵⁴

By the end of 1869, Tom Scott's plan to consolidate a southern railway system from Washington to Atlanta via Richmond (see Map 2) had begun to solidify. His strategy differed greatly from Robinson's. Where Robinson had relied on local leaders and state legislatures, Tom Scott counted on national legislation, national banks, and the future value of land grants. Where Robinson had bound companies together through contracts, Scott secretly bought them using front men and dummy corporations. Where Robinson bent the Confederate railway corridor toward Norfolk, Scott started in Richmond and used convicts, steel rails, and explosives to extend the corridor southwest toward Atlanta. Scott's strategy seemed perfect, but he failed to measure white southerners' anxieties about economic changes that the railway corridor represented. Two sets of opponents emerged who vowed to—as Marx wrote—"conjure up the spirits of the past to their service." Moncure Robinson called on Confederate general William Mahone to kill the air line, while Georgia Democrats initiated a campaign of violence to destabilize Georgia's Republican regime.

In June of 1870, Robinson had begun to notice the outlines of Scott's strategy. When Robinson discovered Scott's contractors surveying a railroad parallel to his Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac, Robinson voided his contracts with Scott and began to plot his revenge.⁵⁵ Robinson understood, perhaps more than any other railway director, the anger of southern merchants. Robinson also understood some of the political and technological



A&C	Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line	RF&P	Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
A&NC	Atlantic & North Carolina	S&R	Seaboard & Roanoke
C&SC	Charlotte & South Carolina	SCRR	South Carolina Railroad
ETN&GA	East Tennessee & Georgia	SS	Southside Railroad
GA	Central of Georgia	VA&TN	Virginia & Tennessee
NCRR	North Carolina Railroad	W&A	Western & Atlantic
NE/SC	Northeastern of South Carolina	W&M	Wilmington & Manchester
PBRG	Petersburg Railroad	W&W	Wilmington & Weldon
R&D	Richmond & Danville	—	Existing trackage
R&G	Raleigh & Gaston	-----	Proposed trackage
R&P	Richmond & Petersburg		

Map 2. Proposed Line from Washington to Atlanta, 1867

changes that were making an iron confederacy of state railroads more important and more powerful. Having displaced merchants with the Seaboard Inland Air Line himself, he understood merchants' sense of privation and knew how to mold it into an attack on Scott's system.

The changes that urban merchants faced were complex, and suggested no easy answers. The complexity of these economic changes helps to explain why merchants were so quick to blame a single Yankee outsider. Before the war, railroad companies had been relatively weak, and had favored merchants strategically located at railway crossroads and seaports. But the balance of power was shifting. Economic and technological changes, some beginning before the war, eroded merchants' control over localized railroads.

The first economic blow to the merchant-dominated railway system was the changing flow of credit. Since the 1820s, New York credit had pulled international traffic through the city of banks.⁵⁶ This banking credit became increasingly important when southern banks failed after the war. Here the Republican Party's role was obvious. Southern bank collateral had been liberated (as slaves) by the Thirteenth Amendment or repudiated (as Confederate bonds) by the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, during Congressional Reconstruction, the Republican Congress imposed harsh reserve requirements on southern banks entering the national banking system.⁵⁷ Without the credit and services of local banks, coastal merchants in Savannah or Charleston could not provide credit to planters.⁵⁸

The second economic blow to antebellum trade patterns was the arrival of large English steamships. These new ships, with screw propellers and massive hulls, took over most transatlantic traffic.⁵⁹ These enormous ships could not safely enter the South's shallower ports in New Orleans, Charleston, or Richmond.⁶⁰ So to meet these ships and benefit from international trade, southern agricultural traffic had to pass through larger ports like Norfolk or Baltimore. Many merchants in the old port cities were rendered obsolete.⁶¹

Finally, the transatlantic telegraph disrupted the merchant-controlled system because telegraphs let English buyers determine cotton prices in all the major southern markets and choose the cheapest market on the spot. This made it difficult for factors to exploit localized shortages and bargain up prices, and factors thus became less necessary.⁶² All of these changes suggested a redirection of the southern marketing and transportation network toward big cities at terminals or ports. Convergence toward a few port cities would unite the South, at the expense of existing trade centers like Charleston, Savannah, Petersburg, and Richmond.

In the past, when merchants, factors, and their agents noted such changes, they would send a lawyer to lobby the capital city. A few well-placed bank charters, some restrictions placed on local railroads, or exorbitant licensing fees could clear up the situation.⁶³ In less extreme times a few well-chosen words from large shareholders at the terminal could set the local railroad directors straight.⁶⁴

But during Reconstruction, states had less power over transportation markets. One problem was finding the right railroad to target for protest, given the plethora of state charters granted to newly competitive lines. Republican governments, particularly in Georgia and North Carolina, granted liberal charters for lines in every possible direction in the hopes that at least some of these chartered companies would turn southern towns into Manchesters.⁶⁵ Still other companies were chartered that *paralleled* existing roads, constituting a direct threat to small lines.⁶⁶ Also, the political tumult of Reconstruction ensured that no group of town fathers with limited resources to assign to a lobbyist could be assured of a policy that consistently favored their interests. In 1868 white conservatives in the Georgia legislature expelled black members; the next year the U.S. Congress expelled *them* and reinstated black officials. In both cases railroad policy changed dramatically.⁶⁷ Moreover, many southern states adopted general laws of incorporation. In an afternoon a transportation company could charter itself with a letter to a county clerk and then bid for through traffic along a route unfamiliar to city merchants.⁶⁸ More to the point, railroad companies after the war could no longer cater to merchant stockholders by defending existing traffic patterns. Economic and political changes that followed the war forced directors to think more expansively. In some cases consolidation seemed the only path to financial security.⁶⁹

So if the tumult and transformation that came with Reconstruction helped consolidators like Tom Scott and Moncure Robinson, it made merchants confused and angry. Steamships threatened to erase the competitive advantage of smaller southern ports, while telegraphs devalued merchants' knowledge of local markets. Merchants' power over traffic diminished during Reconstruction just as railroad directors became more distracted and independent. All of these changes seemed to foreshadow the end of a southern trading system controlled by city merchants, but it did not suggest who would dominate it. In Richmond, Moncure Robinson made sure he could give them a Republican to blame.

To stop Scott's plans for consolidation, Robinson stirred up General

William Mahone and the merchants of Richmond against the Pennsylvania Railroad. Since Robinson had spent the war in Philadelphia, he felt Mahone made a better front man for the attacks on the Penn in Virginia. A Confederate war hero with his own railroad system from Norfolk to the west, Mahone was an influential man in 1870. When the Republican party seemed divided in the late 1860s, it was Mahone who helped build a splinter faction in Republican ranks called the True Republicans. Mahone and others pushed conservative Democrats to vote in Republican primaries and choose New Yorker Gilbert C. Walker as the Republican governor. These “True Republicans” prevailed in 1868, ushering in a return to conservative dominance. The orthodox or “Regular Republicans” may have overstated the matter when they called Mahone’s management of Walker’s election “a Confederate triumph.” Still, orthodox Republicans saw that Mahone had considerable respect among white workingmen, men who valued his exploits. When Mahone found that the Pennsylvania Railroad had extended its railroad corridor at the expense of his, Mahone donned his Confederate colors and joined the attack against Thomas Scott.⁷⁰

Robinson’s lawyers began the offensive. Prominent Virginia senators, they were also members of the influential Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation, which they used to explode the Pennsylvania’s scheme. In January 1871 they exposed Scott’s methods in other parts of the country. Shortly afterward, the committee subpoenaed Vice President Roberts of the Penn to explain why the charter, seal, and directors’ minutes of the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Railroad were sitting in an office in Harrisburg.⁷¹ Suddenly Scott’s simple system of bribery, lobbying, and dummy companies had become crude and rickety. On 5 January, hearings began in Richmond on the validity of the Alexandria & Fredericksburg charter. That evening, the committee minutes and sworn testimony of participants were printed in the *Richmond Dispatch*. The following day spectator flocked to the committee’s chambers. The headline in the winter of 1871 sounded like the report of intrigue on the battlefield:

Ways That Are Dark

Unsuccessful Attempt to Push the Chameleon Bill through the House

Revolutionary Schemes of the Bucktails

They Are Met and Repulsed at Every Point

They Give Up and Allow the Bill to Go to a Committee

Grave Doubts as to Its Constitutionality.⁷²

Scott was suddenly on the defensive. He formalized his control of the Richmond & Danville a month later by buying Virginia's stock in the railroad. The *Richmond Whig* condemned the purchase as an "ineffable infamy," a sale of the Commonwealth's "commercial independence and political autonomy, to a foreign corporation."⁷³ Mahone, who always painted with a broad brush, recalled the nickname of Pennsylvania's first military regiments by calling the purchase "the Bucktail Swindle."⁷⁴

Political conservatives in the Virginia Legislature followed Mahone's lead. By March of 1871 they convened a "Bribery Investigation Committee" to expose Tom Scott. From the beginning, the committee determined that intrigue against Virginia's interests must be the fault of black politicians. Convinced that *white* Virginians could not be responsible for the state's impoverishment, the committee subpoenaed most of Virginia's black legislators to find evidence of the Pennsylvania's intrigue. Their investigation showed that few legislators had accepted bribes, but that nearly all had been offered \$300 or more for votes that favored the Penn. The investigation turned up a Colonel Jenkins as the Penn's lobbyist, who was, rumor held, paid out of Pennsylvania funds by "the chief of the road."⁷⁵ Even shadier doings turned up in the days that followed. The committee learned that, to gain control of the line to Washington, the Pennsylvania Railroad had hired "Captain Cheeny Parker" as a detective to circulate a petition through Richmond on behalf of the Pennsylvania's bill.⁷⁶

The wild rumors that circulated in the city were even more damaging to the Penn's project. Scott was said to have brought "abandoned women" from New York and Philadelphia into Richmond hotels during the Penn buyout of the R&D.⁷⁷ Legislators immune to the favors of Scott's female "lobbyists" were tempted with other inducements. The Virginia house, after voting on behalf of a Scott proposal, had been invited to a "bounteous feast" of the liquid variety, which was announced in the house chambers as a temperance lecture.⁷⁸ Pennsylvania money, it was claimed in 1871, "was as plentiful as mud in James River water." One of Mahone's directors said that Scott kept a parlor in a hotel in Richmond with two huge punch bowls. "One was filled with punch; the other contained greenbacks."⁷⁹

While the rumors were probably true enough, southern newspapers assembled them as a morality play. The committee's spectacular hearings were designed not to explain how a railroad corridor was conceived out of capital, but to blame economic changes on men of war. Richmonders had profound economic problems that needed explanation. Since the Confeder-

acy had surrendered, Richmond was no longer the center of southern trade. The city's massive flour mills had been destroyed in the Confederate retreat, and plummeting flour prices after the war meant that most of the mills would never be built again. At the same time, tobacco from west of Richmond could not compete with the newly discovered "bright tobacco" of the North Carolina piedmont.⁸⁰ Blaming regional impoverishment on a single individual proved a more comforting explanation. Punchbowls full of greenbacks and hotels with "abandoned women" overseen by a Republican made the process seem more understandable.

However righteous was Virginians' anger at Tom Scott, it is a little ironic that General Mahone led the offensive. Mahone was himself president of a recently consolidated interstate system: the Atlantic, Mississippi & Ohio. Three years before his attacks on Tom Scott, the Virginia assembly had harshly attacked Mahone's consolidation plan.⁸¹ Wags in Richmond had even dubbed the AM&O "All Mine and Otelia's," referring to Mahone's wife.⁸² To overcome the initial opposition of Richmond merchants, Mahone had funded a large lobbying organization.⁸³ It is likely that Mahone's familiarity with the process of buying legislatures made him the perfect prosecutor.

By 1870 Mahone had learned how to, in Marx's words, "conjure up the spirits of the past." As a Confederate war hero, he had the enviable public image of a Virginian fighting a Yankee aggressor. As one of Mahone's allies, a legislator from Bedford County, said of the Mahone road: "Here is a Virginia road managed by a Virginian, whose profit lies in Virginia."⁸⁴ The "foreign" ambitions of Tom Scott and his allies, he continued, were simply unscrupulous: "Let the State pause before it yields up the key to so vast a treasure as this," thundered one of Scott's critics. "They are great railroad stock jobbers, who, in the money market, would be called speculators, and in a gambling-house would be called gamblers."⁸⁵ In this morality play, then, Virginia played the Virgin Queen and Tom Scott was obliged to play the part of the foreign devil. As a Pennsylvania Republican, and an assistant secretary of war under Lincoln, Scott made an easy target. In one month, wrote a Pennsylvania sympathizer, Mahone and his allies treated the legislature to comparisons of Scott's southern railway system with "giants, and ghosts, and vampires."⁸⁶

Robinson and Mahone deployed their forces brilliantly to kill Scott's through line in the Virginia assembly. Once Robinson's lawyers had exposed Penn control, Mahone used his influence in the Virginia Assembly to prevent further consolidation in Virginia and to maintain the hold of the "Robinson Dynasty"

on the Confederate corridor into Georgia. In what a sympathetic paper described as “argumentum ad Mahonem,” the Mahone forces succeeded in tying up many Pennsylvania-supported bills in committee. Those bills that got to the house or senate were loaded with so many contradictory riders that the bills were unintelligible to their original supporters.⁸⁷ A paper favorable to the Pennsylvania described Robinson’s use of wartime symbols, suggesting that Robinson and Mahone had interests besides Virginia’s in their attack on Tom Scott’s system: “We thought that General Mahone’s glass was turned to the sea; but suddenly he has executed the movement of ‘*Right about, “face”!*’ and looks to Richmond. . . . The [Pennsylvania-controlled] Petersburg road strikes the [Robinson- and Mahone-controlled] Southside lines squarely at right angles at Petersburg; and there Mr. Moncure Robinson and General Mahone are to issue the command, ‘Halt!’ until we ‘examine your passport.’”⁸⁸

The future of the Mahone’s coalition was interesting. Mahone, whatever his Confederate credentials, was no traditional conservative. Through the 1870s he pushed for free education, opposed poll taxes, and began a movement to roll back or “readjust” Virginia’s debts to northern capitalists.⁸⁹ Opposition to Tom Scott, the symbol of Yankee invasion, did not necessarily lead to conservatism. It did stall Scott’s trunk line. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, deadlock in the Virginia assembly prevented the Penn from chartering a trunk line that could pass through Virginia. Instead, Scott’s railway corridor terminated in Richmond, where goods were unloaded and then forwarded to northern cities on James River steamboats.⁹⁰ By the late 1870s the Penn stole a march and managed to terminate the system at the coastal town of West Point, Virginia. It would not be until the 1880s that an all-rail route could bypass Richmond entirely.⁹¹

For Moncure Robinson, the time-honored disguise and borrowed language of the Confederacy seemed a perfect means to disrupt Tom Scott’s plans in Virginia. Under the banner of William Mahone, white urbanites in Richmond—middle class and working class—revolutionized themselves. They fought railroad corporations for a decade using the language of Confederacy. Yet for all their seeming radicalism, the opponents of Tom Scott’s Atlanta & Richmond Air Line made an awkward-looking army. Some of its leaders supported a competing railroad system, and some fusionist opponents of consolidation could not refrain from blaming freed people for the arrival of railroad consolidators.

In Georgia, Confederate impostors saw the ghosts of the Union army else-

where, and they arranged their colors differently. While attacking the moral threat of northern railroads, they concentrated their anger on black legislators. The violence that attended the ouster of black legislators crippled the state, and appeared briefly to stop construction. But there were enough white Atlantans who so longed for an Iron Confederacy that they forged their own secret peace with the Pennsylvania.

Controversies over the place of skilled black workers were perhaps nowhere more bitter than in central Georgia. During the war, the railway corridor that linked Georgia to Virginia helped make central Georgia into one of the Confederacy's largest workshops. As early as 1861, central Georgia had relied primarily on the labor of skilled, black workingmen—particularly men trained in railroad works—to staff the armories, arsenals, and powder works.⁹² Black workers who escaped to the Union army helped stop the ring of hammers in Confederate Georgia. In July 1864, when Union forces under William T. Sherman pushed from Chattanooga toward central Georgia, black trackbuilders called Pioneers led the way.⁹³

As black men and women took their freedom, Georgia Democrats hewed increasingly to a white line in manufacturing and railroading. Before Republican governor Rufus Bullock came to power, the administration of the conservative provisional governor had largely removed black workers from state-funded railway projects. When black workers asked the Democratic railroad manager why he could not hire black men, the appointee responded testily that he expected an “avalanche of capital and thrifty emigrants” to lead to the “rapid . . . disappearance of the negro and the negro complications.”⁹⁴

Perhaps it was Georgia's reliance on skilled black workers during the war that inclined white conservatives to turn so quickly to race-baiting afterward. Whatever the reason, it is difficult to compare the civil racism of Virginia's white legislature to the histrionics of Georgia Democrats. At the Democratic convention in Macon, conservatives called the new constitution that Bullock championed an attempt “to crystallize into constitutional form the policy of bringing the State of Georgia under the domain of *negro supremacy*.”⁹⁵ Conservative Benjamin Hill called the new constitution a “corrupt instrument” fashioned by a “nigger–New England conclave” and lorded over by Joseph E. Brown, the “Beelzebub of the fallen.”⁹⁶ Corruption, as Georgia Democrats meant it, referred partly to deals made between Republicans and railroad interests, but referred primarily to their anger at seeing black men in power.⁹⁷

Atlanta Democrats used the borrowed language of the Confederacy to symbolize their anger. “From now until November,” wrote an *Atlanta Con-*

stitution editorial, “let us attack the enemy at every point. With ready aim, quick fire, and hot shot, we will scatter them like frightened sheep.”⁹⁸ Increasingly Atlanta Democrats drew on vicious racial politics that Benjamin Hill had championed in Macon. Torchlight parades through town featured white men on horseback singing “Dixie.” Others marched with lighted signs portraying black men dying or leaving the city. Their banners read, “Collards declining.”⁹⁹ The metaphor joined the new world of tumbling market prices with the hope that market transformations in Atlanta would cause African Americans to disappear.

If white Atlanta’s bigotry was more pronounced than in Richmond, the fables of corruption and decline were the same. As in Richmond, Atlanta newspapers regaled anxious urbanites with stories of easy railroad money and corrupted Republicans. The Democratic papers chose not to pry too deeply into particular railway systems, because many Atlanta Democrats favored a railroad system that would connect Atlanta to northern cities. Criticism centered instead on Governor Bullock, whose connections to northern railroads made him an easy target. The *Atlanta Constitution* attacked Bullock’s two supporters: Joseph Brown and Edward Hurlbert. In attacking Brown, the *Constitution* claimed that the former governor had been a profiteer during the war and stored his funds in “a large bank account in Europe, to which he [draws] secretly.” Brown then used the money to bribe legislators, “without making manifest his operations.”¹⁰⁰

Bullock’s ally Hurlbert proved an easy target as well. As director of the Southern Express company, Hurlbert had helped manage Bullock’s campaign for governor. Just as Georgia governors had done since the 1840s, Bullock repaid Hurlbert with an appointment as superintendent of the state-owned Western & Atlantic railroad.¹⁰¹ Hurlbert merged state railroad operations and election registration, ensuring that each station agent he hired was an “undoubted Republican.”¹⁰² Throughout Bullock’s term, Democrats regularly accused both Bullock’s administration and the Western & Atlantic railroad of bribing legislators with women and drink.¹⁰³

Atlanta Democrats drew from a seemingly endless store of violent metaphors to attack Bullock and Hurlbert. In a long tirade, the *Atlanta Constitution* gave readers fables that somehow put shepherds upon transatlantic ships, with Bullock and Hurlbert at the helm: “The ship of State, manned by a pirate crew, is nearing the breakers on which they threaten to dash her and wreck all on board. . . . Without a change of crew they feel that all is lost.” The choice, the paper assured its readers, was between “liberty and

despotism. . . . The eyes of all true patriots—the hearts of all lovers of free governments, are entering upon that hope, as the eyes of the shepherd watches on the star of Bethlehem above the Judean hills. That hope is the Democratic party. It is the only remaining sheet-anchor of our liberties.”¹⁰⁴ Liberty, democracy, stability—Atlanta Democrats did not want to get off the boat, only to steer it themselves. The only barrier was the state’s Republican governor.

As early as the fall of 1868, Governor Bullock was in trouble, because the deals he made with Hurlbert and Joseph Brown made him look like a thief. By repeatedly recalling the selective stories of Republican corruption, Bullock’s enemies used violence to destroy black representation and make Georgia a white state. In September, white conservatives sent letters to Republicans in the general assembly telling them to prepare to “meet their Maker” and reminding them of the Klan-directed murder of senatorial candidate George W. Ashburn. The only way to save themselves, the anonymous authors wrote, was to vote for a Democratic-sponsored bill that would eject black members from the Georgia assembly.¹⁰⁵

By the middle of 1868, the combination of violence and newspaper attacks had begun to crack Georgia’s Republican majority in the assembly along racial lines. Many white Republicans opposed the bargain that Bullock had made with Joseph Brown. In a critical vote in the house, Bullock’s opponents in the Republican Party sided with Democrats and chose a different brace of senators for congress than Bullock had chosen. Then in September 1868, anti-Bullock Republicans joined Democrats to eject all the black members of the house and senate.¹⁰⁶ There is a splendid irony in the activities of the “purified” Georgia assembly. Having purged itself of all its black members, the lily-white Georgia assembly spent millions of dollars on railroad guarantees. Tom Scott’s air line fared particularly well under the white-only legislature, receiving more convicts, larger bond guarantees, and a more flexible charter.¹⁰⁷

If the Pennsylvania stood to gain from the state’s largesse, the state itself seemed to teeter on the verge of catastrophe. The violence in Georgia accelerated after the unseating of black legislators. In late September, during the presidential campaign, a sheriff’s posse ambushed a black Republican rally near the town of Camilla, in southwestern Georgia. Shortly after the gunfire stopped, officers of the Freedman’s Bureau found twelve freedmen floating dead in a pond near the town, and five other corpses scattered nearby. The white posse, whose members claimed that *they* had been attacked by armed

freedmen, left the conflict with minor injuries. Prominent Democrats endorsed the murders in Camilla, promising to keep the peace if Republicans stayed out of local police matters.¹⁰⁸

Bullock first turned to federal power, and later to state power, to reinstate the elected members of the Georgia assembly and to stop the violence. Shortly after the conservative legislators had expelled black members, Bullock petitioned Congress to repeal the bill that allowed Georgia to reenter the Union. Bullock called for a third reconstruction in Georgia. This move threatened not only the lily-white legislature but the Pennsylvania railroad as well. Bullock referred to the sitting legislature as a “provisional” government. This statement had dire consequences for the air line. If the legislature was “provisional,” its bill supporting the air line might not have the weight of law.¹⁰⁹ In the meantime, hearings in Congress on the “Georgia question” consumed months in Congress.¹¹⁰

As the bill to reconstruct Georgia worked its way through Congress, Bullock appeared to abandon the plans of the Pennsylvania railroad. He decided that a campaign for black voting rights required a strong state, and that a strong state required railroad revenues. After arguing with the conservative state treasurer over whether he could pay for bounties on white terrorists, Bullock approached his appointee Hurlbert for Western & Atlantic railroad funds.¹¹¹ Hurlbert then opposed him, asserting that black men did not have the right to hold office. Bullock removed Hurlbert and promoted a political ally who had no apparent ties to the air line project. It was a move that would further alienate Bullock from the Pennsylvania.¹¹² In 1869, Bullock’s new superintendent used railroad revenues to pay for the Klan bounties. As conflicts within the party grew, Bullock turned more and more to the Western & Atlantic as a kind of proxy state. The new superintendent funded many of Bullock’s initiatives, including public printing.¹¹³

Such activism had a cost for a Republican governor. Industrial capitalists and fiscal conservatives in the Republican Party found themselves increasingly uncomfortable with Bullock’s use of state power.¹¹⁴ As Bullock sought to strengthen police power by using state railroads, he found himself on a collision course with the Pennsylvania Railroad. Bullock’s break with Hurlbert isolated him from many of the white Georgians in the Republican Party.¹¹⁵ The Pennsylvania’s relations with Bullock became even more strained by 1870 as conservatives threatened to impeach him.

Mutual recriminations between Bullock and the supporters of the air line flew about through 1870 and 1871. Bullock eventually turned over the whole

penitentiary to the Pennsylvania Railroad's contractor, but only after the superintendent of convicts complained that the competing contractor abused prisoners even worse. In June 1870, Bullock reluctantly endorsed the bonds of the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. In a sharply worded letter to President A. S. Buford, Bullock wrote that he did so "reluctantly," and would not endorse the bonds for the next twenty miles "unless the law is fully complied with." Some house Republicans chafed so under the power of the Pennsylvania Railroad that when Congress reinstated Georgia's black legislators, the house began an investigation into allegations of bribery and abuse of convict labor.¹¹⁶ Black Radicals in the state senate became vocal critics of Bullock *and* the former legislature, dubbing Bullock the originator of "A New System of Chain Gang Slavery."¹¹⁷

But the scandals that resulted from the investigation into the air line mostly benefited white conservatives. After very public committee hearings, southern conservatives began placing limitations on Scott's convicts. The contractors had to limit corporal punishment, and allow convicts to rest on Sundays.¹¹⁸ In the many articles on the air line's malfeasance, reporters conveniently forgot that it was a white, mostly Democratic legislature that had given the air line its biggest boost.¹¹⁹ Over time, Scott's Republican allies in Georgia drew closer to the fiscally conservative state treasurer, preferring him to the costly Bullock. Bullock soon left the state in 1871 to avoid arrest. "[W]hen we have fattened the Bullock from head to hoof," wrote the local agent of the air line, "we are certainly entitled to the carcass."¹²⁰

As we shall see in Chapter 8, the Penn would never have enemies for long in the booming city of Atlanta. The collapse of smaller port towns and the rise of regional inland trading centers was a development which coastal Democrats raged against. But merchants in Atlanta rejoiced for it. In other southern cities, capital was scarce, but the Pennsylvania's attempt to build a railroad through national institutions had benefited the city. The Penn had helped establish the Atlanta National Bank, the first and one of the few national banks in the South.¹²¹ In short order, white Atlantans were prepared to make their own relationship with Pennsylvania capital.

By 1868, Colonel Tom Scott, multimillionaire and former assistant secretary of war, saw the banners and swords that had been so recently buried reemerge from the South. The specter that haunted the Pennsylvania was the specter of a returning Confederacy. White legislators and newspapers found an explanation for southern poverty that linked railroads to corruption, and corruption to black men. They made Tom Scott the evil genius behind it all.

In Virginia, Scott's railway competitors used newspapers and legislative halls to provide citizens with a morality play. Rather than investigating the new economic geography that interstate railways had brought, legislators told citizens that Yankees were invading again, this time with greenbacks. William Mahone, supported by the Robinson's Seaboard Inland Air Line, played the part of Virginia's defender. When Richmond legislators saw the Penn intervene in the legislature, they imagined that such corruption could only come from the states' African American legislators. In Georgia, the men who resurrected the vanquished Confederacy were a more disturbing bunch. Georgia Democrats sought to depose black legislators and destroy Republican legitimacy, yet fund a convict-built railroad system toward Virginia all the same.

The Penn had begun to understand how powerful Confederate symbols and racial sentiments could be. Who borrowed the language of Confederacy was crucial in order to determine how it was being used. In Virginia, Confederate symbolism could stand for a provincial populism, and a distrust of black legislators. In Georgia it could support a fully stoked racial movement, one that favored an interstate railroad corridor but sought to smash African Americans and white Republicans who might benefit from it. In short, Tom Scott needed to learn the lesson that the erstwhile Captain Hill had learned in his libidinous adventures through the rolling mills of Lynchburg, that the Confederacy was not so completely dead, and that imposture was all that was needed to make use of it.


CHAPTER FIVE

Alamance

A Trenchant Blade

Benjamin H. Hill was tired and hoarse. He was recovering from a fever and so had to speak quietly to the white Atlanta Democrats who had gathered to hear him. He asked the crowd, milling between Alabama Street and the railroad car shed, to give him “entire quiet” so that they could all hear his voice. He looked out under the bush arbor at a hushed mass of ten thousand white men, and began his attack on the Reconstruction Acts of the U.S. Congress. It was late July of 1868 and Hill, formerly the Confederacy’s representative to the Georgia state assembly and now a director of the Georgia Central Railroad, had become one of the most militant foes of interstate railroad corporations, Republican politicians, and their intermingling in the political life of the state. Congress, Hill whispered, was a “band of foreigners,” who had “sent an army of bayonets to make war upon a helpless people.” The state’s constitutional convention, composed of black and white citizens, was an “infamy” ordered by “certain scoundrels” in Georgia whom he preferred not to name. The only reason that most Georgians supported this “thing called a constitution,” was that it promised debtor relief. “The question,” he thundered hoarsely, “was this: how many men in Georgia are willing to confess themselves no better than negroes if they could thereby get rid of their debts?”¹

For Hill, Georgia’s worst enemies were prominent public figures like former Confederate governor Joseph Brown, who sold their allegiance to capitalists and gave legitimacy to the Reconstruction governments which had been formed that summer in 1868.² Referring to Brown obliquely he ex-



“A Political Discussion.” This picture of two men and a child in Asheville, North Carolina, circa 1870s, is probably a visual pun. The older man on the right is riding on a donkey, the symbol of the Democratic Party. The man on the left is presumably a Republican debating him, and the child in the center is sitting on the fence. (courtesy Photographs and Prints Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)

claimed, “There was not a single Southern public man who advocated the acceptance of this Reconstruction scheme who was not bought, and bought with a price, by your enemies.” The rest of his speech devoted itself to cataloguing Brown’s treachery. He had “consented to be bought,” had engaged in “treachery,” had “betrayed you,” and was one with the “renegades” and “rogues” of Georgia, particularly that “stupid express agent,” Governor Rufus Bullock. He predicted grim consequences for Brown’s abandonment of principle. “You have buried the sovereignty of your State, you have sullied


the character of your ancestors, and agreed to make vassals of your children.”³

Ben Hill had begun a rhetorical strategy that summer in 1868. He attacked the political leader most successful at leading white southerners into the Republican Party by calling him corrupt and dishonorable. His rich, rhetorical language invited the crowd to imagine political corruption as a moral and spiritual depravity. Intermingled with these depravities were images of threatening black men.⁴ Hill’s metaphors suggested theft (“Reconstruction scheme,” “scoundrels”), violence (“treachery,” “betrayed you,” “buried the sovereignty”), and putrefaction (“sullied the character,” “thing called a constitution”).⁵ In a similar speech in Macon, Hill claimed that the state constitution, which guaranteed black voting, would enfranchise “seven hundred thousand ignorant negroes who can neither read nor write, who know nothing of the principles of the Constitution or of legislation, agrarians by instinct and taught by political drill-masters that they have injuries to avenge against the white race.”⁶ Hill summoned up violent fears and fantasies about black men, fantasies about murder that were a new part of public discourse in the South.⁷

The connections Hill drew between the dangers of public corruption and the threats posed by black men were not lost on the members of the crowd. Standing in the audience were the Saluda Brothers, white railway workers from near Atlanta who got so stimulated by Hill’s speech that they ran off to attack a skilled black carpenter with pistols and knives. They permanently maimed him and made it impossible for him to lift his tools again.⁸ Many more white men stayed behind to swear oaths to the Ku Klux Klan and to begin organized assaults and murders of freed people, mostly black men.⁹ In the railway hubs of Covington and Macon, the formula was repeated—Hill gave stimulating speeches about violence and theft, and Klans emerged that evening to destroy black communities.¹⁰

The Klan was from its first inception a violent, racist institution. Historians have shown how the Klan adhered to a racism that appealed to many southern whites.¹¹ Other historians have suggested that because the Klan also attacked white Republicans, and attacked citizens in counties where the number of Republican and Democratic voters were evenly balanced, that the Klan had an expressly political purpose.¹² The Klan sought to drive black voters away from the polls, while threatening whites who voted Republican. Both of these features of Klan violence—elemental racism, and the desire to push Republicans out of power—were central parts of Klan violence.

But Ben Hill’s opening speech at the Atlanta railway shops suggests some



“Electioneering at the South.” Freed people, men and women, gathered to discuss political platforms, state constitutions, and contracts. In North and South Carolina, political speeches often followed militia musters. (courtesy Library of Congress)

other features about the Klan germane to this story. Klans did not emerge overnight and they did not emerge in every county where votes were contested. Klan intellectuals like Benjamin Hill and John Gordon visited public areas, not infrequently at railroad hubs, and invited public outrage at “corruption,” particularly about Republicans’ misuse of funds.¹³ They concluded their catalog of corruptions, real and imagined, by asserting that northern outsiders and freed men were the source of these problems. And they invited violence to bring these changes to a stop. The next two chapters will examine the sequence of events that led to the rapid escalation of Klan violence in Alamance County, North Carolina, and the upper piedmont in South Carolina. These areas along the Confederate corridor saw not only protracted Klan violence, but also armed conflicts between Klansmen on one side and state and federal governments on the other. These armed battles led to mass arrests, the impeachment of a governor, and the near-collapse of the Republican Party in the seaboard states, and they concluded with a series of agreements between Klan leaders and the agents of the railroad corridor. Chapters



This image of white men whipping a black woman, made months before the Klan emerged as a formal organization, suggests the violence of southern Democrats and the way in which violence operated as a spectacle for many onlookers. The men pictured here are both former officers and enlisted men, both Union and Confederate. The jackets and white shirts suggest that many of the attackers were wealthier whites.
(courtesy Photographs and Prints Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)

7 and 8 will explore the new kind of Confederate corridor that emerged in the wake of the Klan trials. To avoid the political controversies and “corruptions” that Benjamin Hill alluded to, states surrendered control over the railroad corridor and allowed it to be administered by a new kind of corporation, the modern holding company.

In the summer of 1868, Klan violence flared up in Alamance County, North Carolina, in the area around the repair shops of the state-controlled North Carolina Railroad. Company Shops (now Burlington) was the largest repair facility along Moncure Robinson's railway corridor between Norfolk and Augusta. At Company Shops and nearby Graham an organization of black and white workingmen, some of them railwaymen, formed a Republi-

can Party organization called the Loyal Republican League. As the new state constitution went into effect, Loyal Leaguers became prominent in municipal politics. By the summer of 1868, Democratic political leaders embraced the strategy that Benjamin Hill had introduced. They made public speeches that strongly suggested violence and claimed that the Loyal Leagues represented part of a vast “machine,” tied to the state-managed railroad, that corrupted the state. In the following months, hundreds of local merchants, planters, and a few white railway mechanics joined the Constitutional Union Guard and the White Brotherhood and began a campaign of terror that sought to undermine the newly reconstructed municipal governments in Alamance. When Loyal Leaguers tried to prosecute Klansmen in the first few months of 1869, Klan violence escalated. Some very public murders followed, leading the Republican governor to declare the county in a state of insurrection and to send in newly commissioned state militias. The governor’s response pushed the state into crisis, and led to the end of Republican control of the government.

In Alamance County, a biracial carriage maker named Wyatt Outlaw was at the center of these changes. He was nearly fifty in 1868, and an important man in the county. Outlaw’s mother was a slave, while his father was a prominent white merchant in northern Alamance named Chesley Faucett. Before the war, Outlaw had probably been a carpenter in his father’s shop. At that time Outlaw and his kin, black and white, lived in the northern part of the county in an area called Faucett’s Store.¹⁴ Faucett was a merchant, a slaveholder, and a Whig who had opposed a war over slavery. After 1861 he had become a vocal opponent of the war. At least two of his white sons had left him to join the Confederacy, and died in the war. By the end of the war Chesley Faucett was a broken man. Faucett “has no mind,” neighbors said.¹⁵

After the war, Outlaw opened a shop—probably for carpentry and wagon repair—in the county seat of Graham. The shop was one stop away from the North Carolina Railroad’s repair shops. Perhaps more so than his many white half-brothers or half-nephews, Wyatt Outlaw followed in the footsteps of his father. Many people in Graham, black and white, considered him a respectable and honorable person. Like Chesley Faucett, he lived in his store. Because he had lost his wife, Wyatt Outlaw lived with his children and his mother. All lived on the ground floor of the shop.¹⁶

His duties as a carriage maker apparently gave him the capital and free time to sell liquor in one of the rooms of his shop. In 1868, it was railroad workers who had cash to buy liquor from Outlaw. A sizable number of rail-



African American men outside an “eating saloon” in South Carolina, circa 1870s. Saloons and stores emerged all over the Carolinas, especially along the tracks of the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. These saloons became targets for Klan violence, as Klansmen claimed that freed people stole cotton to buy goods. Of course, saloons like Wyatt Outlaw’s were also political centers, meeting places for Loyal Leagues, and centers for the cooperative sale and distribution of cotton. (courtesy Photographs and Prints Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)

road workers in the nearby shops were freed black men—sixteen of the shops' seventy-two workers were black in that year. Some were former slaves and others were former free blacks who had worked in the shops for years. Of the many maintenance-of-way workers, 345 of the 455 (nearly 76 percent) were men of color. It may have been mostly freed men and white Republicans that frequented Outlaw's drinking room given that another barroom, run by a white conservative, stood closer to the shops. Local courts had tried twice to close down Outlaw's barroom, but Outlaw had apparently refused the summonses of the county court.¹⁷

Just as in other working-class communities before and after the war, the licensing of liquor might have brought together many of the town's working-men. It was probably in his extensive offices that Outlaw first organized the Alamance chapter of the Loyal Republican League. Initiates in the Loyal League were known as Pioneers, the title given to black railroad workers who had rebuilt railroad lines for Union troops. The Loyal League, like the Union League elsewhere in the South, aimed to, as one member put it, "cause voters to have courage to go to the polls and vote." Members were posted at each of the polls during election time to see who voted, and how. They wore small strips of fabric in their lapels to identify themselves to one another, and discreetly tapped their lapels when passing brother members. The fabric in the lapel, secret handshakes, and code words all recalled the wartime "Red Strings" society, an organization that harbored refugees from the Confederate draft. The biracial Outlaw could have been the conduit between Unionists organizations, white and black. Outlaw carried on his father's activities even here—for Outlaw's father Chesley Faucett had been prominent in the Alamance Red Strings.¹⁸

The Red Strings were one of many political threads that bound the Loyal Republican League to older radical traditions. The League embodied many of the Enlightenment traditions that had bound political societies together for generations. Classical references abounded: Outlaw opened and closed the League meetings, and initiated new members, assuming the title of "Archon," the ancient title for chief magistrate. Novice Pioneers pledged to enlightenment principles: "a free press, elective judges, [and] equal justice to all men." They saw education as critical to the order, promising "to aid in elevating and educating the people."¹⁹ One member later recalled before a hostile senate committee that the order existed "sort of to instruct colored people that never knew anything . . . learn them something; to know how to talk, or something of that sort."²⁰ Politically, the group's commitment to total

equality made it more radical than the more familiar organization, the Union League. Loyal League members promised not to “countenance any social or political aristocracy” and even “to wrest power from the rich as such.” Indeed North Carolina’s Governor William W. Holden sought to disband the Loyal League and have its members form into the more conservative Union League.²¹

The groups in the Loyal League, called councils, also intermixed ideals of Christian manhood with their enlightenment principles. A novice member, called a Recruit, pledged his “sacred honor as a man, as a citizen and as a Christian” not to divulge the council’s secrets. Once accepted, a member was called a “brother,” and continually renewed his bond with his brethren, the Pioneers of the League. Recruits sealed their oath with an appeal that “God, who heareth, keep us free and steadfast, and give us victory over wrong.”²²

Elsewhere, the activities of the Loyal Republican League might have received little notice from white southerners, but the workers on the NCRR in Alamance were both powerful and irreplaceable. Because the Confederacy had made the North Carolina Railroad the central part of its railway corridor, Alamance County had become one of the most important railway hubs in the South. A mostly local line before the war, the NCRR was by 1867 at the center of an interstate traffic system that joined Georgia to the Virginia coast.²³ The coming of freedom and the rapid increase in interstate traffic meant that railroad workers received, besides daily rations, cash wages that ranged from a dollar a day to fifteen dollars a week.²⁴ Cash wages set railroad workers apart. Many of the traditional sources of capital in the South had dried up: the Thirteenth Amendment formally liberated slaves, planters’ most valuable asset; the Fourteenth formally destroyed Confederate debt, the basis for most southern banks; and, finally, legislation passed in the late 1860s destroyed nearly all state banks. Thus Wyatt Outlaw stood at the head of a political organization of hundreds of assertive and well-organized African American workers. These were men with resources and stood poised to directly influence municipal and county politics in Alamance County.

The Loyal League’s public activities were extensive. With a minister and a railroad blacksmith, Outlaw helped organize a chapter of the AME Zion Church, which held daylight services and evening meetings. Before breaking ground on a new building, the league had a brief altercation with local whites. Whites in the county operated their own school and church which had been received funding from the state-managed North Carolina Railroad.

League members then apparently approached the railroad for land and funds for their own church and school but were rebuffed. Shortly thereafter, two league members, one white and one black, tried to enter the state-supported church one Sunday in 1867. When parishioners saw that one of the members was black, the league members were forced to stand in the hallway during the service. Shortly thereafter, the church offered to sell the building back to the railroad so that black parishioners could use it. The following year League members bought land for a new church in the town of Graham.²⁵ League members were also partly responsible for the election of a white blacksmith, T. M. Shoffner, to the state senate in 1868. Shoffner's support of the North Carolina Railroad while in office had even inclined moderate Democrats to support him after he took office despite what they called "his chances and his intelligence."²⁶

In a capital-poor environment, every action of successful railroad workers, particularly their assertions of autonomy and political power, assumed tremendous importance. Their resources were not inconsiderable. In the area around Graham, large numbers of African American railwaymen not only withdrew the labor of their wives and children from the labor market, they also hired their own live-in domestic servants. Moreover, freed workers voted with their pay envelopes, often bypassing older merchants in town. A large number of specialized merchants—dry-goods merchants, grocerymen, and liquor dealers—sprang up in the towns of Graham and Company Shops between 1865 and 1870 to serve this community of workers who now had money to spend.²⁷ As with any large group of workmen, some of them single, illicit shops emerged as well, including houses of prostitution and drinking rooms like Outlaw's.²⁸

The white Squires of Alamance were outraged by the growing power of this group of black workers. The old and prestigious Ruffin family left the county altogether, blaming white Unionists for encouraging drastic changes in the way black men presented themselves. The antebellum jurist Thomas Ruffin complained that he had felt "surrounded . . . by a large number of free niggers instigated to the study of Deviltry by the malice and vengeful spite of a large Tory district."²⁹ A few of Alamance's white merchant class actively sought the patronage of new workers or traded solely with the white mechanics, master carpenters, and local farmers.³⁰ Other merchants may have peered out their windows at the new buyers and sellers in Graham, murmuring their contempt and frustration. Something had to be done, said white conservative William Tickel, "to keep down the style of the niggers" in Alamance.³¹

These workers were not only politically powerful, they were essential. White conservatives in the railway had tried to eliminate black railroad workers immediately after the war, but the experiment had failed abysmally. NCRR president Nathaniel Boyden's Committee of Inspection had previously complained about freedmen's lack of "constancy and economy" and rued that, "[t]he late change in our system of labor" had led freedmen to be too independent: "They come to-day and engage to work for a month or three months, commence work, receive rations, and to-morrow they are gone."³² Boyden had tried to replace unskilled black workers with unskilled white ones at the beginning of 1866. This strategy had lasted a year or so, but shortly afterward the road's freed workers had all been hired back again.³³

The Loyal Republican League's difficulties began in June 1867, when a new president moved into the railway offices at Company Shops who would seek to undermine these black workers' autonomy and power. Josiah Turner was a study in contradictions. Scion of a wealthy planter and slave trader, he was one of the two state senators in North Carolina to oppose secession in 1861.³⁴ His abiding fear and anger at black men may have emerged in 1860 after Matt Turner, one of his slaves, burned many of the buildings on his plantation.³⁵ During the war, after a brief stint in the cavalry, Josiah Turner became a representative in the Confederate Congress. He is best remembered for his bitter opposition to the arming of slaves.³⁶ When his wife grew gravely ill in 1865, he wrote her from Richmond, "I must stay here to defeat the arriving slaves in which I think you and the children are specially interested as well as every woman and child in the Confederacy."³⁷

Turner's first answer to the problem of *black* self-activity was to eliminate the "large Tory district" of *white* workers of which Ruffin had spoken. The North Carolina Railroad was filled with highly paid white workers, some northern born, who had been strong Unionists during the war. These men had voted for Red Strings candidates like Chesley Faucett, using ballots with American eagles on them. They had raised an American flag in Alamance County during the war and had used their positions as railroad workers to avoid conscription.³⁸ White children of railway workers were educated at the same schools as the black children of railway workers, and though black and white students studied at different times of the day, well-off workers subsidized the schooling of poorer pupils.³⁹

Turner targeted white workers who had been born in the North for firing, and praised the southern-born workers who remained for their industriousness. In his annual report to stockholders he faulted his contemporaries for

failing to take the radical step of doing without Yankee workmen: “What a pity! the pride and manhood of eight millions of Southern people could not unite in denying all commercial relations with Northern people so long as they refuse political relations with us. This would reconstruct us without the aid of the army or the sword.”⁴⁰ It was toward the beginning of 1868 that Josiah Turner’s path may have first collided with Wyatt Outlaw’s. The Loyal Republican League protested to members of the general assembly about Turner’s firing of league members. Shortly afterward, the state passed legislation preventing owners from firing workers for political reasons. Turner then publicly fired a prominent black shopman, Solomon Lunsford, for his membership in the Loyal Republican League. “If intelligent white men are not allowed to vote the Conservative ticket,” Turner explained later, “why should ignorant black men be allowed to vote the Radical ticket?”⁴¹

Indeed, Turner not only saw the Loyal League as a workingmen’s organization that might interfere with his control of the railroad, he and other conservatives also saw them as dangerous. Alamance Democrats called the white organizers of the League “political adventurers” and claimed that they threatened insurrection.⁴² League members, Turner wrote, not only met at night, they assembled “at the call of drum and fife.” Old fears of insurrection merged with images of war. “We knew then,” Turner wrote later, “that this was all leading to trouble and blood.”⁴³

Had Turner stopped at using the railroad to manage regional politics, the Klan might never have amounted to much in Alamance or surrounding counties. But his ambitions were much more capacious, and his message reached much farther. The conservative governor in 1866 had appointed Turner for this ambition and for his public presence as a speaker. “I regarded Jo. Turner,” the governor later wrote, “as a man who had the capacity and the nerve to shake off this thralldom.” Radical Reconstruction had its answer in Jo. Turner.⁴⁴

When Turner became president of the NCRR in June of 1867, his patron had already been removed from the governor’s office. As the state began to draft a new constitution in 1868, Turner began to mobilize farmers against the Republican Party and to transform their economic hardship into public grievances against the state.

Turner’s position as president allowed him to reach this conservative constituency. Turner wrote in his President’s Report in 1868 that when he tried to sell the road’s bonds on Wall Street, the financiers would not buy his bonds at par. “If I would take 80 cents,” Turner exclaimed, “our political

condition [would be] forgotten, or at least not named.”⁴⁵ Turner chose to instead to name the condition again and again. His report condemned Congress for taxing southern agricultural goods like cotton while refusing to tax the cheap midwestern wheat that was destroying southern farmers’ livelihoods. He attacked the Freedman’s Bureau and the Republican governor. He concluded with a long quote by Edmund Burke on the vices of taxing the farmer’s “feeble” capital.⁴⁶

Just as Georgia’s Benjamin Hill had used railway hubs to spread his message, Turner used his position as railway president to bring the message of the Conservative Party directly to towns along the line of the North Carolina Railroad. Like Georgia Republican Edward Hurlbert, Turner’s position on the railroad allowed him to travel anywhere in the state for free. He traveled over the NCRR to meet a crowd of 4,000 whites in Randolph County, and told them that the Radical Constitution would create interracial schools and militias, and introduce rule by “negro commissioners.” He led crowds throughout the state in calling resolution for a “white man’s government” in North Carolina.⁴⁷ In Alamance he told the story of his faithful servant named Dick, whom Turner had always treated like a son. But, Turner reportedly said, “‘If Dick should ever vote the radical ticket, Dick should never eat my meat and bread; damned if Dick could ever eat my meat and bread.’”⁴⁸ In public speeches he reportedly told white voters that black voters could expect dangerous trouble if they continued to vote Republican.⁴⁹

Outlaw began to respond to Turner’s explicit and implicit threats to the Loyal League as early as July 1867. Outlaw first aligned his organization more closely to the conservative wing of the Republican Party. At a state meeting of the Union League in Raleigh, Outlaw accepted Republican William W. Holden’s commission as deputy member of the Grand State Council. The commission gave Outlaw the authority to travel throughout the state to initiate members and install officers in the more conservative Republican organization.⁵⁰ Drawing closer to the centrist wing of the party had its rewards for black workers on the railroad. When Holden became governor of North Carolina in April of 1868, he facilitated the appointment of a railroad president less offensive to black workers. Throughout Holden’s governorship, workers continued to write him for help in conflicts with local managers.⁵¹ In July 1868, Holden interpreted the new state constitution as giving him the power to appoint county commissioners until the next regular election. For the railroad towns of Graham and Company Shops, Holden asked blacksmith and

state senator T. M. Shoffner for a list of appropriate Republican appointees. Shoffner's list included Wyatt Outlaw, who was sworn in as commissioner in July of 1868.⁵²

By the middle of 1868, Holden's appointee to the North Carolina Railroad, William A. Smith, overturned many of Turner's actions. Smith gave free tickets to Republican electors, and reportedly moved voters to districts where their votes would be most effective.⁵³ In what a Conservative newspaper labeled a "vast and sweeping system of *dead-headism*," Smith reputedly provided free railroad passes to friends of the administration while firing Holden's opponents.⁵⁴ Perhaps to respond to Turner's firing of northern workmen, William A. Smith discharged many white Democratic workers late in 1868. E. G. Rike wrote to his brother that he was "discharged from the Company Shops because I was A white man." "The Road," he complained, "is now in the possession the Rads."⁵⁵

Ousted from his post as director of the NCRR, Turner found new outlets for his vituperative attacks on Republican railroaders and African Americans. With financial help from his father and with a large loan from conservative railroad lobbyist George Swepson, Turner took over the Raleigh *Sentinel*.⁵⁶ From his new perch in the editorial offices in Raleigh, Turner could now assail the North Carolina Railroad as an agent of corruption. No one had a better understanding of the power that a state-owned railroad could have. He likely also got regular reports of the railroad battles over consolidation with his regular dinner partner, A. B. Andrews of the Seaboard Inland Air Line.⁵⁷ The directors of the Seaboard Inland Air Line had their own reasons for disliking the NCRR's new railroad president, for Smith threatened to direct traffic away from the Seaboard's steamship port at Norfolk and toward the Pennsylvania's trunk to Washington.⁵⁸

From the summer of 1868—when Turner left Alamance County—until well into 1870, he began a steady stream of invectives against Republicans working for the railroad. And in those years the Alamance Klan grew to considerable proportions.⁵⁹ In a poem which Turner claimed to have taken from a carpetbagger, he melded images of the railroad's power with black workingmen.

We know that we can make it pay,
For we can run the old machine,
While we get seven dollars per day,
And gold is only one, sixteen.

The negro is our motive power,
He's strong, and we have a down grade,
We make the time, at one (\$) an hour,
While e'er the Treasury will bleed.

We do not care what bonds are worth,
Nor what Jo. Turner has to say;
'Twas greenbacks brought us from the North,
In greenbacks we will have our pay.⁶⁰

Turner's attacks, like Benjamin Hill's, joined images of railroad lobbying with images of black men in positions of power. Treasuries bleed, and black men are the force behind it, the motive power. "Yes, we *have* a new North Carolina," Turner wrote, "In the Judiciary, montebanks, ignoramuses and men who bedraggle the ermine in the mud and mire of politics!—In the offices of the State, mercenary squatters and incompetency! In the Legislative Halls, where once giants sat, adventurers, mannikins and gibbering Africans."⁶¹ Turner's wild language prompted the outgoing editor of the *Sentinel* to say of Turner that he was "a gallant knight, who wields a trenchant blade, which will cut."⁶²

Calling Turner a knight is revealing, for Sir Walter Scott's novel, *Ivanhoe*, was much beloved by both Turner and Alamance Klansmen.⁶³ As Turner's invective did its work in Alamance county, Gothic images out of *Ivanhoe* abounded.⁶⁴ Indeed, many of the Alamance Klan's proclamations that Turner reprinted in the *Sentinel* echoed Scott's overworked prose. One of the leading spokesmen for the Alamance Brotherhood wrote that anti-Klan legislation introduced in the North Carolina legislature would turn Alamance into "dark and bloody ground on which tyrants and despots may do their diabolic work" and that "verily it is the reenactment of Draco's laws written in human blood."⁶⁵ Everyone was welcome to Alamance County, an anonymous brother named Omega wrote, if you did not "steal a mule, insult a woman nor burn a barn." Otherwise the "'spirits of just men made perfect' would be invoked."⁶⁶ The romantic echoes of violence, blood, and ghosts should not be surprising: Scott's novels were the most popular novels in Confederate field libraries and were a staple for the secular readers in southern towns.⁶⁷

The men who joined the Alamance Klan in the years after Turner left the shops were diverse, but they shared a number of things. Among the important leaders, called Chiefs, were former Confederates in Companies F and K



This drawing of western North Carolina Klansmen surrounding Republican John Campbell shows the ornate regalia, false beards, and horns of the first Klan. Klansmen posed as devils, the souls of dead Confederates who had come back to avenge themselves. (courtesy Library of Congress)

of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment. Most of these men had spent more than a year together in the Point Lookout Prison in southern Maryland, southeast of Washington, D.C.⁶⁸ Mostly enlisted men, they had been under the watch of black soldiers during that period. It was likely in prison that they learned the whistles and sign language that made the Alamance Klan so distinctive, and so difficult to capture. Among the general members, many members of the Alamance Klans were shopkeepers and tradesmen.⁶⁹ A smaller number were farmers or sons of farmers, many from among the wealthiest of Alamance families.⁷⁰

We may never understand what mixture of racism, personal hatred, and narrow-minded conservatism sent some white southerners into the Klan, but many of the rituals and violent activities of the Klan suggest that its members sought in part to overturn the political power and the claims to that manhood which the Loyal League represented. Counterpoised to the enlighten-

ment masculinity that black workmen presented, white Klansmen fashioned their own version of white masculinity that appropriated much from Ivanhoe.⁷¹ Unlike Klaverns elsewhere in the South, Alamance white brothers wore ornate regalia that included white robes, paper hats, and horns on both sides of the head. Even their horses had robes.⁷²

Countering the Loyal Republican League's ritual celebration of the emergence of black men into politics and manhood, the white brotherhood elaborated competing rituals of manhood, sexual power, and gallantry. Rather than the explicitly political and *enlightenment* ritual of the Loyal League, white brothers emplotted themselves as *romantic* figures out of Ivanhoe. Hooded Saxon warriors on horseback hid in the massive forests, defending the honor of their native land against foreign invaders.

The White Brotherhood's ritual absorption of the romantic plot of Ivanhoe allowed the order to define itself directly against Republican League ritual, defining its own whiteness out of blackness. Rather than endorsing a formal set of political principles, which placed the law first (as the Loyal League did), white brothers swore blood oaths, with a noose around their necks, promising that their cabalistic law superseded constitutional law. Local leaders did not recall Athenian democracy ("Archon") but an invented tribalism ("Chief"). Meetings were not democratic but martial in that most members were privates who carried out orders, while a few chiefs decided who would be tortured. White brothers did not hold formal meetings in rooms with established positions for a Bible and the Constitution; they assembled camps in the woods, and always at a different place.⁷³

Finally, their activities were explicitly sexualized, with rituals that can only be described as homoerotic. A new member would be initiated by tying a rope around his neck and then be slightly asphyxiated. Then regular members—who wore great horns on their heads—would surround the novice white brother, growl and bark at him, and rub their horns against his body.⁷⁴ Prominent, too, was the Brotherhood's replaying of Jacksonian masculinity. When disguised, members all carried hickory sticks, the canes used by Jacksonian party regulars and marketed throughout the South during Jackson's presidency.⁷⁵

Violent attacks on white Republicans and schoolteachers suggested a fixation on masculinity and sexuality, too. Alamance Klansmen often shaved white men's heads. In the nineteenth century baldness commonly suggested sterility. There were practical advantages to such attacks as well. Head shav-

ing served to efface one's manhood without permanently disfiguring him. Alonzo Corliss, the white Loyal Leaguer who sought to enter the Alamance church with a black league member was bound, half of his head was shaved, and he was painted black on one half of his face. At other times members of the White Brotherhood cut epithets into the skin.⁷⁶

In the more violent attacks on black men, the White Brotherhood aimed to infantilize and emasculate them at the same time that they physically suggested their own animalistic sexual power. Rather than tying black men to posts and whipping them, as had been antebellum custom, one white brother would whip a black man in his own front yard. As a group, white brothers would then gather around their victim and rub his back with persimmon sticks to make him scream. They also used their hickory sticks against targets; but rather than striking their victims, they chased them in front of their houses, walloping them like children as they passed.⁷⁷ Finally, white brothers did not restrain themselves to performative emasculations of African Americans. Overtly sexual violence was one of the things that made the Alamance Klan so prominent. Nathan Trollinger was made to cut gashes into his penis with a knife, for the crime of telling a white woman to keep her pigs out of his corn. Caswell Holt was castrated for allegedly exposing himself to a white woman.⁷⁸

Wyatt Outlaw first responded by organizing a small police patrol. In a Klan raid on Graham in February 1869, the patrol exposed and drove off Klansmen before they succeeded in attacking anyone.⁷⁹ The governor responded to the Klan raid by briefly sending a company of state militia into town.⁸⁰ Many more attacks followed outside of town or in Company Shops, where Corliss was assaulted in December 1869. While many black residents proposed arming themselves for retaliation, Outlaw—true to the precepts of the Loyal League—put his trust in state laws.⁸¹ Days after Corliss was assaulted, blacksmith T. M. Shoffner responded to the attack by introducing a bill to strengthen the state militias.⁸² Shoffner was threatened with hanging, and managed to escape the state.⁸³

Outlaw's faith in the reconstructed state was poorly placed. On the evening of 26 February 1870, one year after the Outlaw's street patrol had driven off the Klan, Klan members entered Outlaw's shop and took him from his bedroom. Half-dressed, Outlaw was separated from his children and ushered into the central square of town. Mounted guards were posted at all exits from the central square while nearly one hundred members of the White Brotherhood took Outlaw to an oak tree across from the County

Courthouse in Graham, tied a noose around his neck, and hanged him. Outlaw's own half-brothers and half-cousins, Faucetts who had joined the White Brotherhood, were probably in the crowd as well. Unsatisfied with their work at first, Klansmen finished their indignities on his body by widening his mouth with a knife.⁸⁴

In Alamance, Klansmen imagined a threat that Turner's proclamations made coherent. As the growth of an interstate railway system gave benefits to black workers, and as Reconstruction whittled away at the wealth and power of older elites, white conservatives sought about for answers. They saw a principled, organized community of black workers who could operate independently of white authority. Men like Josiah Turner helped them imagine massive political "machines" run by black workers and state governments dominated by "gibbering Africans." Black workers' bypassing of white merchants and their assertions of masculinity apparently made local merchants and poor farmers uneasy. Klansmen banished that vision in ceremonies of castration and murder.

Republicans responded by attacking the source of violence, but their attacks actually strengthened Turner, bringing his metaphor of swords, despotism, and violent Republicans to life. In North Carolina, Republican governor Holden—like Georgia's Republican governor Bullock—tried to use the state's partial ownership of railroads to stifle Klan activities. In February 1869, the legislature had given him the authority to hire detectives to infiltrate Klan meetings and prepare indictments against Klansmen. Included on the staff of the detective force, which was directed by the head of the state militia, were a conductor on the North Carolina Railroad and the president of the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad.⁸⁵ With a son and many cousins on the boards of the state's railroads, Holden could use free telegraph privileges to keep tabs on the movements of Klan leaders throughout the state.⁸⁶ With weapons transported on loan from the state of Vermont, Holden used the railroad system to move the state militia from western counties to the seat of Klan violence in Alamance.⁸⁷

Yet Josiah Turner's overblown rhetoric of corruption worked *best* as state power became punitive and visible. Klan violence surely frightened away black voters and intimidated black leaders, but its language of "machines," unjust taxation, trouble, and blood succeeded because state power became manifest. Only when the state was visible, when spies were about and soldiers began extracting confessions, did the Klan's violent rhetoric seem to genuinely explain the shape of the political landscape. Holden's violent

response to Klan leaders in Alamance weakened his legitimacy throughout the state.

It helped that conservatives' newspapers like Turner's could put their own ugly spin on news as it emerged. When the governor suspended writs of habeas corpus in Alamance and neighboring counties, Conservatives called it the "Kirk-Holden War," memorializing Holden's colonel of the militia, George Kirk. It did not help that Kirk was an unpopular Union officer, disliked even by western Republicans.⁸⁸ Turner traveled around the state fabricating "reports" of hangings and whippings used to extract testimony from Klansmen. Democratic newspapers throughout the state glibly claimed that "all the murders, whippings and barn-burnings had been done by the Loyal Leaguers under the barb of Ku Klux!"⁸⁹

In the end, the railway corridor that had helped to make Alamance the center of southern transport became a center of political violence. One of the counties representatives to the state assembly wrote that he had learned, "Northern men are actually afraid to travel through Alamance County on the public highways in consequence of the unfounded rumors that we are rebellious and hostile to that class of fellow citizens."⁹⁰ In a private letter, Judge Albion Tourgée of the circuit court blamed President Grant for failing to support the governor in Alamance County, leaving "those men . . . who took their lives in their hands when they cast their ballots for US Grant and other officials . . . [to] be sacrificed, murdered, scourged, mangled."⁹¹ By 1870 the violence had moved down the railroad line to Spartanburg. Conservatives there would explain economic changes, using the same rhetoric of corruption that Benjamin Hill and Josiah Turner had used. Though interstate railroads had briefly helped black workingmen in Alamance to emerge and begin to reconstruct the South on their own terms, Turner found that rhetorical force could put a stop to it. The rhetoric of corruption—particularly the violent images that connected black advancement with political corruption—could weaken the legitimacy of brittle Republican governments. When Republicans used state power to stop the Klan, Klan newspapers claimed vindication of their romantic stories of Democratic valor arrayed against Republican force. In fact, force was nearly all on Turner's side. Turner did not hold the knife that disfigured Wyatt Outlaw, but it was his trenchant blade that did the cutting.

CHAPTER SIX

Pockets Full of Executions

The Railway Corridor in South Carolina

In South Carolina, interstate railroad systems dramatically reshaped the landscape. The Confederacy first tapped into South Carolina's upper piedmont¹ when it graded and joined railroads between Richmond and Augusta in 1862. The Confederate railway corridor and the coming of black freedom together altered everyday life in the upper piedmont. Just when Confederate quartermasters were depleting the region's livestock, local people, white and black, began to take advantage of their proximity to an interstate railway line. Opportunities for trade and opportunities for violence grew together in those wartime years.

During Reconstruction, railroad directors fought over how far the Iron Confederacy would reach. Moncure Robinson and Alexander Boyd Andrews's Seaboard Inland Air Line extended from the deepwater port of Norfolk, through the North Carolina Railroad, and toward Augusta. At the same time, Tom Scott began purchasing South Carolina railroads to build a competing corridor that would start in Richmond, follow the North Carolina Railroad, and then pass even higher into South Carolina's upper piedmont, ending in Atlanta. Because both Scott and Robinson's system used the North Carolina Railroad to bridge South Carolina and Virginia, the two companies fought bitterly for traffic at the far end of the corridor, in the South Carolina up-country. The shipping rates on cotton dropped precipitously as the directors sought to gain control of the southern market.²

As shipping prices for cotton dropped, the hills along the Broad River turned white with the fleecy staple. Yet the opportunities created by the cot-

ton boom were not distributed evenly. Rising land prices, combined with a Republican policy of extensive property taxes, meant that the burden of change would fall unevenly. Thus controversy in the upper piedmont often focused on the new opportunities for trading that the railroad corridor had created. By 1868, these controversies became increasingly partisan and racial.

Within the upper piedmont, the conflicts took different forms in different places. In the eastern counties of York and Union, planters tried to control the marketing of cotton and to restrict the movement of freed people. Freed people organized into Union Leagues, partly to take advantage of new markets and partly to resist intrusion on their labor time. As former slaveholders and former slaves sought to manage the boundaries between legal and illegal trade along the railway corridor, Klan violence increased. By 1870, York and Union Klansmen in the “Council of Safety” and the “Invisible Empire” began to murder black men by the dozens.

Farther west, in Spartanburg County, property values and taxes rose more rapidly as the railroad came through, and small farms quickly teetered into bankruptcy. Klansmen there fought with Republicans—white and black—over taxation and the disposition of land. As freed men began to insert themselves into local markets, at times on behalf of white women, Klan leaders targeted them individually. Spartanburg Klansmen also assailed railroad-connected white Republicans, whom Klansmen claimed had “corrupted” southern states and reversed the position of blacks and whites.

As in Alamance County, Klansmen in northern piedmont counties used newspapers and public proclamations to fuse the public malfeasance of men connected to railroad rings with black artisans’ success and white farmers’ failure. When Tom Scott sought to extend his Atlanta & Richmond Air Line into Spartanburg county, he found that the Confederate railroad corridor he hoped to manage had generated both resentment and desire. Klansmen in these three counties may have killed more black southerners than any other group of Klans in the South. The killing disrupted Tom Scott’s plans just as surely as the opposition of railway presidents.

The war and Confederate-sponsored railroad building brought drastic changes to the free and enslaved families of the upper piedmont. Before the war, home produce reached the inland city of Columbia only by traveling down the fast-flowing Pacolet, Tiger, and Broad Rivers. A contemporary probably overstated the isolation when he called the area “a wilderness remote from the centers of civilization.”³ Still, few farmers thought it worth the effort to drive cotton boats down the treacherous rapids to Columbia.⁴ If

cotton made it down to Columbia, it could travel more safely in the freight cars that rumbled south and east into Charleston over the South Carolina Railroad. At last, one year before the firing on Fort Sumter, the first railway engine climbed north and west into Spartanburg. But even then, rates on the Spartanburg & Union branch of the SCRR were high, nearly double the rates on northern railroads, and this nearly insulated the upcountry from international markets.⁵ Thus upper piedmont plantations could hardly afford to trade their cotton for goods from far away. Because shipping costs were prohibitive, slaves in the area made wood-soled shoes, wove baskets, and tanned their own harnesses, buggy whips, and shoestrings.⁶

Harnesses, shoes, buggy whips—these goods pointed to another distinctive feature of the upper piedmont besides remoteness from markets. For the history of the Broad River counties was largely the history of livestock. While some upcountry plantations grew cotton, most smaller farms raised or fattened pigs, sheep, and cattle for sale downstate. In Spartanburg County, livestock outnumbered people almost four to one. Animals solved the problem of distance because they made corn fodder mobile and concentrated corn's protein into living tissue and fat. Drovers pushed animals down to plantations and cities on the South Carolina coast, where they were added to the otherwise protein-deficient diet of coastal slaves. South Carolina slaves in turn produced rice, the consummate food crop for European markets. Thus the pigs and cows of counties near Spartanburg acted as the first link in a labor and food chain that finished, as rice, on the dinner tables of iron workers in the Ruhr valley and factory workers in Manchester.⁷ Moreover, the remote towns of the upper piedmont, however small, provided a market for small farmers to sell corn and wheat.⁸ Sale days once a month thus brought together many white planters and farmers.⁹

The Confederate railway corridor radically rearranged these patterns of trade. When drafted slaves extended the Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad through South Carolina and toward Augusta, the railroad put York, Union, and Spartanburg Counties at the center of the Confederate supply line. Quartermasters were soon loading Carolina beef, pork, and corn into railroad cars that would travel north to Confederate camps in Virginia.¹⁰ Many Carolina farmers objected to being the pantry of the Confederacy, particularly as Confederate currency depreciated and the Commissary Department began to impress the region's domestic animals.¹¹ Demands on regional resources also increased as rice planters moved in, their slaves included, to escape the rifled cannons arrayed against Charleston.¹² By 1865,

a downstate newspaper concluded that the war had devoured the livestock that had sustained smaller farms: “Of the stock, horses, hogs, cattle, . . . all but an inconsiderable amount have been consumed, destroyed, or taken.”¹³

Yet the railway corridor did not bring entirely bad tidings to the northern hills. As commissaries depleted the region’s livestock, new opportunities grew in their place. The upper piedmont’s position on the railway corridor gave the area direct access to a world starved for cotton. In the Spartanburg region, farmers began to plant cotton on the hills where sheep and pigs had grazed.

Wartime expediency had drastically altered the upper piedmont’s place in the regional economy. By 1863, officers of the lines along the railway corridor had agreed to let their cars travel freely among the several states. A system of hand signals allowed engineers to determine the position of trains in front of them, so that as many as five trains a day could travel through the Carolina hills to northeastern ports. This cooperation allowed engines to pull train-loads of cotton from central Georgia through the South Carolina upcountry to Wilmington on the North Carolina coast. Blockade runners then brought the cotton to Nassau for sale on international markets.¹⁴

As the Confederacy extended its interstate trading system, regional markets shifted in its wake. Near Spartanburg, cotton became by 1863 a commodity more readily accepted than Confederate currency. Directors of the newly built railroads of the upcountry predicted the depreciation of Confederate currency earlier than most, and began spending their cash reserves on cotton.¹⁵ Railroad agents did not care if they bought from planters or slaves. The former slave Gus Feaster recalled that when the war came and the “Yankees had everything closed up down in Charleston,” that the Goshen Hill Trading Post in Union County “took cotton and corn and anything like dat.” The trading post traded cotton with “folks dat was working on de railroad bed dat was gwine through dat country.” His mother brought cotton to the store to buy a bonnet for herself and to buy her son’s first pair of pants.¹⁶ Feaster’s bare legs had always been a part of his enslavement, and had marked him like other young, male slaves as a “shirt-tail boy.” His mother used Spartanburg’s new market position to dress him as a man. As early as 1864, a wider group of buyers and sellers were trading new goods in the upper piedmont.

It is difficult to gauge how whites in the upper piedmont responded to the war. In 1864, Union general Sherman’s famous march to the sea narrowly averted the heavily defended railway corridor. After arriving in Columbia,

Sherman's men veered east to avoid General P. G. T. Beauregard's troops who were massing at the depot in Charlotte.¹⁷ Farms and plantations on the Broad River thus missed the destructive sweep of the Union raids that so embittered other white southerners. And while Richmonders jeered at Jefferson Davis when his train pulled out of the Confederate capital, the retreating Confederate cabinet was nowhere more warmly received than when it arrived in York and Union Counties in 1865.¹⁸

The pleasantries exchanged with Davis should not suggest that the upper counties were untouched by the war. Thousands of upper piedmont men died on battlefields in Virginia, but those who stayed behind in the Broad River counties suffered, too. Most residents probably wished for a more organized Confederate administration, for there was considerable brigandage in the region. Ex-Confederates with names like Joly and Texas Brown attacked and murdered local residents. "Palefaces" and "slickers," bands of former Confederates, also robbed and pillaged in the upper piedmont.¹⁹

There were white Unionists, opponents of the Confederate government, but it is difficult to assess their loyalties after the war was over. Robert De Large, a freeborn black man from Charleston, suggested that many white families in the upper counties hated the former Confederacy: "Some were forced into the Confederate army, and many driven into the mountains and the swamps of the State for protection." De Large saw debt as the largest concern of upper piedmont farmers, for while "these men, who were conscripted, persecuted or driven from their homes were away, their families were compelled to get provisions to sustain life" from a small community of creditors who would call in their many debts after the war concluded.²⁰

In local towns in the upper piedmont, newspaper men were more sanguine about the dramatic changes the war had brought. To them, the post-war mix of backwoods farm families, planters, and the small community of ex-slaves seemed a harbinger of prosperity. The hills had never been dominated by plantations, and town boosters imagined that the area's mountain scenery, access to water power, and position near the new railway corridor might allow the town of Spartanburg to surpass even Charlotte in prosperity.²¹ As one town poet described the town in 1870:

Nearly all our dwellings are fill'd in a trice,
And town lots are rapidly rising in price,
While every profession, vocation and trade,
Is believed to be now on an upward grade.²²

As Spartanburg's would-be poet suggested, when freedom came to the upcountry, economic reshuffling followed at an almost breakneck pace. Railway consolidations in North Carolina and Virginia made nearby Charlotte, North Carolina, now at the confluence of three railroads, an important inland cotton market.²³ As railroad competition heated up after the war, Moncure Robinson cut freight rates along the railway corridor to draw Carolina cotton north along his Seaboard Inland Air Line.²⁴ Steam-driven cotton gins went up near the depots, their owners accepting one-fifteenth of a farmers' upland cotton for the service of stripping seeds from the cotton bolls.²⁵ Upland cotton yielded a "fair price" in the decade after the war, and this consoled white and the few black landowners who had no debt.²⁶ Cotton marketing prices dropped, too, as Spartanburg and Unionville merchants found that they no longer needed to rely on factors in Charleston, but could use the new through routes to contract with buyers in Augusta, Baltimore, New York, or even Manchester.²⁷ As the cost to ship, sell, and bale cotton dropped, those families with good bottom land found they could sell cotton on multiple markets. By 1870, the *Carolina Spartan* began a regular column that explained to farmers how to plant the new crop efficiently, and more and more farmers began to grow the fleecy staple.²⁸

But for small farmers with hilly land—better for corn than cotton—the market struck them headfirst. Because of price wars between northeastern robber barons, the Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the New York Central drove down shipping prices for midwestern wheat, pushing down the price of wheat all along the eastern seaboard. Between 1868 and 1872, then, wheat prices in major markets throughout the United States were *halved*.²⁹ There are few times in world history that prices for staple foods had declined so precipitously. In towns along railway corridors like Chester and Spartanburg, family diets changed as a result of the Yankee flour now available in country stores. Instead of buying such "necessaries" as local corn and gritty country flour, families traded their cotton for barrels of bleached, "Superfine" flour that came in from the Midwest by rail.³⁰ "[T]his great expenditure of necessities will probably continue in defiance of all theories," gloated the president of the Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta, "while the cultivation of cotton promises greater rewards."³¹ White biscuits replaced cornbread so quickly in the upper piedmont that a hill country farmer remarked that at least corn was "a good thing in [my] family," because fewer and fewer townsfolk would pay much for his country corn.³² By the 1870s, some farmers bought phosphate fertilizers and planted cotton on their marginal land; oth-

ers—particularly in the hill and mountain parts of the county—turned their otherwise valueless corn into whiskey to serve the appetite for liquor that had grown among former soldiers.³³

The upcountry was not poor, indeed it boomed by the standards of the postwar South, but new taxes accelerated these changes, and made the economic adjustments more visibly political. Postwar federal taxes on alcohol forced many moonshiners to begin dodging the new agents of the Internal Revenue Service.³⁴ Some distillers even formed raiding parties to harass these federal officers.³⁵ “These people could not raise cotton,” one Democrat said later, and small farmers felt that distilling grain “was a right given to them by their forefathers that nobody should interfere with.”³⁶ Democratic politics was not inevitably linked to moonshining, however. In North Carolina distillers learned their Republican politics by fighting with Democratic revenue agents, but in South Carolina distillers learned to train their guns on Republican agents.³⁷

Federal taxes may have made white yeomen angry at Republicans in Washington, but state taxes probably affected more people. In the upper piedmont, the combination of abolition and rapid commercialization made land taxes rise rapidly. The tax problem may have been an inevitable result of freedom: before the war, most state revenue in the South had come from a head tax on slaves. The end of slavery meant that tax burdens had to shift from slaveowners to landowners. For the first time the poorest farmers in the South felt the reach of state taxation, which had advanced in the area around Spartanburg to an astonishing yearly tax of 1 percent of the appraised value of land.³⁸ On top of this, property appraisals along the Broad River had begun rising as soon as railroads entered the county. For instance, Spartanburg land valuations doubled between 1850 and 1860, and the value of some of those plots quadrupled again by 1870.³⁹

South Carolina Republicans may have abetted the perception that the economic changes in Spartanburg had political foundations. For Governor Robert Scott, formerly an agent of the Freedman’s Bureau, high land taxes could only be a force for good, as beneficial for planters as it was for former slaves. “[S]tern necessity,” wrote Scott, “will compel [a large landowner] to cut up his ancestral possessions into small farms, and sell them to those who can and will make them productive.”⁴⁰ Many Republicans assumed that poorer whites would be protected by the new homestead exemptions they placed in state constitutions, and that poorer whites would welcome the chance to buy the land forced onto the market by high property taxes.⁴¹ In

addition, Freedman's Bureau agents in the upper piedmont were stingy with aid to landless whites.⁴²

In York and Union counties, the intertwining of economic and political controversies began during Presidential Reconstruction. Planters and freed people along the railway corridor fought over sharecroppers' control of labor time, and over the boundaries of legal and illegal trade. In 1865, upper piedmont plantation owners hoped to take advantage of new cotton markets. Fearing the loss of the labor of their former slaves, they approached local lawyers to write them ironclad labor contracts. The harsh contracts that circulated among York and Union planters required that as soon as freed people made their year-long contracts, they had to remain on the plantation Monday through Saturday. Planters instituted a pass system that required freed people to get permission from landowners if they sought to travel during the week.⁴³ The first constitution written under Presidential Reconstruction helped to further immobilize black workers, for in the same clause that abolished slavery, conservatives inserted a clause that barred freed people from "engaging in any species of traffic and in any department of labor other than manual service."⁴⁴ White townsmen imagined trade and profit as a white thing. Spartanburg's poet described the arrival of wealthy college students as a "ruby lipp'd throng" whose appearance shopkeepers awaited because their "'Pas' and their 'Mas' they are bringing along." White conservatives wanted trade, but they wanted it just as they pleased. Planters imagined that color might mark the limits to which the area's new traffic in commodities would reach: manual labor would be stable and black, while consumption and trade would be mobile, white, and even "ruby lipp'd."

Yet freed workers largely refused to occupy the position in these cotton markets in which conservatives hoped to place them. One of the points of conflict was Saturday. In the upcountry, freed people congregated for Saturday Union League meetings as early as 1866. They often held the meetings at the same places where they came together on Sundays, churches built out of brush arbors. With these meetings, freed people tried to mark out another day of leisure and recreation. Saturday had been a day off for slaves in slack seasons.⁴⁵

Union League organizations, like churches, formed the collective wedge through which freed people tried to establish themselves. Men, women, and children constituted the community together. While only adult men could vote under the Fourteenth Amendment, everyone in the community came to hear speakers and to voice their support or opposition.⁴⁶ Leadership varied



In the late 1860s, large groups of freed people, like the group pictured here, gathered at Union League meetings on Saturdays and at church on Sundays. The original caption on this image from lowcountry South Carolina in the 1870s suggests that these people are standing outside the offices of the Freedman's Bureau. By 1869, Democrats claimed that gatherings of black tenants on any day but Sunday was illegal. By 1870, some of the worst Klan violence was directed at coachmen like the man pictured here.

(courtesy Photographs and Prints Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)

considerably. Near Spartanburg, where black members barely outnumbered whites in 1868, elected representatives tended to be politically connected white Unionists.⁴⁷ In Union and York Counties, African American leaders predominated. In York County, important local leaders were freed people: Jim Rainey (also called Jim Williams) and Tom Roundtree (also called Tom Black).⁴⁸

As with the Loyal Republican League in Alamance, the Union League was always more than a political organization. The Union and York County leagues resembled institutions as diverse as Masonic clubs, evangelical churches, and modern trade unions. In 1868, when the new state constitution was drafted, League members devoted themselves to establishing the rights of tenant farmers. A white miller, William Champion, read the new tenant-landlord section of the constitution aloud, and league members determined that they could continue to occupy their sharecrop land until the end of the calendar year, rather than having to leave at the end of the harvest.⁴⁹ Freed people discussed ownership and control of the land, and it may well have been at Union League meetings that prominent white Republicans came to attract laborers for the next year.

The league also allowed freed people to take advantage of the new markets that the railway corridor had opened up. The new cotton trading towns of Pacolet, Unionville, and Santuck (on the Spartanburg & Union Railroad), as well as Chester and Rock Hill (on the Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta), became organizing centers for the leagues.⁵⁰ Many Unionville league members brought their cotton directly to Alfred B. Owens, a white league member.⁵¹ Another white league member accepted cotton from freed people in the town of Spartanburg.⁵² Just as Gus Feaster's mother had used local stores during the war to buy new consumer goods, some Union Leagues in the upper piedmont served as conduits for the transmission of cotton. In the upper piedmont leagues, leaders were likely to be those freed people, often former coachmen, who had horses or mules and could thus travel to relay goods and information.⁵³

When they were in power during Presidential Reconstruction, conservatives turned to state power to limit freed people's use of the new markets that had come to the Broad River area. At first, conservatives turned to courts. The "black codes" passed by the conservative assemblies made it a crime to accept cotton from a freed person without a note from the landowner. Sympathetic magistrates allowed white planters to issue warrants that closed down any store that accepted cotton from freed people. The charge was criminal, not civil. Cotton traded without a note constituted larceny, and if a judge determined that a freed person regularly traded such cotton, the charge could be advanced to grand larceny.⁵⁴ Conservatives and Freedman's Bureau agents alike considered cotton trading among freed people a dangerous activity, and tried to close down what they called the "grog shops" and "cotton traps" into which freed people congregated.⁵⁵ As the stores prolifer-

ated during and after the war, planters used courthouses and magistrates to seriously restrict the legality of market activity: when whites traded cotton it was commerce, and when blacks traded cotton it was crime.

If York and Union planters had been able to control freed people's labor time and the cotton they produced under Presidential Reconstruction, Congressional Reconstruction changed matters entirely. York and Union planters learned the bitter lesson that the merchants in Gaston, Portsmouth, and Richmond had. Conflicts in Congress and in state houses prevented planters from harnessing interstate railroads to their own ends. In 1867, the U.S. Congress made state governments provisional, enfranchised black voters, and disfranchised former Confederate officials. The constitutional convention of 1868, with black and white legislators in attendance, altered the contract system, giving the first lien on crops to laborers. This first lien gave field workers more latitude in choosing among creditors, and allowed freed people to trade cotton on their own account. The new constitution, the most democratic ever enacted in South Carolina, also dropped the previous ban on freed people's professions and trades.⁵⁶ For a brief time, as the poem went, "every profession, vocation and trade" could freely travel on "an upward grade."

Not everyone was as optimistic. Conflicts between Union Leagues and Klansmen emerged first in York and Union Counties in the summer of 1868, after the new constitution went into effect. Two organizations—the Invisible Empire and the Council of Safety—formed in York and Union Counties to directly attack the Union League. Both orders apparently sought to prevent the organization's growing influence over the shifting relations between laborers and planters. In late July, Union County lawyer Robert Shand issued a "warrant" to freed people on the Simmons plantation telling them to stop attending Saturday meetings of the Union League or Simmons would break their contracts, and they would lose their crops. Tensions mounted through the summer as the governor exchanged letters with lawyers and league members about the legality of the league's Saturday meetings.⁵⁷ One Union County Klansman expressed his expectation that violence would be the only conclusion: "all that wonst to see the Negroes and Rebels fight can com up here," he wrote, "they say that war has to start."⁵⁸ When the Union County Union League gathered for a rally at the Santuck railroad depot a few weeks later, Klansmen had gathered in force to prevent the rally from starting. League members, doubting their chances against well-drilled former Confederates, retreated from the depot. A brief spurt of gunfire wounded men on both sides.⁵⁹

The Klan's apparent victory may have bolstered Union County organizers in their attacks on Union League operations. In 1869, Klansmen murdered cotton merchant A. B. Owens. They claimed that this white man's "organizing the negroes" was just one of the things he did that made him "a very bad and dangerous character."⁶⁰ Elsewhere along the line of the Charlotte, Columbia, and Augusta Railroad, Klansmen visited the stores of Union League leaders who accepted cotton from freed people and burned up their goods.⁶¹ Of course, freed people in the Carolina piedmont knew that the recently built Confederate railway corridor did not just go northeast toward cotton markets, but also southwest away from terrorists. By 1869, thousands of freed workers left York and Union counties for Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi.⁶²

Within another year, Klan attacks became even more violent. In late November of 1870, Tom Roundtree, the freed league captain from York county, traded three or four bales of York County cotton in Charlotte for about \$200.⁶³ In the eyes of Klansmen, Roundtree had violated racial trading boundaries. White conservatives could not imagine what freed people in York County would do with the money when Roundtree came back. Conservatives circulated the rumor that Roundtree "brought that money home for the purpose of buying guns to kill all the whites in the neighborhood."⁶⁴ A few weeks after he returned home, Klansmen broke into Roundtree's house to assault him. He avoided them at first by hiding in the loft, but Klansmen spotted him, chased him out of a window, shot him five times, and then slit his throat.⁶⁵ The ceremonial slitting of the throat after the shooting, which York and Union Klansmen sometimes performed, had been the trademark of pro-Confederate vigilantes during the war.⁶⁶

Union Leagues in the upper piedmont, like the Loyal League in Alamance, sought to use state power to stop Klan attacks. Under the authority of the governor's act of 1869, leagues began accepting commissions for the "National Guard Service of South Carolina" (NGSC).⁶⁷ Conservative newspapers expressed shock that the state would arm freed people to stop Klansmen. "Six boxes of guns and two of accoutrements, for the 'loil' militia, arrived at our depot last Saturday," exclaimed the *Union Times*, "and five boxes of guns were left at Fish Dam on the same day." The reporter threatened that when guardsmen raised such weapons they would not only "kill from the muzzle" but also "at the stock."⁶⁸

Besides organizing a system of guardsmen, the Republican General Assembly made a different distinction between legal and illegal trade. Mag-

istrates, who prosecuted local cases in the county court, were appointed by the Republican governor from 1868 to 1871.⁶⁹ Union County magistrate Ellick Walker, a black man who forcefully opposed the Klan, deputized the Union County NGSC to patrol the county for illegal trading. Instead of having guardsmen search for freed people trading cotton at depots, Walker instructed guardsmen to stop the illegal liquor trade among whites that had grown so rapidly since the war. By 1870, guardsmen began stopping carts on public roadways to search for illegal whiskey. These guardsmen also established pickets to defend prominent Republicans who had been threatened by Klansmen.⁷⁰

A decisive moment in the escalation of Klan violence came in late December 1870, months after the Klan had killed Tom Roundtree. The Union County NGSC stopped Matt Stevens, a drayman who had been distributing moonshine in the county. When guardsmen asked him to surrender his wagon, he ran off to avoid them. One of the guardsmen fired at Stevens and killed him. The Council of Safety, composed mostly of planters and lawyers, assembled in town and circulated a report that the NGSC had tried to “mug” Stevens for his liquor. The Council then began seizing guns from freed people in Union and York Counties. Within weeks they captured Ellick Walker and the guardsmen who had arrested Matt Stevens. Conservative newspapers expressed shock that freed people throughout the community tried to hide guardsmen from the white posses.⁷¹

By 1870, this escalating violence polarized white and black communities. Before the killing of Roundtree and Stevens, important planters who led the northern piedmont Klans found only limited support among whites. Many other whites in Spartanburg, York, and Union Counties supported former U.S. tax collector and Republican candidate Alexander S. Wallace. But by 1870, voting Republican became an increasingly dangerous activity. Voting was public in the nineteenth century. In 1870, one walked up to a public polling place holding either a white Democratic ballot trimmed in black (commemorating Lee’s death) or a red Republican ballot with an image of Abraham Lincoln on it. By 1870, Lyle and other Klansmen were intimidating Republican voters at polling places and tampering with ballot boxes. Black Republicans protected themselves collectively, by coming out in large numbers to vote together.⁷² White Republicans protected themselves individually, by hiding their Republican ballots inside canceled Democratic ballots and sliding them both into the ballot box.⁷³

Before the polarizing violence of 1870, Republicans had often looked

more respectable than Democrats.⁷⁴ The upper piedmont's representative in Congress, A. S. Wallace, consistently supported Tom Scott's proposed Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. Conservatives could hardly oppose a construction project that would establish a more direct railway corridor through the northern parts of York, Union, and Spartanburg Counties. As late as 1870, conservative Democrat Randolph Turner could only promise that a Democratic administration would be better prepared to "hire out the convicts of the Penitentiary to build the Airline Railroad" than would Republicans.⁷⁵ But with the murders of Roundtree and Stevens at the end of 1870, white Democrats were able to shift the debate from railroads to race war. Klansmen also got more organized.

Over the first few months of 1871, the mood among whites got uglier. Another organization of white townsmen, calling itself the "Black Panther klan" of the "Invisible Empire," made a raid on the Union County jail, and hanged two of the guardsmen awaiting trial for the murder of Matt Stevens. In late February, nearly two months after the guardsmen and the Republican magistrate Ellick Walker had been captured and jailed, the Republican judge for the circuit issued a writ of habeas corpus to have the NGSC guardsmen shipped by rail to the capital to stand trial there. Members of the Council of Safety prevented the writ from being served that Friday, and assembled a crowd of nearly one thousand associated Klansmen at Unionville on Sunday evening. The Invisible Empire led the raid on the jail and dragged Walker and seven guardsmen to the old hanging grounds in Unionville. Klansmen finished hanging the men hours before the Monday train arrived to take the prisoners to Columbia.⁷⁶

Republican attempts to put down the violence in Union County only brought a more virulent response from Klansmen. In early March 1871, the governor shipped guns and ammunition to Major Reister of the Chester County NGSC. Reister distributed the weapons to three companies of guardsmen in the thirteenth regiment. Within days, Chester Klansmen circulated a rumor that the league was preparing to butcher all the white inhabitants of nearby Fort Mills. Guardsmen soon learned that Klansmen were mobilizing at the depots between Charlotte and Chester to kill all the league members they found in town. Guardsmen evacuated south and east toward Unionville. Klansmen under the command of Colonel Joseph Gist stopped the guardsmen near the border of Union County. Gist had commanded Confederate forces during the war and so quickly surmised the size and position of the guardsmen as they entrenched near Salem Church. In what Gist described

as a “thick and running fight,” Gist’s mounted company flanked the NGSC and dispersed the guardsmen. Gist claimed that his men killed only a few of the guardsmen, but according to local legend, Gist’s men stacked the bodies in Salem church and burned it to the ground to disguise his massacre of the freedmen in the NGSC. Townsfolk called the area “Burnt Pilgrim” thereafter.⁷⁷ In the following weeks, conservatives captured and killed guardsmen in small groups. Klansmen reportedly tied them up, lined them along the banisters of bridges along Broad River, and shot them into the water.⁷⁸

The horrible violence in the upper piedmont continued for years.⁷⁹ By the latter part of 1871, however, much of the violence shifted from the wartime railroad corridor that passed along eastern York and Union Counties to the more mountainous railway corridor that Tom Scott was building through northern York and Spartanburg Counties. Collision between the aspirations of white landholders and the promoters of the new air line followed a slightly different trajectory. Klan violence in Spartanburg, like the violence in Alamance County, was more ritualistic and appeared to be more precisely targeted upon particular individuals. Klansmen threatened white Republicans who profited from Tom Scott’s air line. Klansmen’s more violent physical attacks were reserved for those African American artisans and railroad workers who appeared to benefit most from the economic changes in the area. Klan attacks and proclamations generally used violent images of physical and moral decay to link white Republicans’ public corruption with freed people’s growing power and influence in the region.

Klansmen in Spartanburg did not target cotton traps or black guardsmen as in Union and York, but rather focused on what they called corruption in the county. Klansmen may have had reason to complain about the Republican Party in Spartanburg. Spartanburg Republicans clearly used state support of railroads to make money, though some simply attracted black workers away from other plantations to work the increasingly valuable land in the area. Dr. John Winsmith had served in the state legislature during the war and had bought considerable land after 1866 in the region where the old Spartanburg & Union Railroad (completed in 1859) crossed Scott’s proposed air line to Atlanta. In Glenn Springs township, where few families had land worth \$2,000, Winsmith had amassed \$30,000 worth of land by 1870.⁸⁰ Around 1869, Winsmith declared himself a Republican, attracted black tenants to his place by allowing Saturdays and Sundays off, and started a school for tenants on those days.⁸¹ Alfred Austell of the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line identified Spartanburg Republicans like Winsmith with “an inside

ring, who contracts and owns most of the Depot Ground.” These well-connected Republicans, thought Austell, would determine precisely where the Atlanta & Richmond would intersect with the Spartanburg & Union Railroad, and could thus buy land and watch its price rise as Tom Scott’s air line was completed.⁸²

Some legislators in South Carolina preferred that the advantages of the railroad corridor benefit the state, and freed people generally, rather than particular Republican landowners. Recognizing that Winsmith and other white Republicans would profit greatly by buying land in the eastern part of the county, Robert DeLarge, a free-born black legislator from Charleston, pushed the state to buy the upcountry land that was so rapidly rising in price, and to divide it into small lots for freedmen. In 1868, the General Assembly formed the South Carolina Land Commission, to buy up open field land, with considerable acreage selected along the proposed route of Scott’s air line.⁸³ Despite the organization’s good intentions, some Republicans became even wealthier by taking advantage of the land commission’s optimism about land prices along the new railway corridor. One Republican in the area bought land in eastern Spartanburg, and then paid a commissioner to buy the tracts that were least valuable.⁸⁴ Conservatives loved to hate the land commission, for besides buying up good land it threatened to expand independent land ownership by freed people.⁸⁵

The land commission may also have bribed county officials in Spartanburg to make more land available in the county. The commission chose P. Quinn Camp as surveyor for land in the county, though Camp was already on the payroll as the county’s tax assessor.⁸⁶ His high pay in these two positions apparently angered local Republicans, who resolved in a league meeting in May 1870 that no officer ought to “hold more offices than such as may pay in the aggregate more than \$1200 annually.”⁸⁷

Camp’s position as tax assessor and land commission surveyor particularly angered Klan leader J. Banks Lyle. In a public letter to the Spartanburg newspapers, Lyle pointed to the problem of Camp’s having these two jobs: if a tax assessor also surveyed property for a land commission, he might overvalue Spartanburg county land as assessor to force it onto the market for the commission. Kickbacks from the commission would be disguised in the payment for surveying.⁸⁸

Klansmen pointed to the possibility of corruption and violently sought to stop it. Camp’s “two deputy bailiffs, with their pockets full of executions [were] riding to and fro over this Township which is one among the least,”

Lyle wrote in the fall of 1870.⁸⁹ Lyle's men stopped the deputy bailiffs, and took away the notices to evacuate land. The debts for which families lost their land, Lyle noted, "appeared to range from ten cents to two or three dollars." Throughout the county after 1870, Klansmen assaulted tax assessors and federal revenue officers and robbed them of their documents.⁹⁰ Spartanburg Klansmen targeted their tax assessor Camp as "a scalawag of low type" who was "very obnoxious to respectable people." Camp saved himself only by discovering from another Klansman that armed companies were searching for him.⁹¹

Klansmen also targeted well-connected Republican planters and the freedmen they had enticed away to grow cotton. Among those targeted were freedmen on the lands of C. C. Jones and John Winsmith, who had offered superior inducements to freed workers to grow cotton on their land.⁹² After Klansmen threatened Winsmith, brigadier general of the NGSC, Winsmith posted pickets of armed NGSC guardsmen around his property.⁹³ The armed pickets enraged Klansmen even more. "[T]hey were out with their guns," said one member of the Council of Safety, "marching and picketing the roads in every direction, stopping everybody who came along."⁹⁴ Klansmen attacked men who worked for Winsmith and Jones, and one night found a way to evade the pickets and gun down Winsmith in his house. Winsmith survived despite the seven bullets that entered his body.⁹⁵

As in Alamance, educators were also important targets. William Champion, who had earlier read aloud the state constitution to Union League sharecroppers, ran a gristmill in the county. He also taught what he called "Sunday school," generally reading and spelling, on the lands owned by John Winsmith. Klansmen grabbed him, blindfolded him, and told him to pray for his life. With the blindfold on him, they posed Champion in ways that tried to enforce their view of teaching freed people. While blindfolded, he was forced to kiss the buttocks of a black man, then a black woman. Klansmen said they made Champion "kiss [him there,] to be on nigger equality." They tried to force Champion and the woman to have sex, while whipping him repeatedly. Finally they removed the blindfold (perhaps suggesting how he might awaken from his errors) and forced him to whip a black man that he knew.⁹⁶

Most other attacks on white men involved forcing them to renounce their Republican principles. John Genobles, a Republican sawmill owner who likely sold crossties to air line contractors, was laid on his stomach and whipped with hickory sticks. He was told that he was "a damned poor

Christian" who had ruined his family's character. Klansmen released Genobles after abusing him, but promised to kill him unless he went to the courthouse on a sale day, renounced his party principles, and declared himself a Democrat.⁹⁷ Throughout the spring of 1871, white Republicans were visited, and then made to renounce their principles on the following sale day.⁹⁸ The public renunciation of principles has always been an important part of violent torture. It gives torturers an excuse for committing violence, but it also dishonors the persons attacked. Most people must have known that Republicans who renounced radicalism at the courthouse did so because they were physically beaten, and were scared of being beaten again. But the public display of fear may have been the most important part of Klan terror, for it solidified the apparent power of Democrats, and made Republican men appear weak.⁹⁹

Besides the attacks on well-connected Republicans and the freed people who worked for them, some of the most notorious violence was directed at coachmen and skilled workers. Klansmen seemed particularly disturbed about black men who worked for white women. Samuel Simmons, a coachman for the widow Whittemore, did her public trading for her after the war. In 1871 she gave Simmons a horse and told him to "get a good trade" for it.¹⁰⁰ Simmons apparently got an excellent trade for the horse, receiving a good mule in trade from Mr. Beloue. Two days later, Beloue determined that Simmons had indeed gotten the better deal, stopped Simmons and Mrs. Whittemore on the highway, and demanded his mule back or he would "blow [Simmons's] God damned brains out." He would, "put six balls through your boy," he told Mrs. Whittemore, and threatened to Simmons that he would "bring the Ku-Klux on you, and swing you to a limb until you are dead, by God." Two or three weeks later, Klansmen broke into Simmons's house on the Whittemore plantation, searched for weapons, and told Simmons that they were soldiers who had died in 1862 and come from the graves to protect their grandchildren. They then showed him the horns on their heads, suggesting that one man's horn had been bent while coming out of the grave. Finally, they pulled Simmons's shirt over his head and whipped him thirteen times.¹⁰¹

Daniel Lipscomb operated in a way similar to Simmons. Also of Spartanburg, Lipscomb had been the coachman for the white Linder family since he was a slave. Though he was seventy-five years old, he was given a plot of land after the war because, as he remarked, he was "a favorite servant." Lipscomb, too, did his trading in town for the Linder family. In addition, he was a league

organizer, and was connected with the supervisor for elections in the district. Around 1869, a white man in his township, Perry McArthur, asked Lipscomb to “electioneer” for him with the “young mistress” of the Linder family. Perry McArthur’s intentions were romantic, and because the young mistress seldom got out of the house, Lipscomb was the only man who could act as intermediary between McArthur and the object of his desire. When the mistress heard about McArthur’s intentions, she gave the coachman a terse reply for her erstwhile suitor: “Uncle, I wouldn’t notice him any more than I would a cat.” When McArthur got the message from Lipscomb (which Lipscomb may well have repeated throughout the settlement), McArthur became enraged. McArthur, with some property but without an elder white man to act as his intermediary, turned to Klan violence to avenge the slights for which he felt Lipscomb was responsible. He and his friends dressed up in sheets, called Lipscomb out of his house, denounced him as a Republican “rattler,” and whipped him five hundred times on the back with a riding crop about the width of a finger. Lipscomb barely survived the attack.¹⁰²

The reason for these attacks on coachmen probably has much to do with the anxieties about black men’s entry into the public sphere on behalf of white women. Black coachmen sold goods, discussed politics, rode horses alone, and protected white women. White men may have imagined this penetration into public affairs as a penetration of a quite different kind.¹⁰³ Since domination of white women had been for so many years coded as political and social control of the region,¹⁰⁴ black men’s apparent affiliation with or management of white women’s affairs may have seemed a threat. Imagining the relationship as theft made it no less infuriating. A death threat sent to Francis and Pink Johnson warned, “we no you have fed of the meat-houses of uper york & Gaston county, & fatened of the coten farms in the Clay Hill Neigher hood, & them principally of widow ladies at that.”¹⁰⁵ However the Johnsons fattened themselves, murder was how Klansmen hoped to stop it.

Besides coachmen who worked for white women, skilled African American men in the Spartanburg community were frequent targets of Klansmen. John Good, a freed blacksmith in the county, put identifying marks on the horseshoes of whites whose horses he had shoed. Good later identified prominent Klansmen when he visited the scenes of Klan attacks. Klansmen killed Good shortly afterwards.¹⁰⁶ Klansmen later attacked a freed gunsmith who, as one Klansman put it, “made himself very obnoxious to the whites by fixing old guns . . . and furnishing new ones to arm negroes.” A local officer of the Klan tried to force his white tenants to kill the gunsmith after they cap-

tured him. When his tenants refused, White shot him and “beat out his brains with the butt of his gun.”¹⁰⁷ By 1871, those freedmen most frequently attacked were men who were grading Tom Scott’s railway extension that would connect Charlotte to Atlanta via Spartanburg. Hundreds of men were attacked in the Limestone district, where workers were grading the new railway line.¹⁰⁸

If Union and York Counties became infamous for battlefield conflicts and the storming of prisons, Spartanburg Klansmen, if equally violent, selectively targeted those with connections to the institutions that were changing the place of Spartanburg county. Some were white Republicans directly connected to the “railroad ring” of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Others attacked were freedmen who worked for these Republicans, had their Saturdays free, and patrolled the county. Others attacked were less directly connected to the railway system: artificers or traders who would have been powerful or influential in this rapidly developing region. Some victims were men who simply worked on the new railway corridor itself. The fact that most freed people in Spartanburg were not armed doubtless helps explain why violence there was more often visited upon individuals. Spartanburg freedmen were not armed because of the conservatism of Spartanburg’s white Republicans. In the election of 1870, John Winsmith, brigadier general of the NGSC, feared arming Spartanburg freedmen and so locked up the arms that were shipped to him. This allowed Klansmen to travel more freely and to take more time torturing the men that they targeted.¹⁰⁹

There may be other reasons why Klan violence in Spartanburg was more individualized and ritualized. This must have something to do with the fact that leaders of the Spartanburg Klans were more closely associated with evangelical Baptists. Spartanburg’s “Cyclops,” J. Banks Lyle, led the Klan from his position as director of the Baptist-managed Limestone Springs Academy.¹¹⁰ Rev. John S. Ezell held a similarly high position in the Klan while ministering to a Baptist congregation on the border of Spartanburg and Union Counties. The Broad River Baptist Association, which connected evangelical Baptists in North and South Carolina, may have been an important conduit for upcountry Klans generally. Other major figures in the Broad River Association were Rev. Nathan Shotwell, father of North Carolina Klan leader Randolph Abbott Shotwell, and Rev. Thomas Dixon, a prominent Klan supporter whose son, Thomas Dixon Jr., wrote a series of novels that resuscitated the Klan in the 1910s.¹¹¹

Whatever accounts for this difference, by 1871 Spartanburg Klan attacks

had become elaborate performances, in which Klansmen sought to force whites to publicly renounce the Republican Party and to separate black coachmen from white women. The principal means by which white conservatives sought to perform and ritualize the theft they imagined was to extend the rhetorical claims of railroad corruption that had been voiced decades earlier by critics like James Henry Hammond. One of the figurative meanings of corruption, since early modern times, was the destruction of the integrity of an institution by bribery or favor. The state of South Carolina had been corrupted, Klansmen asserted, by men like Winsmith. To make their point more clearly, Klansmen compared Winsmith's corruption to the other meanings of corruption: decomposition, despoliation, and sinfulness.¹¹²

Klansmen made their criticisms of political corruption in a variety of public media. Klansmen in the Council of Safety and the Invisible Empire issued formal declarations in newspapers and wrote up "General Orders" which they posted near courthouses. These notes dwelt on the formal corruptions of the Republican Party: railroad-targeted taxation, private development with railroad funds, and abuse of office.¹¹³ Klan rhetoric described this public corruption using metaphors about the physical corruption of bodies. In the "Tax-Payer's Convention" called for by the Council of Safety, Major F. F. Warley drew on the language of despoliation and sin, calling the state of South Carolina a "suffering, heart-broken, and impoverished mother" who was the "victim" of carpetbaggers and local whites. Condemning the railroad "rings," like the Scott-controlled Greenville and Columbia, Warley bemoaned a corruption that had lured even local planters "to the manner born," who now "revel[ed] amid luxuries purchased with money stolen from her. If we could tear the hands of the spoiler from her emaciated person," he thundered, "methinks the rings upon the fingers of some would declare them members of our household."¹¹⁴

Gubernatorial candidate Richard Carpenter, after outlining the public scandals in the state, called on Klansmen with the catch-phrase "my countrymen." He suggested the seriousness of the situation by using the language of spoilage, particularly the corruption of dead bodies. "Your infants in the cradle," he exclaimed, "your aged fathers and mothers stretch out their helpless hands and ask you to rescue them from the spoliation and death threatened by this ring at Columbia." He then implored Klansmen to "discharge your duty to South Carolina," asking them to remember how they had taken up arms in the war for Mexico and the "battle-fields of Virginia."¹¹⁵

Klan violence also fused the corruption of office with corruption of a

physical and moral sort. Leaders detailed accounts of public malfeasance while they made their victims perform acts of physical corruption—kissing buttocks, forced sex, and receiving lashes with one's face pushed in the dirt. Klansmen suggested that the public corruption they attacked and the private corruption that they demonstrated were in fact connected. Klansmen created a Manichean world of white and black which suggested that one kind of corruption (abuse of power) necessarily involved another kind of corruption (moral perversion, decay, and dirt). Klan proclamations and performances created a set of binary oppositions: blackness, dirt, and sex were arrayed against whiteness, probity, and Christianity. Klansmen easily slipped from one kind of corruption to another. When prosecutors and public officials later asked Klansmen about the physical acts of torture, they continually pointed to the formal corruptions of office as originating, even causing, the second.

Thus at the very nexus of new trading patterns that civil war had brought, Klansmen strung together a set of metaphors that sought to explain white southerners' troubles, and blame these troubles on sinful white Republicans and black workingmen. Trading became crime, crime became the misuse of widow ladies. As interstate markets began to turn all people into direct producers and consumers, and as the range of those involved in trading widened to include former slaves, white conservatives saw in nearly every exchange a theft of property, and in every glance a theft of white womanhood.

Federal response to Klan violence was slow in coming. When the Klan had attacked cotton traders, the war department sent guns to the governor. When Klansmen assaulted and murdered black guardsmen, Congress threatened reprisal. But by 1871 Klansmen had begun attacking freed workers who were grading Tom Scott's Atlanta & Richmond Air Line, in the area between eastern Spartanburg and western Union County. It was frustrating, wrote Air Line banker Gabriel Cannon, how “the unsettled condition of the county operates very seriously on all business.”¹¹⁶ In short order, the federal government responded to the terror in the upper piedmont.

By the spring of 1871, the federal government moved into action to stop the Klan in the upper piedmont. President Grant had many reasons to move troops into the most violent counties in the South, including the defense of citizens and polling places. An additional reason must surely have been the defense of the Tom Scott's air line. On Grant's Cabinet sat Columbus Delano, secretary of the interior. Later asked to resign because of kickbacks sent to his son for railroad surveys, Delano was also an important member of

Scott's railway circle. He was an important party to negotiations for the railway charters Scott had purchased in late 1870 in Georgia and the southwest.¹¹⁷ Whatever the constellation of forces behind the activity, and they were manifold, a Joint Congressional Committee established hearings into the Klan. The committee traveled throughout the South to determine the extent of "outrages," as whippings and murders were called, and whether threats to life and property were extensive enough to justify federal force.¹¹⁸ The South Carolina upcountry attracted much of the committee's attention. Pennsylvania politician John Scott, who had been selected as U.S. senator by the Pennsylvania Railroad, chaired the select committee that traveled into the upcountry to investigate the violence.¹¹⁹

Not everyone connected with the air line was happy with the appearance of federal troops, and some local representatives thought that the president and Congress had overreacted in sending federal troops and a subcommittee into the area. According to Gabriel Cannon, who had been a state senator and once lieutenant governor before the war, federal troops actually impeded the work of the air line. Cannon found that the presence of U.S. troops in the area made it harder for him to assess and condemn the property of a Freedman's Bureau school and the AME Zion Church. "The trustees," wrote Cannon, "all ignorant colored men," had the temerity to refuse the air line's attempts to demolish their property.¹²⁰

In the end, massive federal intervention probably diminished the violence in the upcountry. Federal troops and United States marshals succeeding in emptying the pockets full of executions, but their work would be costly and slow.¹²¹ When troops first arrived, Klansmen tore up the railroad tracks connecting the capital to the upper piedmont and so prevented federal interference in a planned raid.¹²² For the promoters of the air line, an embarrassing result of the appearance of troops was the discovery that some of the railroad contractors—who had been construction engineers during the war—were active Klansmen themselves.¹²³ By 1872, the chief engineer of the road determined that he would continue the road's work by actively circumventing federal power. As prosecutions began, the air line spirited away many of the Klan's leaders to a section of construction near the Atlanta border. Klansmen, many of them new to gang labor, briefly learned the unfamiliar work of hammer and hoe. Klansmen worked in secret while U.S. marshals sought to determine their whereabouts.¹²⁴

The escalating violence, which linked the corruption attended by railroads with physical corruption and the sinfulness of bodies, may have taught

Tom Scott something about the dangers of public railroad consolidation. "The condition of affairs down there is very unsatisfactory to us," wrote Scott's finance manager as the violence escalated, "and my wish is to have such an understanding and such an arrangement as will give us that control of the property which under the circumstances I think we are entitled to."¹²⁵ A thousand questions must have roiled around in their heads: Were Republicans the best allies of these new interstate corporations? Could a strong state defend these corporations against public protest? Could rapid economic change not be dangerous along the spine of the old Confederacy? Before the federal government began to arrest Klansmen in the upper piedmont, Tom Scott had determined another way to deal with the many critics and enemies of the railroad rings he had fashioned. In the spring of 1871 he founded the Southern Railway Security Company to make his operations invisible, and to force his enemies out of hiding.

Public Fictions

They walk serene and primal, undimensioned and to us unseen.

—Abdul Alhazred, *The Necromicon*, quoted in HP Lovecraft,
“The Dunwich Horror”

M

oncure Robinson had had many successes by the end of 1870. His Seaboard Inland Air Line successfully drew goods from the central Carolinas and Georgia toward the massive deepwater port of Norfolk. His through bills of lading acted as a chain of credit that connected northeastern merchants to country stores in the Carolinas and Georgia. He also succeeded in drawing the attention of Virginia legislators *toward* the bold schemes of Tom Scott and *away from* his own efforts to unite planters and Conservative railway directors into the air line. Local Confederate heroes like Colonel A. B. Andrews represented the system in the corridors of power in Raleigh.

Nevertheless, the arrival of the Klan along the railroad corridor made railway consolidation a distinctly dangerous business. In North Carolina, Josiah Turner directed his anger at state leaders, but his violent language, and the violence it incited, scared away potential migrants to the region. The system’s success in the upper piedmont in South Carolina had contributed to the shifting of borders between men and women, whites and blacks. White leaders responded with violent performances that expressed their anger at both public malfeasance and the power of black men.

As conflicts sprouted between Virginia and Georgia, Moncure Robinson might have drawn some solace from the fact that he was nearly invisible. Conservative opponents of railway consolidation were much more likely to

attack his more public competitor Tom Scott. Robinson might console himself that, while Tom Scott and the Pennsylvania Railroad were names known throughout the South, the operations of the Seaboard Inland Air Line were inconspicuous. Like any corporation, the Seaboard system was a public fiction—public in its status as guarantor of bills of lading, but fictional in its intangibility. Robinson emphasized the intangibility. Few people could name his company to blame it for the changes that railroad reorganization had brought to the South.

Robinson probably never expected that by the end of 1872 his careful consolidations would be destroyed. For in two years Tom Scott had turned his own public status from a liability into an asset, and used a new kind of corporation to destroy Robinson's air line. Scott gained control of the railway corridor with the unlikely instrument of a holding company, called the Southern Railway Security Company. A holding company, a corporation that owns stock in other corporations, was in some ways even more intangible than Robinson's air line. Like an invisible beast in an H. P. Lovecraft horror story, the holding company sprang before its enemies wielding arcane powers. Unlike railroad companies, the security company could not be forced to set particular freight rates, make its contracts public, open its list of stockholders, or commit its capital to any particular part of its operations. It was a public fiction with none of the public responsibilities of a nineteenth-century corporation.

If the Southern Railway Security Company was more fictional than Robinson's air line, it was also more public. The stocks and bonds of the company traded on Wall Street and in London. Because it was an organization that dealt in stocks and bonds rather than rights-of-way and track curvature, its operations were understandable to merchants, bankers, and the directors of other kinds of companies. The holding company's board could use its influence in New York markets, yet still make executive decisions that would be passed on to directors of local railroads in Richmond, Raleigh, and Columbia.¹ Its capital reserves—developed by selling its own stocks and bonds—allowed it to buy out and harass competitors, and bribe officials. It even bought newspapers to alter public opinion. The Southern's principal target in 1871 and 1872 was the corridor controlled by Moncure Robinson. Scott's holding company took important pieces of the Confederate railway system from Robinson, and assembled these pieces to join Richmond to Atlanta.

With considerable funding from the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Southern

completed the embryonic system that Scott had projected, the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line, in 1873.² This new air line would form the spine of a system that would reach across the South in the 1880s, stretching west to Memphis and New Orleans, north to Washington, and south to the Florida border.³ It would spread its message of economic reconciliation at breakneck speed.

Scott incorporated the Southern Railway Security Company on 22 March 1871 in Pennsylvania, where the Pennsylvania Railroad's lobby was strongest. He had it chartered then as the Overland Contract Company. To avoid giving away his plans to competitors (as Robinson lived in Philadelphia), Scott chartered it as a general purpose company with the power to revise its own name and charter as needed. Its primary power was the right to purchase the stocks and bonds of other companies. On 5 April the directors, many of them the most powerful men on Wall Street, held their first meeting in an office on Liberty Street, in New York's merchandising district.⁴ Here they changed the firm's name to the Southern Railway Security Company, and began to make plans for the consolidation of Southern railway lines into a powerful system that pointed North.

Scott drew in three other groups of capitalists whose interests were quite varied. The first group was a coalition of finance bankers. In the years immediately after the war, no single American banker had the capital to finance a venture as large as the Southern.⁵ Morris K. Jesup had a profound knowledge of the value of Southern railroad securities and knew the debt histories of the various roads. Drexel, Morgan was a new firm specializing in transatlantic financing, which had tremendous pull in England. Young J. P. Morgan's father had recently perfected the "syndicate" system of finance in a massive war loan to the government of France. In this increasingly popular system, finance bankers joined together and *bought* the securities of a state or company all at once, selling them off to a closed circle of investors rather than marketing them in small lots for small commissions.⁶ The system allowed borrowers to get funds immediately, while leaving a few percentage points in the pockets of financiers. Drexel, Morgan and M. K. Jesup were allied in this venture with the Brown Brothers of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, who were masters of the cotton trade.⁷

The second group to join the security company was the Southern Express Company. Represented by Henry B. Plant and George W. Cass, the Southern Express (and its parent company the Adams Express) brought financial support and a thorough knowledge of the business trade through-

out the South. The express company would provide the Southern with its first president: George Cass, nephew of Lewis Cass, also gave the Southern Security Company a friendlier face in the South. The elder Cass had been a prominent midwestern Democrat who had supported Georgia's case for Indian removal in Andrew Jackson's cabinet.⁸ The Southern Express gained two franchises from its participation in the Southern. All lines owned by the Security Company would make exclusive contracts with the Southern Express for their freight business, a tactic that closed out the smaller express companies for the interstate traffic of the South. And lines owned by the security company would purchase their new locomotives through the express company, which provided financing.⁹

The third group was a party of Baltimore and Philadelphia capitalists associated with an emerging coastline railway, which was later separated into a railroad syndicate called the Atlantic Coast Line system. The Coast Line Syndicate was probably formed in March of 1869, when B. F. Newcomer, W. T. Walters, and J. D. Cameron (son of Pennsylvania senator Simon Cameron) gained control of two important railways in a coastline trunk: the Wilmington & Weldon and the Wilmington & Manchester.¹⁰ Newcomer and Walters were successful commission merchants who sought to make Baltimore the northern terminal for southern goods. A railway network controlled by Baltimore capital meant that freight rates would make Maryland's largest city the cheapest way station for transatlantic and northern shipment. Cotton would be piled on the banks of Baltimore wharves for reshipment and sale to the rest of the Atlantic world. Tobacco already came to the Chesapeake city in large quantities for boxing and resale; a single Southern Railway would make it a mecca for graders, buyers, and manufacturers. And that was only the northbound freight. Dry-goods firms and banks in Baltimore that were friendly to the Southern system would be well situated to provide store goods and credit that would follow in the backwash of hogsheads and cotton bales.¹¹ Walters, who had inspected most southern roads a few years before, brought crucial skills to the Southern: "With a very limited tolerance for loose talkers, schemers, and the whole tribe of pretenders," wrote his biographer, "he has always had a quick eye for real capacity in any form." Walters had traveled throughout the southern states in the late 1860s, eyeing the roadbeds, wharves, and terminals of the southern railroads to determine the cheapest routes. "The full intelligence gained in this trip," his biographer concluded, "has notably served his house in its extensive operations since."¹²


The Coast Line Syndicate and Scott's Pennsylvania pooled together their majority holdings in a collection of vital railway links through the South (see Map 3):

<i>Railroad Controlled</i>	<i>Number of Miles</i>
Richmond & Petersburg RR	25
Wilmington & Weldon RR	181
Wilmington, Columbia & Augusta RR	188
North Eastern RR	102
Cheraw & Darlington RR	40
Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta RR	195
Richmond & Danville RR and Its Branches, including North Carolina RR	494
Atlanta & Richmond Air Line Railway	265
East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia RR	270
Total	1,760

Unlike Moncure Robinson's system from Norfolk to Savannah, this was a more formalized consolidation. It appears odd at first that Tom Scott, burned by the public exposure of the Pennsylvania Railroad's operations in the South, would form a public company with stockholders, directors' minutes, and publicly traded shares. Historians of business and accounting have identified two reasons for the formation of the holding company which were clearly important to the formation of the SRSC: holding companies made consolidations easier, though more complicated organizationally, and they made them more secure.

A critical advantage of the holding company is that it allows consolidation of companies that are otherwise difficult to consolidate.¹³ Formal reincorporation of member companies is difficult at any time, and this was particularly so in the nineteenth century. When William Mahone tried to consolidate three east-west railroads in Virginia, he had to get two-thirds of the stockholders from *each* of the member companies to agree to consolidation. A sizable minority in any one of the three companies could stall consolidation.¹⁴ This problem was compounded for Tom Scott. Stockholders on the North Carolina Railroad strongly opposed Scott's planned system. In the 1870s, any formal merger would likely have required a two-thirds majority in the various companies *and* in each of the state legislatures.¹⁵

The advent of the holding company changed all this. The SRSC needed



A&C	Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line	R&G	Raleigh & Gaston
A&NC	Atlantic & North Carolina	R&P	Richmond & Petersburg
AM&O	Atlantic, Mississippi & Ohio	RF&P	Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
CC&A	Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta	S&R	Seaboard & Roanoke
ETV&G	East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia	SCRR	South Carolina Railroad
GA	Central of Georgia	W&A	Western & Atlantic
NCRR	North Carolina Railroad	W&W	Wilmington & Weldon
NE/SC	Northeastern of South Carolina	WC&A	Wilmington, Columbia & Augusta
R&D	Richmond & Danville	—	SRSC routes

Map 3. Southern Railway Security Company Lines, 1871

only to own more than half of the stock in each member company to choose the directors. The board of the security company could make consistent policies about rates, interchange of cars, materials used, and financial organization and then pass these policies on to the directors they chose, who would then promulgate the policies.¹⁶ George W. Cass explained that local directors would have “immediate supervision and control” of their roads as they knew “the resources of the country contiguous, and the wants of their several business communities.” These “gentlemen of experience and judgment,” or “local managements, so to speak,” would work “in accord with the more enlarged sphere of operations of this Company, [to] bring all these roads, and others in the Southern States, into harmonious action.”¹⁷

Of course, consolidation by holding company was not always harmonious in practice. Consolidation was easy on paper, but organizationally it was complicated. Who determined that the day-to-day decisions made by the directors of member companies were acceptable to the directors in New York? Because the Southern mostly used binding contracts to enforce its demands, early holding companies like the security company had no easy way to arbitrate conflicts. The rigidity of the system prevented “local managements” from contesting or altering contracts written in New York; the system also lacked a way to force the local directors to manage the *daily* business in the interests of “the more enlarged sphere of operations” of the SRSC.¹⁸

This problem of conflicting authority came up sharply in 1873 when W. T. Walters, a board member of the security company and the local president of the Wilmington & Weldon, was “traveling like a railroad king” with his family in his private Pullman Car along the Southern’s lines. He telegraphed to President Smith of Western North Carolina Railroad to stop his freight trains for the day and allow his family’s Palace Car to pass through free of charge. Smith telegraphed back that he would not do it, “because the people living along the line of our road are a plain people, and they work hard; I make them pay when *they* ride, and were I to pass you free, in all this style and magnificence, these people would never get over cursing me so long as I lived.”¹⁹

The problem was one of appearances and jurisdictions, and both grew out of the holding company’s semiformal consolidation. Allowing another member of the “local management” across the line for free suggested a truth that Smith did not wish to make apparent: that he was not, in fact, the president of the Western North Carolina Railroad, but simply an agent of a mas-

sive corporation whose wealthy members could stop local schedules on a whim.

The informality of the consolidation was also a problem because, with the board in New York, Walters had no direct control over his employee. The only thing he could do to Smith would be to convince the Southern's board to replace him at the next director's meeting—a decision that was drastic and might take months to effect. Walters got his satisfaction a week later by denying passage to two North Carolina Railroad directors on his private Pullman.²⁰

Nevertheless, the consolidation wrought by a holding company was more secure than the informal agreements of Robinson's Seaboard system. This security is the second reason often cited for the creation of holding companies. If important railroad shares are put into the holding company, members know that these shares cannot be traded. Shares are handed to the holding company and stored in a vault. The company generates funds by selling its own stocks and bonds.

This security was critical to Scott and the Southern because he could not necessarily trust the men whose railway stock went into the security company. The so-called Coast Line Syndicate of Cameron, Walters, and Newcomer had very different plans for their railroads than Scott did. They desired a coastal passenger and freight line that made Baltimore a terminal, and so had little use for a piedmont line that ended in Richmond or Washington.²¹ Scott was friendly with J. D. Cameron and his father Simon, but friendship was no guarantee among capitalists.

In fact, only a few months before Scott incorporated the Southern, he had trusted his closest associate Andrew Carnegie in a deal that allowed Scott and Carnegie to take over the Union Pacific. This was a deal not protected by a holding company. After the two men became directors, Carnegie saw the price of the stock skyrocket, and he secretly sold the shares that had been entrusted to him by Scott and the Pennsylvania's president. Carnegie had been speculating; he assumed he could buy the stock back before the next election of directors at a lower price and make a healthy profit. But enemies of the Scott alliance discovered the sale, bought Carnegie's stock, called a special meeting of the Union Pacific board, and deposed Scott and Carnegie. This failure was Tom Scott's most public humiliation.²² A month later Scott incorporated a number of the first holding companies in the United States, of which the Southern Railway Security Company was the most famous.²³ The relative safety of Scott's holding company would allow him to

buy up the member railroads of Robinson's Seaboard Inland Air Line without worrying that his allies might get greedy.

Aside from ease of consolidation and security, there were two unacknowledged reasons for forming the Southern as a holding company: the importance of a public name in bond markets (especially in England) and the economic leverage of the holding company's diverse membership. Both of these features of the holding company were vital to the Southern.

Publicity was crucial, for by the 1870s, European investors had begun to trust capitalists more than states.²⁴ Scott and other interstate railway directors who were connected with bond markets saw a greatly expanding market for postwar railway bonds in England. Because it was not recorded, we may never know the size of the British market for American railway bonds. It was certainly in the hundreds of millions of dollars, if not in the billions.²⁵ English investors invested their pounds sterling in ventures all over the globe after 1870, when the railway network on the British Isles was completed.²⁶ The recently re-United States seemed a safe bet. Thus, when the Pennsylvania Railroad remortgaged its property for a \$20 million bond issue in 1867, more than two-thirds was sold abroad, payable in London.²⁷ It was this massive market for "American" securities that pushed British and American merchants to form transatlantic merchant banking organizations like Drexel, Morgan. These bankers dealt directly with large investors, counseling them personally about which American securities were safest.²⁸

The most unique feature of this postwar market, and the source of the Southern's strength, was that British investors were willing to take bonds directly from public American companies, rather than asking for bonds hypothecated through or signed by U.S. states. For British investors, the repudiations of the Panic of 1837 had shown them that states could not be trusted to honor their own bonds, and that the signatures of governors were a useless guarantee.²⁹ Then the Civil War had proved that states were not really independent institutions after all.

In the banks and parlors of England, Klan violence at the end of the 1860s may have served to even further empower corporations. By the end of the 1860s, Conservative gubernatorial candidates threatened that when they returned to power, they would repudiate all the bonds which had been endorsed by Republican regimes. This threat to repeat the depredations of 1837 must have driven investors and their bankers further into the arms of the directors of the major public companies.³⁰

Directors, their bankers, and public corporations were swiftly becoming

more reputable than the unruly states of the old Confederacy. In the decade from 1865 to 1875 the names of Daniel Drew, Jay Cooke, and Diamond Jim Fiske became infamous; but at the same time certain railway barons became internationally renowned. Tom Scott, J. Edgar Thomson, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and C. P. Huntington achieved public status as guarantors of loans and bonded debt just as the individual American states faded into the ironwork of national consolidation. These men—capitalists—came to be emblematic of the perceived national order in America.³¹ To investors abroad, U.S. capitalists were far more important than diplomats or politicians. One of Scott's critics eulogized the public emergence of capitalists and the decline of states in a poem:

When pen shall put in hist'ry this decade,
no more will Newgate Calendar³² degrade;
For Mammon's men on sal'ry in highways,
Are millionaires—not brigands—nowadays!

In all the states are widow'd, aged, halt,
Whose funds are lock'd in bonds now in default
From interest cut off—their income lost,
The *world to them* is colder than the frost!³³

The power of “Mammon's men” was indeed great compared to defaulting states. When the Southern floated a bond issue for the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line, it at first received bonds from the state of Georgia in exchange for air line bonds through the process called hypothecation (see Chapter 1). A month later the Southern Railway Security Company respectfully returned the bonds of the state of Georgia after finding that they got a better price in New York and England with the signatures of their own members.³⁴

The unprecedented power of the signature of the security company's directors left the directors of other, smaller, Southern railways thunderstruck. The directory of the South Carolina Railroad found that they could not renegotiate their bonds in England because bondholders did not trust the largely state-owned company to generate returns. The South Carolina's directory blamed their problems on the “joint product of ambitious corporations and superabundant capital” that the Southern represented.³⁵ William Mahone's Atlantic, Mississippi & Ohio Railroad was, despite its name, a mostly Virginia-based enterprise that went from Norfolk west. As a railroad contractor before the war and a Confederate general during the conflict,

Mahone was well known in Virginia; but he was almost unknown in England. Though most of his newly consolidated railroad was built, Mahone's banker in England found that the Atlantic, Mississippi & Ohio could not issue bonds for further construction because Tom Scott and the Southern Railway Security Company were promising to build their *own* line from Norfolk west. Scott's line did not even have a charter to begin building, but the names associated with this spectral east-west railway meant that Scott's bankers could market bonds at a higher rate than Mahone's.³⁶

Public status and recognized signatures were not the only strengths of the security company. What the Southern Railway Security Company could promise that other railways could not was sophistication and the suggestion of control over geographic regions more vast than American states. Just like the Union Pacific, which Scott and Andrew Carnegie controlled for a time, or the "Pennsylvania System," which fanned out from Baltimore to Chicago and St. Louis, the Southern Railway Security Company presented to bond-holders a stable public fiction, a power and a name that represented far more than the mere ability to move people and goods across space. When European investors saw the Southern's maps they saw a vast region—the South—covered by iron bands. From 1871 onward, the Southern Railway Security Company and its corporate descendant, the Richmond & Danville system, bought lines that touched every major outlet for Southern cotton and bought or leased every competing line of more than a few miles. To British investors who pulled on their watch chains and pored over maps of competing railway "systems" in Brazil, Argentina, India and the Pacific, the Southern suggested the same mapped power over settled lands, labor, and staple agriculture.

Mapped precisely in space, measured to the most minute detail in operations, the Southern system became a facsimile of the trade and transport of the South, as easily examined in Richmond as in New York, Manchester, or London. When bankers like Morgan courted English investors they could provide charts of monthly traffic, expenses (by department) per mile run, and ratios of earnings to expenses per mile. The annual report of the Richmond & Danville system showed the operating budget of the railway corridor and its feeder lines. Through the 1870s the report blossomed with a massive catalog of statistics and charts.³⁷ Only the Pennsylvania Railroad itself had more charts and tables.³⁸

However comforting the public fiction of the Southern Railway Security Company appeared, a southern railway system could only be as trustworthy as its power over the region it claimed to control. Scott's new organization

gave it a leverage that its chief competitor, the Seaboard Inland Air Line, could not match. The associated railroads in the Southern had a pincer-like grip around the Seaboard system (see Map 3).

Indeed, competition with the Seaboard Inland Air Line system is what joined Tom Scott and the Coast Line Syndicate together. The Coast Line Syndicate wanted to connect its coastal railroad system, with a northern terminus in North Carolina, to its wharves in Baltimore. But like Tom Scott, the syndicate found that Virginia's general assembly was dominated by hostile Richmond merchants who listened to Moncure Robinson, and followed General Mahone.³⁹ Both Scott and the Coast Line Syndicate knew that tangling with the entrenched Richmond lobby on their own was dangerous. "The embrace of Mr. Moncure Robinson and General Mahone," wrote a friend of the syndicate, "requires a pretty rigid backbone. They are adroit and accomplished wrestlers."⁴⁰ Newcomer, Walters, and Cameron hoped that by joining forces with Scott, they could buy the influence needed to wrestle an all-rail route past Richmond and into northern cities.⁴¹

The Southern Railway Security Company had a unique twist on a traditional railroad strategy. When one railroad system fought another, it used a "tourniquet" to force the weaker railroad into line. In this strategy, for example, all SRSC railroads would make connections to the Robinson railroads expensive while drastically cutting prices on roundabout routes that were controlled by the Southern.⁴² The Southern would maintain the tourniquet until Robinson relented and allowed a settlement. The philosophy of the tourniquet was simple: there can be only one trunk line, one spine in a region's trade; an effective tourniquet demonstrated to weaker competitors that they were superfluous, appendages that could be amputated at will.⁴³

What the Southern Railway Security Company represented was a tourniquet more massive and complete than any imagined by the stock jobbers and coupon clippers of Wall Street.⁴⁴ Its economic leverage was visible both in its large, easily maneuverable capital base and the power of its non-railroad members. Perhaps a tourniquet is the best way to describe the company's structural power and its special strategy, for in a few short years the "wrestlers" of the Robinson dynasty, their limbs starved of oxygen, had dropped to the mat.

The Southern began first with attempted buyouts. In June 1871, the security company employed William Sutherlin, a director of the Richmond & Danville and a Danville tobacco manufacturer, to purchase the controlling interest in the Raleigh & Gaston Railroad. He faced Colonel A. B. Andrews,

who managed the line as part of Robinson's Seaboard Inland Air Line. Sutherlin first tried to purchase stock owned by the city of Norfolk but found that Robinson had predicted this move. A bank allied with the Seaboard Air Line had lent the city more than \$40,000 and had received in exchange all the city's proxy votes until the loan was repaid.⁴⁵ Sutherlin next tried a public buyout offer to the directors, who rebuffed him.⁴⁶

At last Sutherlin turned to bribes. Using a discretionary fund in excess of \$100,000, he convinced North Carolina Railroad president William A. Smith and a majority of its directors to give the Richmond & Danville a twenty-year lease on the railroad.⁴⁷ During a midnight session, the directory turned over the road to the Richmond & Danville.⁴⁸ Thinking ahead, the Richmond & Danville directory had prepared to change the gauge of the North Carolina Railroad to match their own road, a move that would make one-half of the North Carolina Railroad into a section of the through line from Atlanta to Richmond, and make the other half—which stretched over to Robinson's Raleigh & Gaston—useless.⁴⁹ In a swift countermove, the R&G directory detailed two of its members to “use every legal means to resist” the lease.⁵⁰ The members succeeded in getting the North Carolina Assembly to hurriedly issue a law preventing gauge changes on any railroad in North Carolina.⁵¹

Yet once the Southern could dictate the policies that governed the North Carolina Railroad, they could begin to raise the costs of Robinson's other lines. By February of 1872, the security company consolidated the management of the Richmond & Danville with the North Carolina Railroad. The new superintendent began a thorough inspection of North Carolina Railroad contracts. He reinterpreted one of the clauses in the North Carolina Railroad's contract with the Seaboard Inland Air Line, and claimed an additional 10 percent of the profits generated by freight coming from its line south of Charlotte.⁵² The bales of cotton from the Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Railroad had been key to Robinson's revenue. But the pressure made them give up quickly. By the fall, stockholders sold their shares to Sutherlin while the president, A. B. Andrews's father-in-law, planned his resignation.⁵³ By the late fall of 1872 the Southern Railway Security Company used legal means to control and then buy another of Robinson's small western feeders.⁵⁴ The Seaboard system had lost two limbs by the end of the year.

As a holding company, the Southern Railway Security Company had a powerful set of directors, many of whom were not railroad executives. This unique organizational structure gave the Southern many other ways besides

simple railroad competition to raise Robinson's costs. The Southern Express Company, which was a partial owner of the security company by 1871, drastically reduced the fees it paid to the Raleigh & Gaston Railroad at the end of 1872. They claimed that the railroad's reduced business hardly made it worth their while to operate over his road.⁵⁵ The Western Union, whose directors included two security company members, also made him hire his own telegrapher and cut off the Seaboard Inland Air Line's free telegraph privileges.⁵⁶ This made the forwarding business, crucial to Robinson's through bill of lading, much more expensive. Without free telegrams, his men could not call ahead when traffic was delayed (see Chapter 3).

It is difficult to imagine the variety of harassing strategies the Southern used to raise the costs on Robinson's roads and to suborn traffic. A. B. Andrews began to get a sense of this power in 1872. Convinced that too much Seaboard Inland Air Line traffic was disappearing in the fall of 1872, Andrews hired a spy to travel over the roads of the Carolinas to discover why he was losing freight business. He paid a man to snoop around the yards of the Southern's companies, to make payoffs to freight agents in cities farther south, and to report back on his progress on a weekly basis. One month the agent discovered that the Southern-controlled North Carolina Railroad was detaining Raleigh & Gaston railroad cars in their yards and hiding them behind the circus train. The North Carolina Railroad would use the cars for storage, while reducing the cars available to the Raleigh & Gaston.⁵⁷ When Ward tried to bribe freight agents farther south, he discovered that many Carolina agents were already getting payoffs from the security company to secretly mark goods "via Greensboro." Thus goods that merchants had explicitly consigned over Robinson roads were traveling exclusively over the railroads of the Southern Railway Security Company.⁵⁸

Thus by 1873 the Robinson-Andrews-Johnston connection was feeling the force of an organization with public power in New York and London and secret power in the South. They began to understand how the informal association of the Seaboard Inland Air Line was little match for the Southern. With less capital than the security company, and no tightly organized stock pool, they could not protect themselves from the security company's buy-outs of member roads. Without a formal holding company, they could not build a powerful New York board of directors and thus influence related companies like the Southern Express and Western Union.

By the fall of 1873, Andrews felt it necessary to make public some of the activities of the Southern, but in a way that would hide his organizations'

hand. Andrews provided information about security company tactics to his father-in-law, William Johnston, who was the perfect front man for the attack. Johnston had been a prominent secessionist and legislator who had been given the honorary rank of colonel after serving as interim commissary-general for the Confederacy.⁵⁹ He was happy to oblige Andrews. The Southern had recently unseated him from the presidency of the Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Railroad, and the holding company appeared to have designs on the Statesville railroad which he still controlled. In a circular attacking the “foreign corporation,” Johnston detailed some of the ways in which the security company had taken over other railroads in North Carolina. The Statesville Road was the only significant road left, he wrote, but “the ever vigilant Security Company, taking time by the forelock, has determined now . . . to set their snares for it.” Johnston concluded his attack with a call to arms that called for a return to war. “Our ancestors took up arms and fought through a long and bloody war to avoid lawless taxation,” Johnston railed, “and we shall be unworthy of our sires if we not only quietly submit but seemingly invite the secret power of monopoly to become our master.”⁶⁰

Yet when Johnston issued his circular critical of the Southern Railway Security Company, he found that he was locked out of media attention. The circular, designed for printing in newspapers in North and South Carolina, did not even appear in Johnston’s hometown newspaper, the *Charlotte Observer*. The paper publicly stated that it would not publish the piece unless the writer came forward publicly and provided detailed evidence of SRSC corruption.⁶¹ While sympathetic to the problem of railroad monopoly, the editors of the *Observer* avoided controversy, apparently feeling that direct attacks on the security company were ill advised.⁶² What Johnson did not know was that the *Raleigh News*, the premier paper in North Carolina, had been bought by the Southern in 1871 and was unlikely to print the story.⁶³

Robinson and Mahone, fighting the Southern Railway Security Company in Virginia, were also flummoxed by the rapid change in media sympathy that had begun in 1871. Indeed, the security company had taken Richmond newspapers by storm. Scott’s major functionary in Richmond was Alexander K. McClure, one of the Pennsylvania Railroad’s lawyers who had used Pennsylvania newspapers to organize support for the fledgling Republican Party since the 1850s. McClure may have been the man to suggest that Scott purchase the *Richmond Enquirer*. A rabidly Democratic paper with a long history in the city, the *Enquirer* would challenge public statements made by the *Richmond Whig*—sympathetic to the Mahone and Robinson railroad

systems—and the Richmond *Dispatch*—the sounding board of Virginia's hostile House Committee on Roads and Internal Improvements.⁶⁴ A fledgling corporation, the Richmond Enquirer Publishing Company purchased the *Richmond Enquirer* in early 1871, shortly after the Southern was formed. Using new postbellum general laws of incorporation, the company's stockholder—the Southern or the Pennsylvania Railroad—could keep its identity a secret; the new organization appointed local men as editors, men with ties to Scott's subsidiary railroads.⁶⁵

Within a few months Mahone and Robinson also found that the *Richmond Dispatch* was less sympathetic to its struggle. Later in 1871 the security company got closer to Richmond mayor Henry K. Ellyson, the editor of the *Dispatch*, apparently by allowing Ellyson to distribute the *Dispatch* and the Southern-owned *Enquirer* on the railway cars of the Southern system.⁶⁶ These subscription agents doubled as reporters who brought gossip and stories back from as far away as Charlotte.⁶⁷ With railroad passes, Ellyson's employees could sell both Richmond papers to a much greater market than the capital city. In fact, the security company got so close to Mayor Ellyson in the following months that Ellyson posed as a southern investor seeking to buy a railroad charter that the Southern wanted.⁶⁸

The purchases and strategic alliances had their intended effect in the city of Richmond. Two years later, a house committee in Virginia, searching for information about bribery, examined the security company's purchases of Virginia railroads. The committee hearing was not covered in the Richmond press.⁶⁹ By the end of 1871, when the Southern was only a few months old, the only major paper critical of its affairs in Richmond was the *Virginia Gazette* in the town of Lexington.⁷⁰

The security company moved on to other papers on the railroad lines that it owned, either through marketing relationships or direct purchase. The *Raleigh News*, the *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, and the *Atlanta Constitution* all apparently joined the fold of the Southern by 1871. With these three papers the mode of operations was the same: incorporation, nondisclosure of incorporators, then public reversals about the character of the security company and its affiliates.⁷¹

Railroad ownership of newspapers is perhaps not as sinister as it seems. For newspapers, ownership by a railroad was a kind of vertical integration. Throughout the United States after the war, newspapers were becoming larger and more capital intensive. For large-circulation city newspapers like the *Richmond Dispatch* or the *Atlanta Constitution*, paper was the most

expensive input. For the largest newspapers, paper costs were more than \$200,000 a year.⁷² And as a bulky item, paper's price depended on a railroad's commitment to purchasing specialized paper cars and offering favorable freight rates. By the 1870s the Richmond & Danville began providing paper cars, with a lower freight rate, and supporting a paper industry in Manchester, across the river from Richmond.⁷³

More important, however, was the exposure that a railroad could give to a newspaper. The Richmond & Danville gave free passes to reporters, who could provide market news and southern "human interest" stories as well as sell the paper in the regions reached by the newspaper. Indeed, the reach of the *Richmond Enquirer* grew just as the Richmond-to-Atlanta trunk line was being built. By 1872 the paper had a North Carolina section, and when the security company acquired the Western North Carolina Railroad, the *Enquirer* gave reports from new railroad towns like Hickory. This promotion worked two ways: as reporters extolled the virtues of new country towns for farmers and aspiring country merchants, the Southern saw interregional traffic increase between the terminal city of Richmond and the feeder lines in the upcountry.⁷⁴ Consolidation between railroads and newspapers was understandable. Both were commercial media, providing services to staple growers, merchants, and bankers. Newspapers had everything to gain from the connection.

What the Southern stood to gain, besides support for the necessary work of colonization of feeder territory, was positive publicity. It was here that Tom Scott had proved the weakest in the early months of 1871—and its master in the years to follow. To buttress the powerful financial interests in a Southern trunk line was now an apparatus of media support, a cultural base secure enough to support a flourishing economic superstructure.

The relationship between the Southern and the public sphere of the South was complex. The newspapers with ties to the security company were not simply shills for the company but provided direct evidence of the region's importance to the company and the company's importance to the region. Apart from shutting down debate, and studiously avoiding discussion of sensitive topics like railroad ownership or freight rates, the Southern's newspapers performed two rhetorical functions for the parent company: they linked the Southern with the power of nature and with the pathos of the vanquished South.

Part of the way in which the images of the South and the Southern were linked was to make the security company appear as a healthy force of nature,

most often a stream, which circulated life-giving water between southern cities and the countryside. In Richmond the *Dispatch* wrote that the security company's line would remove "obstructions" from Richmond's industrial production and provide it with "outlets to the South" that would "absorb all that Richmond can ever make."⁷⁵ The creation of a railroad trunk line meant rejuvenation for the South by fulfilling the desire to "raise our sunken fortunes, to build up our waste places—to make the flower to flourish where the thistle now grows!"⁷⁶ One needed only follow the metaphor of nature to the metaphor of growth to imagine Richmond as the South's natural terminus. The SRSC promised that a southern region defined by a railway network would be the circulatory system of the South. "Count the men employed in and about the Tredegar [Iron] Works, and calculate what a hundred such mills would do for Richmond," the *Dispatch* exclaimed. "You would then learn what an increase of prosperity would spring from building iron steamers."⁷⁷

The railroad, then, only distributed the bounty that would naturally "spring" from the region. As a force of nature, there could be nothing sinister in its motives. In a toast to the Pennsylvania Railroad (a month before the formation of the security company), a Virginia state senator made explicit the claim that railroads could do nothing but good. The directors and lawyers of the company "could proudly point to the *wake* of the Pennsylvania Central locomotive wherever it had gone. It had found countries poverty-stricken, and had made them rich."⁷⁸ Capitalist investment, no matter how intended, had a natural effect, a wake, that benefited everyone.

Opposition to the fertile stream of the security company was thus unnatural and unhealthy, an "obstruction," a "great barrier" set up by men with a "disease of nervous apprehension."⁷⁹ "The whole system of 'obstruction,'" wrote the *Richmond Enquirer*, referring to Robinson's attempt to oppose the Southern's trunk line, "is a fight against destiny and the uncontrollable laws of nature."⁸⁰ These man-made obstacles could never stop the awesome natural force of the interests of the South and Southern. "The grand interests of this immense country," they wrote, "must by their great force override the troubles of the day and wash away the knolls and rafts of passion and prejudice that have vexed the Government."⁸¹ For those who obeyed the course of nature immanent in the security company, the end was more promising. "We think," penned the *Dispatch*, "the railroad enterprises are one of the conduits through which the excess of capital in the North is to flow into our nearly exhausted coffers, and help to equalize the money standard in the nation."⁸²

Describing the Southern system as a stream made a certain amount of sense. Railroads before the war had often supported the traffic borne by canals and rivers. The Richmond & Danville Railroad, for example, had originally been built to join James River traffic in Richmond to Dan River traffic in piedmont Virginia. If one ignored the fact that only one company can operate on a line of track, it is a sensible shift.

If the equation of the security company with nature was at least understandable, the equation of the South with a company in New York required more effort, though it could prove more valuable. The Southern's opponents were rhetorically disabled by linking them to the images of the war and imagining the Southern and the South together as its victims. Thus Robinson and Mahone, in opposing railway consolidation, were possessed of a "rapacious and monopolizing spirit that would war upon lines" for "selfish gratification."⁸³ For many Southerners who had opposed the war, or saw it as a useless folly, this metaphorical association could be quite effective. The Southern's newspapers wrote about railroad battles between the security company and Mahone using headlines suggestive of war news, such as "Inside History of General Mahone's Plan for Capturing the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad."⁸⁴ In a long analysis of a Mahone attack on the Pennsylvania interests, the paper's reporter assumed the attitude of a war correspondent.

The morning opened placidly and promisingly at the Capitol yesterday. The sunshine was golden, the air balmy, the mocking-bird in the Clerk's office caroled forth its sweetest notes, the apple-women in the rotunda wore their most attractive smiles, the incense from the cigars of gathering members was fragrant and grateful, the manner of the doorkeepers in receiving visitors was inviting and bland, and the countenance of the Speaker as he assumed the venerable chair gave no sign or token of the approaching storm. . . . It was about as unpropitious a seeding for a crop of armed men as we have ever heard debated on the legislative floors.

After this, a resolution opposing the Pennsylvania's effort to connect Richmond to Washington was introduced on the floor, and the warriors came out of hiding.

But suddenly the snapping fire of the advance began. The videttes showed great activity. There a sharpshooter dodged from tree to tree, and there a light dragoon hallooed in with trenchant sabre. Still the main lines

lay quiescent. But each face showed expectancy; and it was now very evident that some mysterious germ of war was concealed beneath the innocence of the apparent question, and that fact having been generally established, spectators proceeded to ask a universal question—What is it?—Nobody seemed to know. . . . In place of the irregular popping of carbines and dodging of light troops came the sullen roar of artillery and the forward movement of a compact though small column. Mr. Wood, of Halifax, aimed and discharged his columbiad at Mahood's substitute, offered an amendment, and made a speech to it.⁸⁵

Such humor undermined Mahone's status as a Confederate war hero by turning him from a warrior for Virginia's interests (his own view of himself) into a "selfish" proponent of an imagined conflict. The Southern's papers called him a "wrestler," and joked that

the Pennsylvania company had encountered a foeman worthy of its steel, and [we] remembered the lines:

Now gallant Saxon, hold thine own,
No maiden's arm is round thee thrown!⁸⁶

Mahone was depicted as a laughable warrior who could not give up war; not a defender of the South or of Virginia, but one who would endanger it for his own reasons.

The security company similarly attacked Richmond merchants by calling them enemies of the Southern, and thus of the South. The Southern's papers wrote of Richmond merchants who opposed the security company as antebellum sectionalists whose lack of patriotism brought the war in the first place. Richmond merchants who opposed security company schemes were "sectional interests which warred against one another and combined by turns to carry out schemes by taking money out of the public treasury."⁸⁷ The laudable aims of the Southern, on the other hand, were read back into the past as the sectionalists' beleaguered opposition:

For long years there was a vain struggle to connect the lines of rail in the towns of Virginia. It was deemed of vital importance to the prosperity of those towns that the traveler should "light" and "take something," not in the spirit of hospitality, but with the intention to get something out of him as he passed. He must get a snack, take a drink, and ride in the "bus" from depot to depot. It was a genteel form of twisting "bucksheesh" out of him.

The beggars of the East would force it from him by their unendurable cries—the drinking and eating shops and “shave-tail mule” of our so-called “cities” coerced it by maintaining a gap which had to be filled up with refreshments and a hack.⁸⁸

In this fascinating switch of personalities and interests, the *opponents* of trunk lines became like robber barons of old defending their petty and narrow domains through theft and “obstruction.” And though the war had quelled narrow, sectional interests, merchant opponents of the Southern, by threatening to prevent the syndicate from controlling and combining the railroads of the South, were said to revert to tactics that were “in principle barbarous.”⁸⁹

Finally even the war itself was reinterpreted, as merchant opposition to railway expansion was blamed for the conflict. It took quite a stretch of logic: Southern railway newspapers argued that the war had been caused by poor railway facilities, which had caused population stagnation, which had caused the South to be underrepresented politically.⁹⁰ Thus, the merchants of Richmond and men like them had caused the Civil War. By opposing railroad consolidation, merchants were sure to bring about another losing battle. Failure to consolidate would prevent people from moving to the state and then, “Commerce will be restricted to her disadvantage, people will not be invited here to make investments, her lands will not rise in value, her minerals will not be developed and we will only linger while other States are steadily growing richer and richer, and more powerful in the national councils.”⁹¹ The only way to support the South was to allow railway consolidation, and the creation of the Southern. A threat to a Southern railway was nothing less than a threat to the safety of the South.

In these ways the Southern figuratively constructed the South and its own place within it. Hurting the Southern Railway as nature meant hurting the parched land of the South, which needed the natural, active stream of trade between hinterland and city that the security company was sure to bring. Opposing the Southern Railway as South was nothing less than a revival of Confederate sympathies, which was at best comical and at worst might leave the South underrepresented in Congress and bring final destruction in another protracted and bloody—though this time economic—war.

Aside from the obvious tactical advantages of the control of local newspapers, a number of interesting results grew from the metaphorical refiguring of the security company. The first is that the operations of the Southern

appear to work all by themselves. Because the minutes of the board meetings of the security company were not released to the public in the South, very explicit policies on the part of the company—such as cheapening fertilizer rates to encourage cotton production⁹²—appeared to be natural forces. In our own time this rhetorical process is effaced, and the historical subjects who participated in the building of the South are rendered invisible. Historians regularly speak of cotton as the “force behind the South’s hunger for new territory” or assert that “demand for cheaper textiles expanded the borders of the old Cotton Kingdom.”⁹³ The transformation is complete: explicit policy rendered natural as a free-floating “economic force.”

The other result of the association of the security company and nature was that the force used by the Southern was naturalized and thus made acceptable. Freight-rate differentials that favored cotton, special subsidies to favored shippers, through rates which turned cities from terminals into fueling stations, all were rendered natural by the metaphorical language of the security company. If we understand that these metaphors were printed in a company paper, then the effort to turn a corporation into a force of nature appears patently ideological. But when these metaphors were repeated over and over in a newspaper that described the rest of the world—wars in Europe, baseball scores, speeches of senators—as a seamless web of apparently truthful facts, one was left to turn blame elsewhere: on nature, on Republicans, on oneself.

Finally, the Southern’s newspapers eased the entry of the holding company into the lives of Southern residents. In North Carolina the Southern’s chief North Carolina counsel, Zebulon Vance, became governor. During the war he had violently opposed the Confederacy’s construction of a Richmond-Atlanta trunk through the towns of Danville and Greensboro. After the war he became a crucial supporter of the security company—favoring consolidation as an executive while at the same time making populistic speeches condemning the company. Vance was critical in disabling the Southern’s most violent critic, Josiah Turner, by taking the state printing contract away from him and turning it over to the security company newspaper, the *Raleigh News*.⁹⁴ Ironically, Vance came to power because of the scandal that surrounded payoffs to Republicans in the midnight meeting that made the North Carolina Railroad a part of the Southern trunk. When the Democrats came to power, the security company and the Democratic Party together quietly closed ranks. When Democrat Turner detailed Democratic participation in the scandals that created the trunk line, he was declared a

“bolter,” and nearly drummed out of the party.⁹⁵ When Turner began a speaking tour of the state to detail the perfidy of Democrats, party newspapers labeled him as a deranged rustic. “Josiah Turner Jr. will address the people of Rockingham” wrote the *Charlotte Observer*, “on the state of the country, condition of the party, power and influence of rings, composting, deep plowing, clover and bees.”⁹⁶

The Atlanta & Richmond Air Line was completed in September 1873, when the former chief engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Herman Haupt, oversaw its completion.⁹⁷ With the North Carolina Railroad under the control of the security company, freight cars could travel uninterrupted from Atlanta to Charlotte. Because of the Robinson dynasty’s legal maneuver, a gauge change at Charlotte and again at Greensboro was still necessary, but special “compromise” cars were used for the trip which allowed car wheels to be narrowed for the run from Charlotte to Greensboro and widened for the run from Greensboro to Richmond, so that no freight had to be reloaded.⁹⁸

Compromise cars ran along the line as compromise speeches eased the transition that made the Southern a part of the South. When the Southern’s depot agent inaugurated a new engine on one of the trunks, he named it after a stockholder who had been bought out by the security company:

Gentlemen: Allow me to introduce engine AB Davidson, named in honor to our respected townsman, AB Davidson, Esq., one of the oldest stockholders and directors of the c&sc, now the cc&ARR. One who has stood by the road in times of prosperity or adversity, one who in her prosperous days, when she declared 8 per cent. on her stocks, received his dividends with cheerfulness; who when by misfortunes of war, saw his favorite enterprise laid waste and her shops dismantled, her prospects blasted, came forward and with his money and credit helped her to her present prosperous condition, and saw her stock pass into the hands of the Southern Security Company, which, with its immense capital and competent officers, will never let her make a retrograde movement, but usher forward to her once proud and defiant position.

Thus the Southern created the public image to suit its ambitions. Former stockholders like Davidson, Confederate figureheads like Colonel A. S. Buford, Colonel W. T. Sutherlin and (in 1875) Colonel A. B. Andrews, were honored with engines. The new Georgia towns of Buford and Sutherlin grew up almost overnight. As the compromise cars rumbled over the land-

scape of this New South, and the compromised southern newspapers churned out pages of explanation for southern backwardness, the vicious battles over private ownership of public corporations abated. The Southern only needed to ensure that states which had largely built these railways would never regain their power to control them.

A Railway Redemption

In the summer of 1868, Ben Hill had railed against Joseph Brown, federal officers and northern railroad men. His violent rhetoric of corruption became the rallying cry for Klansmen throughout the South in the following two years. It had led to pitched battles between Klansmen and public authorities in Alamance County, North Carolina, and the upper piedmont of South Carolina. But beginning in the winter of 1870, Hill's bitter language had subsided. In late December he had dinner with Joseph Brown at a fête for two northern capitalists who would soon form the Southern Railway Security Company. Simon Cameron, former secretary of war for Lincoln, had traveled down with Columbus Delano, the capitalist and secretary of the interior, to confirm a railway redemption.

Tom Scott had organized the affair at the newly constructed Kimball House in the massive ballroom downstairs. Together Hill and Brown drank toasts to a railroad lease they now shared in. Over an oyster dinner the former enemies discussed their joint control of the Western & Atlantic Railroad, formerly owned by the state. Tom Scott's new Southern Railway would buy and control the line; Hill, Brown, and other Georgia figureheads would manage its local operations.¹ Over the next year the Southern would buy up majority stock in eight major railroads in the South. Richmond would have direct connections to Augusta, Charleston, Atlanta, and Memphis. The Southern would control the lines, in the words of the annual report, through "gentlemen of experience and judgment" like Benjamin Hill.

On the surface, this system of bribery and imposture may seem little different from Scott's original strategy of buying legislatures and remotely man-



The front office of the Kimball House, circa 1870s, where Thomas A. Scott arranged the rapprochement between Georgia Klan leaders and Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano. (courtesy College of William and Mary)

aging Southern railroads through powerless figureheads. But to prominent intellectuals like Hill, the security company's use of conservative intellectuals like himself made the system much more satisfactory. After the dinner at the Kimball House, conservatives—that coalition of white Democrats and former Whigs who opposed the Republican Party—would regain control of the Georgia assembly and force the governor to flee the state. Conservatives called this movement the *Redemption*, or the buying back, of southern states.

The dinner at the Kimball House formally represented the bargain. Here is what they got. Interior secretary Delano gave a toast to the state of Georgia. According to Hill, this toast was a coded promise that federal troops would no longer defend Georgia's black voters at polling places. Georgia, Hill said, would be left to "work out its problem in a legitimate way, unawed by bayonets and undisturbed by military force." Hill did not, of course, mean the military force of armed, white Democrats who would continue to prevent black men from voting. Hill understood that he was surrendering control of the state's central railroad to northern capitalists. "I saved the State by that

night's work," Hill bragged later.² An Iron Confederacy would solidify white control, while northern-controlled railroads would rebuild the South economically.

Yet Hill may have little understood the costs involved in this bargain. For the sale of the state's interest in its railroads meant ceding power over the southern economy to a holding company. Before long, the security company would absorb other state organs, such as penitentiaries and agricultural societies, and use them to reorganize the South into an apparatus for the extraction of cotton, tobacco, and raw materials. Conservatives regained control of state governments just as state governments lost their power to control the South.

The mechanics of the Redemption bargain in Georgia were quite complicated. By 1870, after Georgia's Republican governor Rufus Bullock had used railroad funds to fight Klansmen, the business press in Georgia began calling for the privatization of the Western & Atlantic.³ The most conspicuous of these newspapers was the *Atlanta Constitution*, a paper tightly connected to friends of the security company.⁴ Privatization suited many of Georgia's conservatives, as it hobbled the power of the executive and paid homage to the Democratic Party's *laissez-faire* heritage. Of course, conservatives failed to mention that the railroad had long generated more funds than it required.

Pressured by centrists in both parties, Bullock's final executive decision was to lease the road to a coalition. At the oyster dinner in the Kimball House, Bullock leased the Western & Atlantic Railroad to the gentlemen of the security company, who would operate it under the aegis of Brown and Hill.⁵ When Democrats took control of the assembly and threatened to impeach Bullock, the governor resigned and fled.⁶ Brown did the work of keeping the deal safe. Formerly the Republican strategist for Bullock, Brown rejoined the Democratic Party just in time to choose the house committees that would investigate Republican corruption. The new treasurer of the Western & Atlantic reassured Simon Cameron that the plans of the corporation were safe in the hands of Joseph Brown, the newly minted Redeemer. "The committee appointed by the legislature," the secretary wrote, "is perfectly satisfactory to [former] Governor Brown and I can find but little opposition as yet, though we can't always tell what will be done. I have no fears whatever of the result. Brown is very active and *runs* the legislature."⁷ If the oyster dinner closed the deal, Joseph Brown's committee proceedings on corruption were the show trials that confirmed the bargain.⁸

In South Carolina, capitalists in the Southern Railway Security Company

joined hands with conservatives as well, but they may have changed sides too quickly to build the system they wanted. When the air line was reorganized in 1870, the most prominent Klansmen in the South Carolina upcountry were added to the local board of directors. The combination of conservatives on the board and renewed infusions of capital from New York was a reassuring sign to promoters. A columnist for the *Richmond Dispatch* wrote that after the reorganization the “clouds which hovered over this important work have dissipated.”⁹

But contrary to the atmospheric expectations of the security company and white conservatives, Republicans remained in power in South Carolina until 1876. The Southern’s most pressing problem was labor, but Republican governor Franklin J. Moses (who replaced Robert Scott in 1872) had the charge of the penitentiary. Moses was less tractable than Bullock. Republican stalwarts in South Carolina had a united black vote behind them, and so could ignore the labor problems of a conservative-dominated railroad project between Atlanta and Spartanburg.¹⁰

The security company made an important mistake in embracing conservatives so quickly. They chose white Democrats to fill the local board before the state was redeemed, but neither side could get what they wanted. Until 1877, the Republican Party demanded and got federal troops to defend its voters from conservative terror. With few conservatives in the state house, the security company found little sympathy for their complaints about state-supported railroads. The state-supported South Carolina Railroad ran from Charleston into the upcountry, and bisected the Southern’s trunk from Richmond to Atlanta. Through the years of the Great Depression (1873–77), the South Carolina line’s impudent directors competed with the Southern for cotton traffic.

Because Democrats had failed to redeem the state in 1872, they were unable to deliver what the security company needed. By the early 1870s, relations between the Southern and its Democratic allies became uglier. When the white conservatives of South Carolina tried to sway the chief engineer to place the roadbed of the Atlanta & Richmond Railroad nearer to existing towns in the upcountry, they quickly discovered how little pull they had. The chief engineer, a Virginia native, surveyed and built through the unpopulated hills in Pickens County rather than near the towns in more populous Anderson County. Democrats publicly complained, but they had made their Faustian bargain. How to complain about being figureheads for Yankee capital, without explaining how they had gained their positions in the first

place? Decisions about line placement would be made by the road's executive committee, and in New York. For Democrats, exposing the bargain would have been a calculated risk, because there were still benefits to gain from membership on the board of directors: one director got a railroad terminal named after him and another formed a bank that would have been a regional repository for the system. But these men would never control the course of their region's development again.¹¹

Finally, in 1877, the power of the Southern grew as the power of black voters declined. The Compromise of 1877 led to the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, allowing conservatives to bring their own troops out of hiding. By 1877, conservatives had learned more subtlety than had Klansmen Benjamin Hill and Josiah Turner. Redeemer Wade Hampton's men traded their white robes for red shirts, and they avoided shooting their opponents when they were close to polling stations. In certain counties, their chief functionaries were small cadres of black men who were willing to threaten black voters in exchange for patronage jobs.¹² Soon after, Wade Hampton became South Carolina's governor.

The transfer of power to conservatives proved just the tonic to strengthen the line from Richmond to Atlanta. After Wade Hampton was inaugurated, the South Carolina Railroad failed, apparently because Redeemers raised taxes on the railroad's property in Charleston. A year or so of reorganizations only held off the inevitable as local capitalists watched the formerly state-supported company slip into the hands of Baltimore capitalists, then (by 1899) into the waiting arms of the security company's successor, the Southern Railway. As in Georgia, Democrats took over the Palmetto State just as the state lost its most closely guarded power.¹³

In North Carolina, too, the state was redeemed at nearly the same moment that the state gave away its railroads. William A. Smith, appointee of Republican governor Holden, saw the conservative forces gathering to impeach Holden in 1871. With the support of some of the largest private stockholders, Smith prevented the conservative legislature from gaining control of the North Carolina Railroad. He first prevented the assembly of a quorum, thus stalling the choice of new directors. Then in a midnight meeting in September, shortly after the governor was impeached, Smith leased the railroad to the security company.¹⁴ Some Democrats opposed the lease, but in vain. A battery of security company lawyers got the suits and countersuits moved to the federal circuit court.¹⁵ Legislators in the North Carolina assembly held public hearings to investigate corruption. As in Georgia, the SRSC had

enough Democratic friends in both houses to ensure that the committee investigations would reaffirm the evils of state control of public works, and lay the crimes against the state at the feet of the former Republican governor. More to the point, Democratic friends of the security company would be spared the indignity of personal investigations into their affairs.¹⁶

In Virginia, the balance of power over legislation swung back and forth. Sometimes the political luminaries in Virginia favored the Pennsylvania Railroad. Other times the forces of William Mahone and Moncure Robinson were ascendant. Unlike the states farther south, however, the end of Reconstruction did not come at the same time as retrenchment and privatization. Redemption came first; the sale of the state's railroads followed two years later.

Redemption in Virginia can be dated in July 1869, when a conservative-dominated Republican faction, called the True Republicans, came to power. Governor Gilbert C. Walker had come to power through involved promises to railroad interests, a story that has been extensively documented.¹⁷ Scott's formal control of the Richmond & Danville came two years later. In 1871 Tom Scott met with Richmond & Danville conservatives A. S. Buford and W. T. Sutherlin. Together they entered the offices of Virginia's Board of Public Works to work their magic. The men watched as the Commonwealth's secretary sold all the state-owned stock to Tom Scott. Scott got an excellent deal. The railroad stock was half-price, because Buford neglected to tell Virginia officials that the previous stock dividend was an extra share of stock. Even better, Scott managed to trade Virginia bonds for railroad stocks at par, even though the Virginia bonds were nearly worthless. When a state-appointed member of the railroad's board of directors balked at such dealings, Buford had him replaced with a man who favored their deal. The work was completed somewhat later, as all records of the transaction—even the investigation by the House of Delegates—were removed from Virginia's state library.¹⁸ Scott's informal control of the system was transformed public ownership of the R&D, the key to the corridor from Richmond to Atlanta.

The end of Reconstruction in the seaboard states had many causes: Klan violence made state governments seem unstable and illegitimate; the national Republican Party learned to disengage nationalism (which it favored) from the pursuit of equality (which it abandoned); state Republican Parties fractured from within; Democrats took the political center by appearing to accept the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.¹⁹ But the seaboard states that had been reconstructed by railway were also redeemed by railway.

Republican administrations folded in part because northern railway capitalists turned away from Radical Reconstruction and found allies in the Redemption movement. Southern conservatives soon learned, however, that the railway system would absorb some of the important functions of state governments.

For as the Southern Railway Security Company absorbed state railways, it also took control of related state institutions. The most important of these were state penitentiaries. The advent of free labor created larger and larger prison populations. This was partly a change in the borders of the law. Conservative southern states increasingly defined black farmers' traditional appropriations of plantation timber, tools, and manufactured goods as theft. Even when sharecroppers broke contracts, states like Georgia defined the action as a theft of service.²⁰ As a result, by the 1870s, African Americans increasingly found themselves committing newly defined crimes against property and propriety.²¹

Northern capitalists were the chief beneficiaries of the growing prison populations that the new sharecropping and wage systems had created. As southern states faced the high costs of penitentiaries, they transformed the public institution of incarceration into the private system of convict lease. In Georgia, Southern Railway contractors leased all the convicts of the Georgia penitentiary at no cost. The security company leased North Carolina's convicts to tunnel through western mountain ranges. Railroad directors even sat on the board of North Carolina's State Penitentiary, and offered pardons to felons who stole from railway cars if they explained their methods in detail.²²

While state prisons were the most profitable institution to come under railroad control, state agricultural societies also came under the wing of the Southern. Before the war, state agricultural societies had been quasi-public institutions which underwrote agricultural reform movements. Reformers saw themselves as counterweights to railroads, which overestimated guano yields and thus pushed farmers to constantly ship guano *in* and tobacco *out*, at the cost of their self-sufficiency.²³ After 1869, these organizations changed dramatically. In Virginia the principal agents of the security company took over the Virginia Agricultural Society, a former state institution, by buying hundreds of lifetime memberships and signing the proxies over to local officials. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad bought out the Piedmont Agricultural Society, probably in response. In North Carolina, the Piedmont Agricultural Society was controlled by the Southern's membership. The chief journals of the agricultural societies, which before the war had published




Convict laborers, probably on the Western North Carolina Railroad between 1885 and 1915. In the far distance to the west are prison guards. These workers appear to be packing dirt and rock between the ties. This image was reproduced as a postcard, and the caption, "Stripes but no Stars," was intended as a joke about black men in military service. (courtesy North Carolina Division of Archives and History)

railroad freight rates, were afterward filled with ads for fertilizer. The state fairs that the societies put on changed their emphasis as well. Before the Virginia takeover, students had competed in essay contests by writing on such topics as political economy. After the Southern Railway placed its imprint on the fairs, however, students were challenged to build clay models of railroad bridges and to write about which fertilizer mixes were the best ones for cotton production.²⁴

As the Southern consumed various organs of the state, it came to wield the sort of power over local economies that states had had before the war. The most important business interests associated with the SRSC were cotton brokers, investors in extractive industries, and tobacco manufacturers. These interests sought a transportation apparatus that would cheapen the extraction of southern staples and raw materials.²⁵

Of course railways only helped the intensification of cotton production. There are as many explanations for the postwar expansion of cotton pro-



An advertisement, circa 1880, for the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. (courtesy College of William and Mary)

duction as there were cotton gins. Forcing freed people to grow the staple after freedom was an important part of the Freedman's Bureau's mission; the rise of the tenure system of agriculture apparently demanded a southern product that would bring cash; it was a crop that southerners, with little capital to invest in education, could grow; poor whites were lured to grow it by high prices in the early years; planters apparently wanted nothing else as a crop; high market prices and Civil War devastation dictated that people grow it.²⁶ Southerners grew cotton for many reasons.

Nevertheless, some of the security company's members had important reasons for intensifying cotton production along the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. Alfred Austell, the Inman brothers, Daniel James, and R. T. Wilson were important forces in the formation of the air line. Austell and John Inman helped form the New York Cotton Exchange; Inman sat on the first board. The cotton exchange was funded by cotton buyers who wanted to manage their production costs by ordering cotton before they needed it, to thus buy "futures" in cotton and avoid surprises if cotton prices *rose*. It was also funded by New York merchants who wished to buy cotton by telegraph and immediately sell their bills of lading, avoiding surprises if cotton prices *fell*.²⁷ John's brother Samuel sold to the exchange directly from his base in Atlanta.²⁸ R. T. Wilson brought cotton to New York as well.²⁹

The Atlanta & Richmond Air Line was crucial to their designs. Indeed,

Austell and Logan made tremendous fortunes in the depression of 1873–77 by using the air line to forward cotton. As men with seats on the board, they could command the capital needed to fund cotton shipments; factors and shippers without seats had to sell indirectly to the exchange.³⁰ The cotton exchange and other innovations like it allowed buyers' agents to scour the countryside, giving cash or credit to would-be planters for their future cotton.

Tobacco producers in Baltimore and New York also needed an efficient corridor for the extraction of tobacco. What kept them awake at night was the growing localization of chewing- and cigarette-tobacco production. Of course nearly every city had a tobacco factory, but since colonial times Baltimore had gotten more hogsheads of tobacco than most other cities because of its proximity to producers on the Chesapeake, and from there the James and York Rivers. New York was well placed for international export of tobacco goods. But as the Richmond & Danville Railroad developed after 1848, tobacco cultivation extended into the piedmont, and Baltimore and New York manufacturers saw manufacturing expand in the cities of Richmond and Danville.

The competitors only expanded after the war, as the newer bright tobacco spread even farther into the hills of the South, spawning small manufactories in the tiniest communities.³¹ A new tobacco tax and the Southern Railway's cheap tobacco corridor to the sea helped Baltimore and New York merchants regain part of the tobacco market. Still, northern tobacco rollers knew that planting capital at the center of the corridor was the best way to beat competitors. Thus when the Southern extended its reach to the remote towns of Winston and Salem, the manufacturers of Baltimore moved in to place experienced manufacturers at the center of the tobacco corridor. They chose a barefoot Virginian named R. J. Reynolds to turn Baltimore capital into efficient wholesale factories.³²

Southern Railway interests extended beyond cotton and tobacco into extractive industries as well. During the war, Herman Haupt was one of the Union army's most successful engineers. As head of the U.S. Military Railroads, he had detailed freed slaves as construction workers throughout the occupied South. As the Pennsylvania Railroad's chief engineer, he had driven running costs to the bone, allowing coal to be shipped over the Pennsylvania for pennies a ton.³³ When Tom Scott made him chief engineer of the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line, Haupt also did a careful survey of the line between Richmond and Charlotte, and suggested a program of regrading

and relaying track that began in 1871.³⁴ While in Richmond, the Pennsylvania also had him draw up a plan for the extraction of granite from lands east of Richmond. Haupt reported to the newly incorporated “Old Dominion Granite Company” that by using convict labor and a special transport rate on the Richmond & Danville, the company could make more than \$10 per ton in the quarry. Because the Philadelphia and New York capitalists had secured the land before the railroad line had been proposed, no other competitor could hope to gain either the rates or the exclusive use of cars that the Old Dominion Granite Company had.³⁵

“I was much pleased with the neatness and order perceptible in the operations at the quarries,” wrote Herman Haupt in his 1871 report, “and with the cheerfulness and industry exhibited by the hands, nearly all of whom are colored.”³⁶ Haupt’s position as chief engineer meant that he could ensure that the stone convicts extracted from the ground would travel over the line at cost or below.³⁷ Within a year, the Old Dominion Granite Company was thriving at the expense of its competitors.³⁸

What Haupt failed to mention was that the company-sponsored works provided the convicts, most of whom were jailed for petty larceny, with food so poor and conditions so abominable that they died by the dozens every year. Scurvy, dropsy, dysentery, and the ominous, all-encompassing “consumption” were the ills that killed the New South’s earliest victims of railway-sponsored extractive industry. The director of the penitentiary did not record whether the Southern Railway Security Company or the Old Dominion Granite Company provided any granite tombstones for the convicts they killed, most of whom were buried on the penitentiary grounds nearby.³⁹

Mining was an important subsidiary enterprise for other security company members, too. By 1874 Joseph Brown, an early dinner guest at the SRSC’s banquet and political operative for their affairs in Atlanta, used the railways’ tendrils to bring minerals out of Dade County in northwest Georgia.⁴⁰ Like the Southern Railway, he soon had his own corps of convict laborers at work in the Dade Coal Company. Convicts worked underground where cold water dripped on their heads, were chained to beds in their saturated clothes, and were whipped when they failed to make their weekly quotas.⁴¹ D. Willis James, a Liverpudlian transplanted to New York and a prominent member of the security company, started mining companies in the South and West directly along the lines of railway systems.⁴²


The security company’s interests in cotton, tobacco, and extractive indus-

tries help explain the kind of institution that the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line would become: an apparatus that continually cheapened staple transport costs, aggressively promoted fertilizer, and structured itself around the efficient delivery of staples to eastern Virginia.

Staples would always travel cheapest on the Southern Railway, particularly for long hauls from southern depots to New York and Baltimore. The security company's competition with the Robinson dynasty had established one principle of railroad traffic that made the postwar period unique: cotton and tobacco were incredibly cheap to ship after 1870. Before the war, cotton had been rated as a first- or second-class commodity on most railroad lines. By 1870 cotton was rated as a much cheaper fourth-class commodity on the Seaboard and then the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. Intense railroad competition was clearly the cause of this.⁴³ Besides the general favor shown to tobacco and cotton, these southern staples were also most likely to be discounted or rebated when these railroad systems competed for particular business.⁴⁴

The piedmont also favored long hauls. An item that went from station to station on the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line was more expensive to ship, and had to be prepaid. Goods that went from a station to a major depot such as New York or Baltimore went the two or three *months* in transit without having to be prepaid. This acted as an informal loan to the shipper who shipped all the way to New York or Baltimore, and directly favored brokers like Austell, who sent goods to his partner on the exchange in New York, and Baltimore manufacturers, who took finished tobacco from R. J. Reynolds's factories and put labels on it in Baltimore.⁴⁵ Alternative crops and alternative destinations were excluded by the same narrow competition. The increasing integration of these lines with the cities of Baltimore and New York meant that older southern crops like corn and winter wheat could not compete with the bonanza farms of the Midwest.⁴⁶ Once the direction of these commodities was set, turning rates around was nearly impossible. Southern interstate railroads would compete for cotton and tobacco, and price all other commodities higher to pay for them.⁴⁷

Fertilizer, generated from phosphate after the war, also radically transformed the southern piedmont. These new and cheap fertilizers extended cotton culture fifty miles north of Atlanta, previously the northern edge of the cotton belt.⁴⁸ Families on marginal land who used fertilizers with names like "Powhatan Raw-Bone Super-Phosphate" could grow cotton or tobacco right up to their doors.⁴⁹ Freed people on the smallest patches of land could



A new steam-powered cotton gin in Aiken, in the South Carolina upcountry. Carriages brought cotton to be ginned and pressed. Railroad cars then carried bales to their destination. Immediately after the war the most common destination for cotton would have been Charleston. By the 1870s, more and more cotton went along the Confederate corridor to Richmond or Norfolk. (courtesy Photographs and Prints Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)

get advances for fertilizer and produce small patches of seed cotton. Groups of these small farmers would pool their cotton to make a bale, bring it to a press, and divide the proceeds after market day.⁵⁰ In the uplands north of Atlanta, farmers could use fertilizer to put cotton fields on the steepest hill-sides.⁵¹ The security company underwrote this process by providing extremely low rates for the transport of fertilizer. On the trunk line, the price to ship a ton of fertilizer from New York to Spartanburg dropped from \$14 per ton in 1870 to \$5 in 1873, when the line came into town.⁵² The reason was simple. Since fertilizer was payable in cotton and tobacco, fertilizer ship-

ments that were subsidized from Richmond to the upcountry were guaranteed to flow back from the upcountry to Richmond.⁵³ Before the war, few Richmonders had ever *seen* a bale of cotton. When the SRSC promised that railway consolidation would mean that cotton would enter Richmond, a critic responded that it was impossible: “Richmond doesn’t manufacture enough cotton to-day to clothe the convicts in the State penitentiary.”⁵⁴ But the SRSC was true to its word, and by the middle of the 1870s residents increasingly saw cotton bales pass through town and into newly built cotton mills.⁵⁵

The Southern Railway Security Company pushed forward the technology of cotton processing, making shipping and processing costs even lower for men like Austell and the merchants of Baltimore.⁵⁶ In the piedmont regions, the ginning and pressing of cotton was pursued in a quite different way. In the older regions of cotton production, the old “buzzard wing” cotton gins—powered by horses and humans—continued to hold sway. “More crude and wasteful devices for the manipulation of cotton,” wrote one observer “could not be found in India or China.”⁵⁷ But in northeast Georgia and western South Carolina—the regions along the Southern’s Atlanta & Richmond Air Line—steam-powered cotton gins which could bale 400 to 1,000 bales a season were erected at or near Southern Railway depots.⁵⁸ The newness of the steam gins created problems at first. According to the same observer, the gin operators were “as a rule, unaccustomed to running machinery” and so often produced “nepped,” or overginned, cotton.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the scale of operations on these gins allowed for many spinoff industries. Proprietors of these huge steam gins could take more and more out of cotton, producing cottonseed oil, fodder, and fertilizer from the tons of waste they generated.⁶⁰

So while cotton and tobacco had long histories in the South, the Southern altered the way southerners brought them to market. Cotton fertilizer arrived in sacks on Southern Railway trains. Nitrogen, phosphoric acid, and potash were mixed to suit local soils in the stores that grew up next to Southern Railway depots.⁶¹ In towns along the air line, ginning became highly mechanized. At the Glendale Factory in Spartanburg, for instance,

wagons with seed cotton were driven directly on to a scale, weighed and tolled. The cotton was easily and rapidly thrown down into a hopper, and instead of being tediously and laboriously lifted . . . by hand up a flight of stairs, into the ginning room, was conveyed from this hopper on an endless apron of cheap construction to a platform in the building. From this

platform two small boys with wooden rakes pushed [the cotton] into the automatic feeders of three Hall gins. Thence it passed through condensers immediately to the press. A skilled workman in attendance on the gin closes the door of the press, shifts a loose belt, and the bale is packed. Meanwhile the cotton seed is delivered at another point by a belt. As soon as the wagon is unloaded it drives to the latter place, a trap-door opens, and the seed falls into the wagon, which then moves a few feet further and receives the bale on top.⁶²

Agents brought their fleecy bales into town and had them loaded onto the Southern Railway's cotton cars. Tobacco fertilizer also came in on Southern Railway trains; at harvest time planters brought their tobacco to warehouses at the market centers of Winston, Danville, and Richmond. Plugs moved by express car to local markets; hogsheads went north on SRSC freight trains.⁶³ In the air line counties, then, agriculture took place within an environment constructed by the Southern and refined by local businessmen, an environment shaped almost exclusively to the demands of staple agriculture. First there, then in the rest of the South, as the security company acquired feeders and competing lines, the production of southern commodities took place within an apparatus designed exclusively for cotton and tobacco.

This built environment—narrowed to the cheap delivery of staples, aggressive in promoting fertilizer, and technologically structured around its efficient delivery—inhibited change. Such is a feature of modern corporations that historians of the South often miss: large and modern companies can stifle change just as surely as country farmers, shave-tailed mules, and stubborn land can. And this process was surely not just initiated by the security company for its own reasons. The structure of the railroad industry partly matched the strategy adopted by farmers who were already producing cotton and tobacco. Ultimately the process reinforced itself: textile and tobacco mills, situated at railway crossroads, burdened the southern economy even more by absorbing local capital. These local stockholders put their capital into mills then balked at radical changes in investment or risky ventures in new areas.⁶⁴ Startup firms that sought to market commodities more perishable or time sensitive than cotton—on a railway system tuned to the cotton crop—required special arrangements for delivery that were prohibitively expensive.⁶⁵ Farmers who sought to grow tobacco in Ohio or families that grew grain in the oil fields of western Pennsylvania doubtless faced the same obstacles.⁶⁶

In the counties from Richmond to Atlanta, poor and rich alike became subjects—willing or otherwise—of King Cotton and Queen Tobacco. In South Carolina and Georgia, many white southerners moved to the counties touched by the new air lines to grow cotton.⁶⁷ “[H]ealthy homes for white cotton farmers,” wrote one correspondent, “are being established almost without limit.”⁶⁸ Between 1870 and 1880, residents of cotton counties on the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line grew 44 percent, while cotton production increased almost 1,000 percent. In air line counties north of Winston and Salem, tobacco production also increased markedly, nearly tripling in the warehousing centers of Winston, Danville, and Richmond.⁶⁹

It is likely no accident that the Southern Railway Security Company came to manage most of the important railroads of the South during Redemption. However effective the Pennsylvania and the Coast Line Syndicate had been in purchasing the support of key members, nothing could beat direct ownership or lease of the state’s most important railway systems. Redemption proved a promising avenue for such a transformation. By finding prominent political allies in the newly consolidating conservative parties in the South, the Southern acquired the most important railway systems of the South. What conservatives got was a state they may have scarcely recognized. Pruned of the most important organs for the exercise of state power, the state, once Redeemed, was worth less than the Redeemers expected. Ironically southerners like Benjamin Hill would find an emerging interstate economy and the Solid South they hoped for at the moment they abandoned public control of transportation to the tender mercies of the Southern Railway Security Company. This interstate system as it grew in the 1870s and 1880s, was directed by capitalists interested in cotton, tobacco, and extractive industries. The Southern refashioned the South, structuring it around the production of staples, with much of the profit traveling to Baltimore and New York. What price, then, a Railway Redemption?

CONCLUSION

An Ironic Confederacy

The trip began at the end of February 1874. Nine capitalists and their wives, most of them friends, boarded Tom Scott's personal railway car to travel "from the Hudson to the Saint Johns." The huge maroon car labeled "Pennsylvania" would travel via Richmond, Greensboro, and Charlotte, through the South, along the route of the Piedmont Air Line. The journalist who accompanied them must have failed to notice that this band of millionaires was tracing the journey that Jefferson Davis, his family, and his cabinet had made less than ten years earlier. Or perhaps he simply failed to mention it.

The trip was considerably calmer than Davis's. No navy cadets had to be stationed at the top of the cars to guard them. The route had been surveyed more than once since the Confederate hegira, and the constant attention of gandy dancers and other maintainers of the roadway kept the crossties, fill, and iron rails beneath their feet in good repair. The car itself, with four rooms and a piazza, had every convenience: the dining room, parlor, and ladies' dressing room had ingenious folding pantries and tiny closets. The kitchen had a refrigerator, a cooking range, and hot and cold running water. When dinner approached, they ate on a table "spread with India China and the choicest linen." They rolled empty splits of champagne out of the back of the car as they made their way through multiple-course dinners prepared for them by the cook on board. When cotton fields appeared out the windows, it alerted the wealthy travelers that they "were really in the Southern country."¹

The journey was also less eventful than Jeff Davis's, and the travelers found themselves frequently bored by the region. They thought the hotel-

keepers were rather stupid, and amused themselves by smirking at the rude towns, a “tumble down shed” here, a hotel like a “rough country meeting house” there.² When they gathered to have their picture taken in Georgia, Mr. Sloan took a “negro baby” from the arms of its mother and deposited the child in the lap of Mr. Taylor—president of the City Bank of New York—just as the flash went off. The millionaires decided not to keep the photo. “It was feared,” wrote the chronicler of the journey, “that the picture, with this adjunct, would be deemed an overwrought illustration of the union of the North and South at this stage of reconstruction.” The writer failed to record what the mother or child felt.³

Here was a respite from the Panic of 1873–77 for the millionaire families of New York and Philadelphia, a storm that even the Southern Railway Security Company had been unprepared to weather. Just a few months before their journey, the holding company had sold the bonds of the southern system’s lynchpin—the Richmond & Danville—back to the Pennsylvania Railroad.⁴ Gradually the tightly integrated system of newspapers and railroad companies that the Southern had assembled began to unravel. In 1880 Scott sold the R&D’s controlling interest to an organization called the Richmond Terminal, in exchange for a twenty-year agreement about the course of southern traffic patterns.⁵ By May 1881, and a few months after Tom Scott died, a string of scandals broke in North Carolina about the system’s web of bribery and illegal operations. In the next decade, many southern politicians got elected by appearing to be tough on the new owners of this consolidated southern railway system. Small country newspapers like the *New Berne (N.C.) Lodge* took to calling the railway network “the hydra-headed monster that for so long a time has had its iron heel on the industries and trade of our Old North State” and “the vampire that is feeding on the life blood of our industries and trade.”⁶

Yet the Southern Railway’s incorporation of its Confederate opponents made such opposition futile and fleeting. Fusionists, Readjusters, and Populists found that they might briefly come to power by condemning the Iron Confederacy that had formed between northern capitalists and southern Democrats, but they could not derail it. Southerners who condemned the bargain as corrupt found it to be tenacious as well. Populist candidates found themselves vilified by railroad-controlled newspapers and discovered new opponents whose railroad passes allowed them to canvass the state. They found it difficult to answer the conservative cry that they were soft on black crime, particularly when conservatives engineered race riots in railroad

towns like Danville. Even if they came to power in southern states, reformers found that control of the state provided no power at all. Until the turn of the century, southern states were mortgaged to pay for railroads built in the 1850s; and before the railroads could begin to make a profit, they were given away to northern corporations. Plans to provide public education to southerners constantly floundered because state resources, minerals, and decision-making powers were in the hands of others. However unstable the Southern Railway's control of the South, it remained an organized center of political and economic power between Richmond and Atlanta. In 1894, J. P. Morgan formally reorganized the system as the Southern Railway Corporation, devaluing much of the stock to favor bondholders in England and the North.

The railway journey that Scott's millionaire friends made at the height of the system's power in 1873 provides a brief snapshot of the political, economic, and cultural changes that brought the Southern Railway to life. The friends' speedy and uneventful journey through the South from Richmond to Atlanta had been nearly impossible before the war, even after the railway building frenzy of 1848. At that time, strong southern states controlled the fortunes and limited the interstate ambitions of railway directors. Jefferson Davis had made the interstate corridor possible, for it was a centralizing Confederate nation that built the core of the system. Actually, of course, it was hired slaves who graded and built the line they passed over. For some black workers, this was the last work of their enslavement, for others the last work of their lives.

When the war was over, railroad directors of the Seaboard Inland Air Line built a transport system that insulated them from state power just as Tom Scott's railway car insulated his travelers from the uncomfortable landscape of the South. When the Pennsylvania Railroad took over the system, the journey became smoother and more direct. Still, it came at considerable cost: black convicts built north from Atlanta, goaded on by an alliance of Georgia conservatives and Republicans, while freed workers built south from Charlotte, attacked by Klansmen from Spartanburg County.

There were many legal and political difficulties in this final surge of building, but we should never underestimate the power of organized capital to make the journey a comfortable one. After failing at first in 1870, the Pennsylvania organized the Southern Railway Security Company which tamped down state legislatures, laid down southern newspapers, and tracked public opinion into a narrow line. It gobbled up the southern landscape by forming alliances with southern conservatives.

All that was left was to erase the black workers and Reconstruction governments that had made the interstate railway possible. This was not simple: like Mr. Taylor who posed for his picture, Radical Republicans embraced black freedom for a brief instant in war, but quickly tossed it aside after the blinding flash was over. The Republicans of the Southern Railway Security Company clasped hands instead with white southern conservatives, and banished black Americans from the frame. Railway Redemption cleared away the rubble. As the wealthy northern travelers looked outside their windows during their rumbling journey back north, all that was left to do was to look at the southern landscape outside the car. Cotton and tobacco fields stretched across the horizon in a blur, and erased the brief and troubling image of Reconstruction.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C.
ABA	Alexander Boyd Andrews
ABAP	Alexander Boyd Andrews Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
ARLET	Atlanta & Richmond Air Line Railway Company, Letter Book, 1871–72, Flowers Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
AWT	Albion W. Tourgée Papers (microfilm), Davis Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
KKK hearings	U.S. Congress, 42d Cong., 2d sess., House Report 22, “Testimony Taken by the Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States”
LRL	Loyal Republican League
LOV	Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia
NCC	North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
NCDA&H	North Carolina Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina
NCRR	North Carolina Railroad
OR	<i>Official Records of the War of the Rebellion</i>
OUTR	U.S. Congress, 42d Cong., 1st sess., Senate Report 1, “Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Alleged Outrages in Southern States”
PRC	Pennsylvania Railroad Collection, Pennsylvania State Archives
SHC	Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
SLAST	Session Laws of the American States and Territories (microfiche), Marshall-Wythe Law Library, College of William and Mary
SRSC	Southern Railway Security Company
SWM	Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia
VTL	Special Collections, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia

INTRODUCTION

1. Charles Iverson Gray Papers, Box 4, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Davis, *The Long Surrender*, 31–2, 51–62.

2. Ishbel Ross, *First Lady of the South*, 214–30.
3. Ibid., 229–30. For discussion of the railway ensemble and its effect on travel, see Schivelbusch, *Railway Journey*.
4. “The Memphis Scheme of Internal Improvement,” *Richmond Enquirer*, 14 Nov. 1849. The term “transportation corridor” comes from Stilgoe, *Metropolitan Corridor*.
5. Summers, *Railroads, Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity*.
6. For discussion of Howard Odum’s tangled efforts to define the South, which begins with the Richmond-to-Atlanta corridor, see Michael O’Brien, *The Idea of the American South, 1920–1941*. Thanks to Peter Coclanis for directing me to Odum.
7. “Where Our Troubles Come From,” *Greensboro Patriot*, 11 Aug. 1870.
8. Important exceptions to the trend of separating southern business history from international changes are Woodman, *King Cotton*, and Coclanis, *Shadow of a Dream*.
9. An exception is Cronon, *Nature’s Metropolis*.
10. There is a branch of economic theory focused on public utilities whose fortunes have risen and declined. A good synthesis is Charles Phillips, *Regulation of Public Utilities*.
11. The failure of neoclassical economic theory to account for institutional forces has led sociologists and economists toward a theory of path dependence. See Roy, *Socializing Capital*, chap. 2, and David, *Technical Choice, Innovation, and Economic Growth*.
12. This is not a completely institutionalist story. Competition between the Seaboard and the Richmond & Danville system did lead to a drop in the grade (and thus shipping price) of cotton. Also, longer-term competition between international staples helped undermined the southern economy, as many other historians have said.
13. *Richmond Whig*, 20 Feb. 1866 (“anaconda”), 5 Oct. 1866 (“skeleton”), 1 Feb. 1872 (“monster”); “Legislature of North Carolina,” *Daily Charlotte Observer*, 5 Mar. 1873 (“mammoth”); *New Berne (N.C.) Lodge*, undated, in Alexander Boyd Andrews, comp., “Scrapbook of Newspaper Clippings on North Carolina Railroads,” NCC (“vampire”); “The Spoliation Bill,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Mar. 1871 (“giants, and ghosts, and vampires”).
14. Of course corporations have much older legacies. The best general work on the place of the corporation in medieval political philosophy is Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*.
15. Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan*.
16. Monleón, *A Specter Is Haunting Europe*, 52.
17. On the idea of whiteness, see Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*; Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*; and Lott, *Love and Theft*.

CHAPTER ONE

1. [James Henry Hammond], *Railroad Mania*, 4.
2. Ibid., 6.
3. A modern statement of this claim can be found in Fogel, *Railroads and American Economic Growth*. A recent review of the regional impact of railroads is Heckleman and Wallis, “Railroads and Property Taxes.”
4. [James Henry Hammond], *Railroad Mania*, 13.

5. Historians have examined Hammond's imperious control of those around him, his political adventures, and his efforts as an agricultural reformer. Some of the most interesting work that relies on Hammond's letters and diaries are Genovese, *Roll Jordan Roll*; Faust, *James Henry Hammond and the Old South*; and Bleser, *The Hammonds of Redcliffe*.

6. Dozier, "Trade and Transportation along the South Atlantic", Heath, *Constructive Liberalism*, 274–77.

7. *Poor's Manual of Railroads*, 1868–69, 20–21.

8. [James Henry Hammond], *Railroad Mania*, 12.

9. *Ibid.*, 4.

10. Per-capita wealth in the South was higher than in most European countries. Engerman, "Reconsideration of Southern Economic Growth."

11. Ransom and Sutch, *One Kind of Freedom*. Though "Negro brogans" and other necessities were supplied by northern firms to southern slaves, they would likely have been bought in bulk only once a year by planters, not shipped seasonally to multiple retailers. Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, chap. 1; Dawley, *Class and Community*.

12. Rawick, ed., *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 207.

13. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 52, 85; Gallman, "Self-Sufficiency of the Cotton Economy."

14. On plantations' reliance on the coasting trade, see North, *Economic Growth*, 52; North's claim that plantations required large quantities of food has been disproven by, among others, Gallman, in "Self-Sufficiency of the Cotton Economy." Others see planters' demands as being constrained by the lack of railroads. Ford, *Origins of Southern Radicalism*, 60–63.

15. It is difficult to determine what items were shipped back, as no annual reports enumerated their "up" freight. This is probably because down freight was billed differently depending upon the staple exported, while up freight was so varied that it was billed at a fixed price per ton, excluding stone, timber, and iron. These goods are those most frequently mentioned in advertisements of the *Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser* for packet goods to be resold to the interior.

16. A convincing explanation of the rigidity of the plantation household can be found in Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household*, 37–99.

17. Until the 1860s, most piedmont Virginia merchants had to pick up their goods in Richmond, as the legislature prevented rail lines from forwarding goods from packet schooners. See Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 72–73; *Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser*, 6 Jan. 1837, 19 Jan. 1847, 9 Jan. 1849.

18. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Transportation in the Cotton Belt*; Genovese, *Political Economy of Slavery*. Engerman disputes one part of this claim in "Effects of Slavery." I agree with Engerman that the size of the internal market did not inhibit the development of industries in the South, but would suggest that plantations structured transportation opportunities such that it was unprofitable to connect major cities together, unless the final destination was a port or port town. That there may have been sufficient demand to support southern industry has been demonstrated by Bateman and Weiss, *Deplorable Scarcity*, chap. 3.

19. Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia, *Annual Report*, 1855, table 1; 1857, table 1; 1859, table 4.

20. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1856, 28–30. The road apparently charged cheaper rates for longer distances, thus boosting long-distance traffic in both directions. See *ibid.*, 5–7.

21. Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1859, 24–29.

22. Henson, “Atlanta Railwaymen,” 19–20.

23. Richmond & Danville, *President’s Report*, 1854, 1–5; 1855, 1–3.

24. Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1857, 12–13.

25. This may be because the Central of Georgia had a fairly broad range of goods to carry to Augusta, including 180,000 pounds each of hides and bacon and 14 million pounds of copper ore in 1855. See Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia, *Annual Report*, 1855, 42–43. Nonetheless, even on the Central of Georgia, 90 percent of the yearly variation in earnings can be accounted for by yearly variation in cotton shipments. Henson, “Atlanta Railwaymen,” 14–15.

26. [James Henry Hammond], *Railroad Mania*, 5.

27. Cleveland and Powell, *Railroad Promotion*, 200–202.

28. This distinction between the role of stocks and bonds was a commonly understood part of financial transactions on railroads. See Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1850, 18.

29. Gunn, *Decline of Authority*; Johnson and Supple, *Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads*.

30. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Transportation in the Cotton Belt*, 194.

31. “The Richmond & Danville Road,” *Richmond Enquirer*, 1 Aug. 1871, 26 June 1846, 21 Sept. 1847, 24 Sept. 1847.

32. Unsigned [probably S. A. White] to John Allen, 3 Mar. 1859, John Mebane Allen Papers, SHC.

33. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Transportation in the Cotton Belt*, 2.

34. Still, one may argue that conspicuous consumption and wild gambling were part of the self-fashioning of the planter class. See Wyatt-Brown, *Southern Honor*.

35. Sanders, *Cameron Plantation*, 4–8; business correspondence, 1848–49, Franklin H. Elmore Papers (microfilm), reel 4, SWM.

36. By 1848, Georgia railroads were paying one-quarter in cash, three-quarters in stock. Heath, *Constructive Liberalism*, 274.

37. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1849, 18.

38. *Ibid.*, 1854, 17.

39. *Ibid.*, 1854, 19.

40. Charlotte & South Carolina, *Report*, [1848], Franklin H. Elmore Papers (microfilm), reel 4, SWM.

41. Konkle, *John Motley Morehead*, 316–20.

42. “Report of the Chief Engineer . . . ,” in NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1851, 5–17.

43. *Greensboro Patriot*, 26 June 1852; NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1854.

44. *Ibid.*, 11 June 1853. Col. Joel McLean was contractor for the third section from Alamance County to Greensboro. His division was divided into fourteen sections, at least six of which were worked by separate companies of slaves. On the problem of payment for the first year of construction, see Cecil Kenneth Brown, *State Movement in Railroad Development*, 78–80.

45. For a detailed discussion of railway construction work, see Brooke, *Railway Navvy*.

46. Kyner, *End of Track*, 102–4.

47. *Greensboro Patriot*, 21 Feb. 1852.

48. NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1854, 4–11.

49. Levine, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness*, 208–13.

50. NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1854, 4; *Greensboro Patriot*, 9 Oct. 1852.

51. “Hand hire bonds—1864–65,” vol. 59, North Carolina Railroad Collection, NCDA&H; Henson, “Atlanta Railwaymen,” 110.

52. “Letters Received,” vol. 59, North Carolina Railroad Collection, NCDA&H.

53. *Greensboro Patriot*, 15 Mar. 1851; RNC [his brother] to David F. Caldwell, 14 Dec. 1852, David Franklin Caldwell Papers, SHC; Henderson Scott to John Mebane Allen, Melville, N.C., John Mebane Allen Papers, SHC. For a general discussion of slaveowners, slaves, and the railroad, see Starobin, *Industrial Slavery*.

54. James L. Scott to John Mebane Allen, 25 Dec. 1852, John Mebane Allen Papers, SHC.

55. Fannie Allen Thompson to John Mebane Allen, 21 June 1852, Mary Jane Allen to John Mebane Allen, 21 Nov. 1853, John Mebane Allen Papers, SHC.

56. Deposition of Joel McLean, 29 Sept. 1858, in the case of Brooks v. McIver, Guilford County Civil and Criminal Papers, 1855, NCDA&H.

57. *Greensboro Patriot*, 11 June 1853.

58. Ibid., 21 Feb. 1852.

59. “The Central Railroad of North Carolina—Words and Deeds,” *Richmond Enquirer*, 17 Oct. 1849; Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 16–22.

60. Cameron appears on page 58, Holt on pages 44 and 282, Mordecai on pages 268, 370, and 388 of box 10, ledgers, North Carolina Railroad Collection, NCDA&H. See also Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 32.

61. “Rough Notes,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 13 Sept. 1849.

62. In reference to antebellum railways, see “Railroad Policy,” *Greensboro Patriot*, 25 Feb. 1869.

63. The outstanding state debt for banks in 1838 was \$7.8 million for Alabama, \$3.5 million for Arkansas, \$22.95 million for Louisiana, and \$7 million for Mississippi. Adler, *British Investment in American Railways*, 10.

64. Schweikart, *Banking in the American South*.

65. Second auditor to Col. Henry L. Hopkins, chairman of the committee on the bonds of public officers, 4 Feb. 1842, Board of Public Works Files, LOV.

66. Jenks, *Migration of British Capital*, 73–78.

67. Not all railway finance in the South followed such a circuitous route from English purse to railway strongbox. In other cases, states acted directly as intermediaries. South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia pursued some form of mixed enterprise, often buying a fixed percentage of railroad stock directly.

68. In *Jacksonian Economy*, Temin has written that the pet banks were just as stable as banks subsidiary to the Second Bank of the United States, given that both kinds of banks had the same reserve ratios. But a bank’s stability may have much more to do with its management and whether its investments are sound. Some auditors’ reports suggest

that many of these banks were poorly managed and were little more than subsidizers of public works. On Virginia, see second auditor to Col. Henry L. Hopkins, chairman of the committee on the bonds of public officers, 4 Feb. 1842, Board of Public Works Files, LOV. On the weakness of Alabama banks, see James Dias to Franklin Elmore, 18 Nov. 1849, Franklin H. Elmore Papers (microfilm), SWM.

69. Sometimes this support just meant placing a state seal on a railway's own bonds as the Memphis & Charleston was forced to do when New York investors could not be interested in the bonds themselves. Memphis & Charleston, *Annual Report*, 1852, 14-15. More often there was a direct swap. See Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1858, 11.

70. Carosso, *Investment Banking*, 8-13; Chernow, *House of Morgan*, 3-13.

71. Adler, *British Investment in American Railways*, 46-67. Note, however, that cotton prices were high and metal prices were low between 1848 and 1850, another explanation for the sudden influx of capital in southern railroad systems. See Nelson, "Public Fictions," chap. 1.

72. Jenks, *Migration of British Capital*, 72, 77.

73. Van Oss, *American Railroads and British Investors*, 108-10.

74. Memphis & Charleston, *Annual Report*, 1852, 14-15; Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1858, 11; Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1851, 21. The Georgia Central relied on its banking privileges and international standing. The East Tennessee & Virginia received a direct loan from the State of Tennessee before the war. East Tennessee & Georgia, *Annual Report*, 1867, 16.

75. Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia, *Annual Report*, 1857, 78-79.

76. The board funded some of its own projects which it then turned over to private companies. Goodrich, *Government Promotion*, 96-97.

77. *Ibid.*, 106.

78. *Ibid.*, 114.

79. Lines clustered around Illinois and emerging trunk lines like the B&O, the Penn, and the Illinois Central were especially favored. Some investors in London even bought shares or "convertible" bonds—bonds that could be converted to stocks if revenues reached a certain specified level. Adler, *British Investment in American Railways*, 52-66.

80. Stover, *Railroads of the South*, chap. 1.

81. See the table in Adler, *British Investment in American Railways*, 23. The figure of 38 percent comes from the secretary of the Treasury and is based on the reportings of railway directors. The figure of 59 percent comes from Winslow, Lanier and Company, a very experienced overseas banking house. The 38 percent figure probably does not account for brokers who held securities for foreign owners. Adler, 22-24.

82. For a discussion of railroad systems—collections of railroads that crossed state lines—see Johnson and Supple, *Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads*.

83. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1849, 22, and 1850, 15.

84. Barringer, "History of the North Carolina Railroad," NCC.

85. [James Henry Hammond], *Railroad Mania*, 14.

86. "Report of the Special Joint Commission . . . as to Complaints in Regard to Railroads . . .," Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1868.

87. Garrett, *Atlanta and Environs*, 408.
88. Johnson and Supple, *Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads*.
89. Taylor and Neu outline the political economy of railroad construction based on merchants. The thrust of their argument, however, is that the antebellum railroad system North and South was more haphazard and less well-connected than historians or economists have believed. George Rogers Taylor and Irene Neu, *American Railroad Network*.
90. Memphis & Charleston, *Annual Report*, 1851, 15; Shufflebarger, “Beginnings of the Norfolk and Western.”
91. The quote is from Edward Stanly, a Whig legislator, in Barringer, “History of the North Carolina Railroad.”
92. *Greensboro Patriot*, 2 July 1853.
93. John F. Gilmer, speech before the North Carolina Legislature, quoted in the *Greensboro Patriot*, 8 Mar. 1851.
94. Boney argues that while few of the lines connected with each other in Georgia, cities *within* the state were linked. See F. N. Boney, “The Emerging Empire State, 1820–1861,” in Coleman, *History of Georgia*, 156–63.
95. See J. J. Thomas, *Fifty Years on the Rail*, 21–26, for firsthand discussion of the sites of new construction. See also Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*.
96. Memphis & Charleston, *Annual Report*, 1852, 10–25.
97. Derrick, *South Carolina Railroad*.
98. “The Richmond & Danville Road: Its Inception—The Great Benefit Which It Has Brought to Richmond,” *Richmond Enquirer*, 1 Aug. 1871.
99. Emphasis in the original. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1850, 18.
100. Quoted in *Greensboro Patriot*, 10 Apr. 1852.
101. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia*, 300–334.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Harrison, *Legal Development of the Southern Railway*, 9.
2. Wender, *Southern Commercial Conventions*, 423–659.
3. On both proposed trunk systems, see Harrison, *Legal Development of the Southern Railway*, 8–14. For the probable origins of the name Atlanta, see Ward, *J. Edgar Thomson*, 40–42.
4. George Rogers Taylor and Irene Neu, *American Railroad Network*, 45–48.
5. In Virginia, railroad companies could not charge fees for “manifesting, receiving or shipping”; Virginia, *Code of Virginia*, 1860, 355. The charter of the Raleigh & Gaston limited it to transporting passengers and freight and to erecting depots; it provided no other rights. North Carolina Senate, “A Report on the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad”; ORDC, 156–66. George Rogers Taylor and Irene Neu, *American Railroad Network*. Only one railway system, the Seaboard & Roanoke, had an efficient method of through traffic before the war; it was this system with which Col. A. B. Andrews would become connected. Portsmouth, Virginia, was a little port city that served eastern Virginia and central North Carolina before the war. A few hundred tons of manufactured tobacco,

baled cotton, and milled grain reached the wharves of Portsmouth directly from the area around Raleigh, North Carolina, each year after 1850. Before the war there was neither a cotton or tobacco market to speak of in either Raleigh or Portsmouth. Most of these goods were actually bound for markets and merchants in Philadelphia or Baltimore. See *Edgefield (S.C.) Advertiser*, 15 Nov. 1865, 31 Jan. 1866, for advertisements of forwarding agents in Augusta and Charleston. For wholesale merchants' reliance on railroad traffic patterns, see Moeckel, *Development of the Wholesaler*, 22–31; Seaboard & Roanoke, *Annual Report*, 1861, 20; and Osborne, "Professional Biography of Moncure Robinson," 257–59.

6. Reidy, *From Slavery to Agrarian Capitalism*, chap. 1; Siegel, *Roots of Southern Distinctiveness*; Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Transportation in the Cotton Belt*; George Rogers Taylor and Irene Neu, *American Railroad Network*. For the South Carolina Railroad, see the obituary of John Ravenel in *Charleston Mercury*, 17 July 1862. For general information on this railroad, see Derrick, *South Carolina Railroad*, 11–51. Compare with Ford, *Origins of Southern Radicalism*. Ford argues that railroads drew substantial support from the upcountry, though his primary case for this is the Blue Ridge Railroad, an ambitious line that was never completed for lack of funds.

7. Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia, *Annual Report*, 1855, tables 1–2; Woodman, *King Cotton*; Matthew Brown Hammond, *Cotton Industry*; Reidy, *From Slavery to Agrarian Capitalism*, 15–23.

8. Tilley, *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company*, chap. 2; Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1856, table B. On the historical changes in the flour trade in Richmond, see Lewis D. Crenshaw, testimony, in U.S. Senate, 43d Cong., 1st sess., *Transportation-Routes to the Seaboard*, vol. 2, 403–5.

9. John J. Thomas to Frances Thomas, 26 Feb. 1863, John Thomas Papers, Flowers Collection, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

10. James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 371.

11. Telegram, 23 Dec. 1863, Captain Francis to E. M. Love, major and commissary-general, reprinted in "Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865," 100.

12. Opposition to Leroy Pope Walker and Judah Benjamin was concentrated on the conduct of these two offices. See Goff, *Confederate Supply*, 27, 51.

13. Three-fourths of the beef and two-thirds of the bacon bought by the commissary-general came from Tennessee in 1862. Goff, *Confederate Supply*, 37.

14. However, much of Georgia's goods may have been produced in Alabama or farther west. Captain John M. Strother, asst. commissary-general to Colonel L. B. Northrup, commissary-general, 9 Feb. 1865, reprinted in "Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865," 95–96. Also, by 1864 much of Georgia's cotton production had been turned over to the production of food. see F. N. Boney, "War and Defeat," in Coleman, *History of Georgia*, 191.

15. Major Wm. B. Cross. to Quartermaster-General A. R. Lawton. [January? 1865?] "Memorandum of Resources of Department—Clothing, Camp Equipment, and Miscellaneous Stores," reprinted in "Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865," 118–19.

16. *Columbus (Ga.) Daily Examiner*, 9 Sept. 1862; Crist et al., *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, vol. 7 (1861), 414–16; Coulter, *Confederate States*, 270.

17. Robert E. Lee to John Letcher, governor of Virginia, 15 June 1861, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 2, 928–29.

18. Crist et al., *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, vol. 7 (1861), 414–16. On the strategic difficulties, see Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 57–58. See also *Charleston Mercury*, 21 Feb. 1862.

19. Nevins and Richardson, *Messages and Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 1:41–42.

20. Wells, *Confederate Navy*, 101–2.

21. Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Examine into the Quartermaster's Commissary and Medical Department, Provisional Congress, 29 Jan. 1862, in *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 1, 884–85. On the alleged failure of the Confederate army to follow up the battle of Manassas with the occupation of Washington, see James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 345–47.

22. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 89–90.

23. Quote from Mary Chesnut, cited in James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 319.

24. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 108–9.

25. Major S. B. French to Commissary-General Col. L. B. Northrop, 17 Jan. 1864, reprinted in “Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865,” 101–2.

26. Coulter, *Confederate States*, 275–77.

27. *Charleston Mercury*, 3 Feb., 13 Feb., 9 July, 22 Oct., 30 Oct., 6 Nov., 8 Nov. 1862.

28. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Transportation in the Cotton Belt*, 385.

29. James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 514–5.

30. Ward, *That Man Haupt*, 112–47.

31. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 108–9; Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 114–20.

32. F. W. Sims to Brigadier General A. R. Lawton, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 93.

33. Goff, *Confederate Supply*, 19. President Davis eventually removed Myers from duty. This may have been because he was perceived as a “pet” of the Confederate Congress. Goff, *Confederate Supply*, 142–43.

34. Goff, *Confederate Supply*, 19–23.

35. Wadley to Seddon, 14 Apr. 1863, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 483–85.

36. Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 107–12.

37. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 483–85.

38. Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 120–21.

39. Younger, *Diary of Robert Garlick Hill Kean*, 55.

40. Quoted in Johnston, *Virginia Railroads in the Civil War*, 190.

41. Goff, *Confederate Supply*, 58–59.

42. Randolph had different views of the role of the Confederacy than did Jefferson Davis. Randolph, according to his biographer, “desired a Southern republic that Virginia would dominate.” A more centralized, Virginia-centered republic was what Randolph sought to create when he assigned friends and family members from his circle of genealogical, cultural, and technocratic elites. Shackelford, *George Wythe Randolph and the Confederate Elite*, 93–101.

43. Rowland, *Jefferson Davis, Constitutional*, 5:169–70.

44. Lewis E. Harvie to General I. M. St. John, late commissary-general of the Confederate States, 1 Jan. 1876, reprinted in *Southern Historical Society Papers* 3 (1877): 109–11.

45. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 1, 947; Harrison, *Legal Development of the Southern Railway*, 90.

46. *Charleston Mercury*, 11 Feb. 1862.

47. Harrison, *Legal Development of the Southern Railway*, 90. Lewis E. Harvie, president of the Richmond & Danville, got then-Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin to ask Judge Thomas Ruffin of the North Carolina Convention to push the charter through in North Carolina. The convention approved the charter on 8 February 1862. Malcolm Clark, "First Quarter-Century of the Richmond & Danville," 52.

48. The order to begin construction is in A. L. Rives, acting chief engineer bureau, to Capt. E. T. D. Myers, Provisional Engineer Corps, C.S. Army, 30 April 1862, in *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 1, 1107. Harrison, *Legal Development of the Southern Railway*, 90. Apparently William T. Sutherlin, a high official in the Richmond & Danville, was the only commissioner in Virginia for collecting subscriptions for the Piedmont Railroad. This unique position would have allowed him to ensure that nearly all of the stock was purchased by the Richmond & Danville. Malcolm Clark, "First Quarter-Century of the Richmond & Danville," 52-54. Commissary General Northrup, Report to the Secretary of War, 9 Feb. 1865, reprinted in *Southern Historical Society Papers* 2 (1876): 87.

49. Albert Fishlow argues that 70 percent of superstructure costs were for iron in the 1850s and that superstructure accounted for 28 percent of overall costs. Iron equipment of all kinds accounted for about one-third of costs. See *American Railroads and the Economy*, 120-22, 340-50; and Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 42.

50. In fact, in the initial survey for the corridor, A. M. Dupuy, the civil engineer hired by the Confederacy, estimated the cost of iron as \$180,000 or one-third of the total cost of construction of the line from Danville to Greensboro. See *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 1, 1085-87.

51. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 365-66.

52. William Wadley to James Seddon, secretary of war, 14 April 1863, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 483-85; James A. Seddon to D. H. Kenney, Engineer Bureau, 21 July 1863, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 655.

53. Coulter, *Confederate States of America*, 273-74.

54. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 808-9.

55. Wells, *Confederate Navy*, 37-39, 101-2.

56. Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 120-21.

57. Fishlow, *American Railroads and the Economy*, 118-20.

58. George W. Randolph to Z. B. Vance, 10 Nov. 1862, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 175-76.

59. AL Rives, chief of Engineer Bureau, to J. A. Seddon, secretary of war, 7 May 1864, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 392-93.

60. Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 151.

61. George W. Randolph to Z. B. Vance, 10 Nov. 1862, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 175-76, and James A. Seddon to Z. B. Vance, 4 Feb. 1863, *ibid.*, 385-86.

62. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 393-94; Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 114 (shooting), 151-52 (Vance and slaves).

63. *Charleston Mercury*, 21 Oct. 1862.

64. By 1864 there were grumblings within the War Department itself about the extent of these favors granted to the NCRR, F. W. Sims to General Lawton, CS Quartermaster's Department, 16 Aug., 1864, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 598-99. Comprehensive conscription of Confederate troops began in April 1862, the first such act in U.S. history. See Barney, *Flawed Victory*.

65. Stokes, *Company Shops*, 34–36; Henson, “Atlanta Railwaymen,” 150–51; Thomas Webb to Col. Peter Mallett, 28 June 1864, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 599–600.

66. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 598–99.

67. *Ibid.*

68. North Carolina Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1865, 12–13, 20–21, *Annual Report*, 1866, 15–16. Compare Price, “United States Military Railroads in North Carolina,” 256–57, who argues that when the Union army took over part of the line at the end of the war, they did very little permanent repair.

69. W. D. Porter, president of the S.C. Senate, to James A. Seddon, secretary of war, 30 Dec. 1862, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 267–69; J. G. Gilmer, chief of Engineer Bureau, to J. C. Beckinridge, secretary of war, 16 Feb. 1865, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 1084–86.

70. Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1860, 10–11.

71. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 968–70.

72. *Ibid.*, 89.

73. Stimson, *Express Business*, 156–63.

74. General Orders No. 77, S. Cooper, adjutant and inspector general, 22 Oct. 1862, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 138–39.

75. Stimson, *Express Business*, 165–66.

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Richmond Whig*, 7 Nov. 1865.

78. Stimson, *Express Business*, 160–61.

79. *Columbus (Ga.) Daily Examiner*, 15 Aug. 1861; *Daily Richmond Examiner*, 18 Mar. 1865.

80. *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 89. For the suggestion that the Charlotte & South Carolina and the Southern Express Company are connected, see Quartermaster F. W. Sims to Quartermaster-General A. R. Lawton, 22 Feb. 1864, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 92.

81. The Southern Express Company thrived in part because other railroads were unwilling to allow their freight cars to travel over the rails of another road. Wm. M. Burwell to J. A. Seddon, secretary of war, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 3, 226–27.

82. Stimson, *History of the Express Business*, 161–63. On the way that patrolling boundaries forged national sentiment, see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

83. For the Georgia railroad strategy, see Phillips, *Transportation in the Cotton Belt*.

84. Wm. M. Browne to Capt. L. P. Grant, 22 Oct. 1862, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 139–40; General Orders, No. 93, *OR*, ser. 4, vol. 2, 198–201.

85. Minor Meriwether, lieutenant colonel of engineers, to Lt. Gen. R. Taylor, 20 Oct. 1854, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 39, 738–43.

86. East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1869, 21.

87. Somers, *Southern States*, 168; Harrison, *Legal Development of the Southern Railway*, ix.

88. Black, *Railroads of the Confederacy*, 73–74, 161–62. Taylor and Neu, *American Railroad Network*, 45–48. Track that crossed within a city was crucial to interstate connections. Otherwise, Teamsters would break up cars and carry traffic. City merchants and teamsters proved the most vocal opponents of city-crossing track.

89. Haupt, *Reminiscences*; Trowbridge, *The South: A Tour of Its Battlefields*, 501–2.

CHAPTER THREE

1. While this organization later became the basis for the Seaboard Air Line, a trunk line that followed the eastern seaboard, the first incarnation as the Seaboard *Inland* Air Line was a trunk that connected Norfolk to inland cities like Charlotte and Columbia. When it later lost control of the North Carolina Railroad (see below, Chapters 4 and 5), it became the more familiar eastern seaboard route.

2. Andrew Johnson, “The Annual Message,” 4 Dec. 1865, in Edward McPherson, *Political History during Reconstruction*, 64.

3. Eric McKittrick has pointed out a more extreme position, which he calls the “Southern” theory, in which all state affairs would “revert to their pre-existing condition” after the war was over. He calls this an extremely radical position, and I cannot think of too many Democrats who espoused it seriously after 1865. McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, 97.

4. Benedict, *Fruits of Victory*, 19.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Jaynes, *Branches without Roots*, 57–74; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 5–31; Foner, *Nothing but Freedom*.

7. Olsen, *Carpetbagger’s Crusade*, 59–78; I am here collapsing two distinct positions in Radical Republican thought that McKittrick has outlined, the “conquered provinces” school and the “state suicide” school. See McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, 93–119. The relationship between railroad debt and education was most visible in Virginia, in which continued payment for railroad mortgages forced the state to close public schools in the 1880s. The Readjusters emerged as a coalition of whites and blacks who supported readjustment of these debts. See Ours, “Virginia’s Funding Legislation,” 56.

8. Raleigh & Gaston Railroad, “Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of Stockholders,” 2–3. For presidential Reconstruction, Carter, *When the War Was Over*, is especially strong on fiscal policy.

9. Benedict, *Fruits of Victory*, 13.

10. Escott, *Many Excellent People*, chap. 4.

11. Freyer, *Forums of Order*; Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan*, 238–302.

12. Piedmont Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1866, 2–3; East Tennessee & Virginia, *Annual Report*, 1867, 11; U.S. Congress, 39th Cong., 2d sess., House Report 34, “Affairs of Southern Railroads,” 173–88.

13. Andrew Johnson, “Veto of the Civil Rights Bill,” 27 Mar. 1866, in Edward McPherson, *Political History during Reconstruction*, 76.

14. Interstate railroad corporations were emerging in the North as well; lawyers referred to their unique status between state and federal power by calling them public fictions. Interstate railroads had state and national citizenship (and were thus *public* members of a community that could sue and be sued), but they are also *fictional*, not really tangible people that could be jailed or hanged by a criminal court.

15. Poster, “Wanted 50 good Turpentine Hands . . .,” 1 Dec. 1865, folder 2, “Articles of Agreement between AB Andrews, Robert Hawkins . . . State of North Carolina, County of Franklin . . . Jan. 1866,” ABAP; W. H. Wesson, Charleston, S.C., to W. J.

Hawkins, 4 Jan. 1866, ABA to W. J. Hawkins, 6 Feb. 1866, Hawkins Family Papers, SHC.

16. ABA to R. M. Dunlop, superintendent, Blue Ridge Railroad, 3 July 1865, ABA to Col. Bryel³, QM Department, North Carolina, 31 July 1865 ("Rebel government"), Office Raleigh & Gaston Railroad to ABA, 18 July 1865 (combination tickets), ABAP; Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 465–66; Raleigh & Gaston, *Annual Report*, 1866, 8 (ferry). Andrews's maternal grandfather, who raised him, was Col. John D. Hawkins. Andrews's uncle was Philemon B. Hawkins (1823–91), a railroad contractor until 1875 and director of the North Carolina Railroad. Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 465, 476.

17. Jno. Moncure Robinson, Seaboard & Roanoke Railroad Co., Portsmouth, Va., to Dr. W. J. Hawkins, 6 Sept. 1866, folder 137, Hawkins Family Papers, SHC.

18. "An Act to Incorporate the Roanoke Batteau Transportation Company," North Carolina, July 1868, private laws, 46, SLAST.

19. Escott, *Many Excellent People*, chap. 1.

20. Stokes, *Company Shops*, 57–58; J. J. Thomas, *Fifty Years on the Rail*, 14.

21. See, e.g., the series of letters to Dr. William J. Hawkins in Jan. 1866, folder 135, Hawkins Family Papers, SHC.

22. Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 465–66.

23. Ibid., 329–30, 345–51; "First Fight of Gunboats with Cavalry," 84–85; "Alexander Boyd Andrews," 391–404; "Our Railway Rulers," 29–30.

24. By 1866, Andrews was accused of sponsoring bills on his own in North Carolina's General Assembly. See Will. A. Jenkins to ABA, 16 Feb. 1866, ABAP.

25. Josephus Daniels, *Tar Heel Editor*, 405–6.

26. Raleigh & Gaston Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1866, 7.

27. E[mery] J. Burns to ABA, Pendleton [S.C.], 25 June 1859, Poster, "Wanted 50 good Turpentine Hands . . .," 1 Dec. 1865, "Articles of Agreement between AB Andrews, Robert Hawkins . . . State of North Carolina, County of Franklin . . . Jan 1866," ABAP.

28. Foner, *Reconstruction*, 78–88.

29. Before he started at the Raleigh & Gaston, Andrews conferred frequently with overseers and his ferryman about how to get more work for less money from newly freed workers. H. L. Norfleet to ABA, 17 Mar., 8 June 1866, TM Stuart Rhett to ABA, 15 June 1866, ABAP.

30. For contracts Andrews wrote, see "Articles of Agreement between AB Andrews, Robert Hawkins . . . State of North Carolina, County of Franklin . . . Jan 1866," ABAP. For conflicts over contracts between other railroads and the Freedman's Bureau, see NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1868, 8.

31. For the role of families in the formation of local bourgeoisies, see Davidoff and Hall, *Family Fortunes*. Andrews and President William Johnston corresponded regularly, and they and their wives met frequently in Charlotte. See Johnston to ABA, 20 Nov. 1870, 21 Nov. 1870, ABAP. For the stockholders list of the Raleigh & Gaston, see Raleigh & Gaston, *Annual Report*, 1867, 24–26. The Hawkins women may have held stock because larger blocks of stocks had less voting power but many small blocks of stock, with proxies, counted as more votes. They may also have been dowries or inheritances.

32. Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*.

33. John Moncure Robinson to Moncure Robinson, 3 June 1864, 26 June 1864, Moncure Robinson Papers, Swem Archives, SWM.

34. Osborne, "Professional Biography of Moncure Robinson," 257–59.

35. Seaboard & Roanoke, *Annual Report*, 1867, 10–11. For a picture of a similar wharf arrangement, see Andrew Russell, *Russell's Civil War Photographs*, 36.

36. Seaboard & Roanoke, *Annual Report*, 1867, 13.

37. Alexander Brown, *Steam Packets on the Chesapeake*, 52–57; Holly, *Tidewater by Steamboat*, 81–83.

38. North Carolina, "An Act to Incorporate the North Carolina Iron and Steel Rail Company," *Session Laws*, July 1868, private laws, 42–44, SLAST.

39. Patterson, "Seaboard Air Line," 204–5. The company was chartered to mine iron in North Carolina, but it was more likely a simple way of funneling the profits of the individual railroads to its directors through a harmless-looking debit on the balance sheet.

40. Raleigh & Gaston, *Annual Report*, 1869, 3, and 1873, 9.

41. *Edgefield (S.C.) Advertiser*, 8 Nov. 1865.

42. *Ibid.*, 10 Jan. 1866, and 18 Apr. 1866.

43. Derrick, *South Carolina Railroad*, 245–46.

44. Columbia & Augusta, *Annual Report*, 1866, 6; Board of Directors' Minutes, 24 Oct. 1866, Richmond & Danville, VTL.

45. The bill of lading he kept went from Mississippi by steamship to City Point, Virginia, and then by rail to Petersburg, Virginia. Shipping Certificate, Southern Transportation Company Freight Line, 5 Oct. 1865, ABAP.

46. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 381–84. The only dated agreement with an express company that I have found is Richmond & Danville Railroad Company, *Agreement with the Southern Express Company*, in AAR. For contemporary descriptions of express-company business, see Stimson, *History of the Express Business*, 156–63. The charter of the Southern Transportation Company was sold to the Pullman Palace Car Company in May 1877; see *Railway World* 4 (1878): 444. The railroad cars were manufactured in Philadelphia; see *Edgefield (S.C.) Advertiser*, 31 Jan. 1866.

47. Shipping certificate, Southern Transportation Company Freight Line, 5 Oct. 1865, folder 4, ABAP; Chandler, *Visible Hand*, 128–29.

48. Debits and Credits, Southern Express Company handbill, 3 Dec. 1865, folder 4, ABAP.

49. Maybee, *Railroad Competition and the Oil Trade*, 112–33.

50. Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems*, 192–93. Maury Klein argues that the Louisville & Nashville's Green Line Transportation Company was the first fast-freight service in the South, starting 1 January 1868. See Klein, *Louisville & Nashville*, 76–77; and Chandler, *Visible Hand*, 124–30.

51. Murray, "History and Development of the Bill of Lading," 689–732; Younger, *Diary of Robert Garlick Hill Kean*. The Virginia legislature tried to fix the rates of the express companies in 1866 to 40 percent over the regular charges for the distance and to limit them to transporting fifteen thousand pounds of goods in any one trip. *Code of Virginia*, 1866, 579.

52. "An Act Concerning the Chatham Rail Road Company, Amending an Act to

Incorporate the Said Company, Passed February 15th 1861," folder 1, ABAP; Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems*, 192–93.

53. Seaboard & Roanoke, *Annual Report*, 1867, 19–20, discusses the quota system between the S&R and the Wilmington & Weldon. On the general organization of fast-freight lines, see Theodore Voorhees, "The Freight Car Service," in Clarke et al., *American Railway*, 287–90.

54. For differences between the freight engines and the through and passenger engines, see Grimshaw, *Railway Catechism*; James H. Robinson, forwarding agent, to ABA, 10 Oct. 1873, and W. H. Stanford to ABA, 27 Sept. 1873, ABAP. For the establishment of "through-freighting" between Raleigh & Gaston and the Seaboard & Roanoke, see Raleigh & Gaston, *Annual Report*, 1866, 11–12.

55. See, e.g., the discovery of cars detained at company shops in D. T. Ward to ABA, 30 Oct. 1872, ABAP. Also see T. R. Darrell, supt., Western Union Telegraph, Southern Division, to W. J. Hawkins, 15 Feb. 1873, ABAP.

56. Virginia, *Acts of Assembly* 1866–67, 24 Apr. 1867, chap. 90, pp. 893–97, SLAST. Note that this may have been an attempt to give preference to a new, state-chartered express business, the Virginia Express Company; see *ibid.*, 17 Dec. 1866, chap. 17. The relatively restrictive charter of the Raleigh & Gaston can be found in North Carolina, *Laws of North Carolina*, 1850, chap. 123, p. 250. The summary of further restrictions on the Raleigh & Gaston are in Seaboard Air Line Railway, *Corporate History*, 18–19.

57. North Carolina Senate, *Report Relating to Raleigh & Gaston*; "Josiah Turner v. The Richmond & Danville Railroad Co." in North Carolina, *North Carolina Reports* 70 (1874): 1. Turner tried to charge the association of roads that had invalidated his railroad pass for life, but the court held against him because he did not and could not "allege that the defendant is a corporation, or liable to be sued."

58. Jonathan Worth to Engelhard & Price, 27 Jan. 1869, in Hamilton, *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, 2:1271–75.

59. This was not a unique transformation in the sale of agricultural commodities. Midwestern wheat, stored in grain elevators or in transit to eastern cities, was bought and sold repeatedly in the early commodity exchanges two decades before the Civil War. See generally Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis*.

60. H. S. Haines to Col. John Screven, 4 Apr. 1871, H. S. Haines Letterbooks, 2:53–65, SHC. For a description of Broadway after the war, see James Miller, *Miller's New York*.

61. H. S. Haines to Col. John Screven, 4 April 1871, H. S. Haines Letterbooks, 2:53–65, SHC.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Thomas Clark, *Pills, Petticoats and Plows*, 28–30, 39–53.

64. Ayers, *Promise of the New South*, chap. 4.

65. Thomas Clark, *Pills, Petticoats and Plows*, 112–15.

66. Seaboard Air Line Railway, *Corporate History*. William Patterson asserts that the air line probably predicated its formal appearance on letterhead in April 1870. Patterson, "Seaboard Air Line," 188.

67. Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 17.

68. A. Pope to ABA, 21 Aug. 1873, James H. Robinson to ABA, 23 Sept. 1873, TMR Talcott to ABA, 24 Nov. 1873, ABAP.

69. Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 328–30; North Carolina, “An Act to Incorporate the North Carolina Iron and Steel Rail Company,” July 1868, private laws, 42–44, SLAST; Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 504–7.

70. Business correspondence, Jan. 1868–Mar. 1869, in folders 140–49, Hawkins Family Papers, SHC.

71. William J. Hawkins started the Citizens’ Bank of Raleigh in 1870. James J. Thomas started the Raleigh Savings Bank and the Commercial & Farmers’ Bank of Raleigh. Rufus Sylvester Tucker started the Raleigh National Bank. See Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 330, 507, 509.

72. Brown, *John Motley Morehead* (“City of the Sea”); A. E. Rhodes to Jonathan Worth, 26 July 1866, in Hamilton, *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth* (“Mullet Road”), 2:1271–75; “Scrapbook of Newspaper Clippings on NC Railroads”; “Communication from Gov. John M. Morehead” in NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1866, 42–47; Caldwell, *Founders and Builders of Greensboro*, 43–50. Morehead died in 1866, and so never saw the full flowering of the air line.

73. Jonathan Worth to Josiah Turner, 25 Feb. 1868, and Jonathan Worth to Engelhard & Price, 27 Jan. 1869, Hamilton, *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, 2:1271–75.

74. This was indirect. Worth appointed directors who selected the president.

75. Jonathan Worth to Josiah Turner, 25 Feb. 1868, and Jonathan Worth to Engelhard & Price, 27 Jan. 1869, Hamilton, *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, 2:1271–75.

76. The other railway was Johnston’s Columbia & Augusta. See Raleigh & Gaston, *Annual Report*, 1869, 2–3. The contract was signed on 28 July 1868.

77. They also asked the council to levy a tax on the railroad for all passengers who now passed quickly through the city, efficient connections making them less likely to stay the night in Portsmouth. “Report of the Committee of Ordinances, to the City Council Relative to the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad,” 5 Feb. 1867, in Emmerson, *Some Fugitive Items of Portsmouth*, 156–66.

78. Ibid., 156–57.

79. Ibid., 161–62.

80. Ibid., 162–65. Emphasis mine.

81. Grice’s importance to the Seaboard & Roanoke can be seen in Moncure Robinson to George W. Grice, 12 Mar. 1875, Moncure Robinson Papers, Swem Archives, SWM. There is no correspondence in this collection between 1865 and 1875. On the bank and the air line, see McGuire, “The Seaboard Air Line,” 101. On the bank’s position as a holding place for bonds and its importance to the Robinson interests, see Patterson, “Seaboard Air Line,” 212, 218.

82. Seaboard & Roanoke, *Annual Report*, 1868, 3.

83. Ibid., *Annual Report*, 1861, 20, and 1870, 7. Tonnage went from 17,814 to 111,552 tons.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. “A Swindler on the Rounds,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 18 July 1870.
2. “Compliments to General Lee,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 30 Apr. 1870.
3. Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 196–97.
4. Paludan, *Victims*, 69–71.
5. Tyler-McGraw, *At the Falls*, 150–52.
6. Boykin, *The Falling Flag*.
7. DuBois, *Black Reconstruction*, chap. 6.
8. Charles Reagan Wilson, “Invention of Southern Tradition” and *Baptized in Blood*; Foster, *Ghosts of the Confederacy*.
9. Perman, *Road to Redemption*.
10. Logue, *To Appomattox and Beyond*, 111–16.
11. The term “gripping abbreviation” comes from Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*,
60. I rely here on Schechter’s elaboration of the term in “Gothic Thermidor.”
12. See Chapter 3, above.
13. Bradley, *Triumph of Militant Republicanism*, 330–41; *Dictionary of American Biography*, 16:500–501; Maybee, *Railroad Competition and the Oil Trade*, 104–11; Fernon, *Hints and Facts for Railway Investors*, 6.
14. George Turner, *Victory Rode the Rails*, 45–61. In Washington, Scott faced John W. Garrett, president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, who was similarly prescient about the value of a single interstate trunk from Atlanta to northern cities. Hungerford, *Story of the B&O*, 2:112–13.
15. “An Act for Completing a Direct and Continuous Line of Railroad from Washington City to Mobile . . .” [March 1868], in general papers, folder 7, Board of Public Works Papers, LOV.
16. The bill was brought up by Samuel Clarke Pomeroy, senator from Kansas and a prominent figure in Tom Scott’s Texas & Pacific Railroad. He was later censured by the Senate for bribing electors. See *Dictionary of American Biography*, 15:54–55. Pomeroy asserted that the bill was “put into my hands by men from States that are not represented here,” as southern states had not been readmitted to Congress. Pomeroy tried to send the bill to the Scott-dominated Committee on the Pacific Railroad, but apparently he was upbraided by Senator Sherman of the Select Committee on National Railways for improper placement of the bill. Sherman’s committee got the bill and presumably buried it. *Congressional Globe*, 40th Cong., 1st sess., 3240, 3314. On Pomeroy’s relation to the Texas and Pacific, see *Congressional Globe*, 41st Cong., 2d sess., June 1870, 4638–42, in which Pomeroy defends his initial wording of the Texas & Pacific Railroad bill. The southern bill was a modified land-grant bill, of the kind that had been opposed by representatives of the states of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia in the 1850s. Haney, *Congressional History of Railways*, 2:15–17. The bill’s line in Washington was called the “Washington, Alexandria and Georgetown” railroad. This can only refer to the Washington & Alexandria Railroad which the Pennsylvania Railroad gained control of immediately after the war. See Tilp, *This Was Potomac River*, 232–96. It is possible that Robinson and Scott together supported the bill, and that the alliance broke down later. For evidence of this scenario, see *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Jan. 1871.

17. The Baltimore terminal was acquired through the Penn's purchase of the Northern Central Railway. "An Act for Completing a Direct and Continuous Line of Railroad from Washington City to Mobile . . ." [March 1868], in general papers, folder 7, Board of Public Works Papers, LOV.

18. Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 103–4.

19. The B&O went to D.C., but only after passing through Baltimore. Hungerford, *Story of the B&O*, 71–72; Stover, *Baltimore and Ohio*, 141–54.

20. The Penn's Baltimore & Potomac got rights over the Potomac on 21 June 1870. They got rights to build Union Station on 3 March 1871. The Penn got exclusive rights because Congress felt that the channel of the Potomac River should be obstructed by only one bridge. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, *Depot Question*, 8; Schotter, *Pennsylvania Railroad*, 86–87; Mordecai, *Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad*, 42; Stover, *Baltimore and Ohio*, 144.

21. Testimony of John W. Garrett in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, *Depot Question*, 5–15.

22. Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction*, 68–76.

23. This was later changed to 13 million acres; see *Richmond Enquirer*, 1 Mar. 1871.

24. This was to distinguish it from C. P. Huntington's Southern Pacific Railroad, which was chartered in California. *Richmond Enquirer*, 4 Mar. 1871.

25. Haney, *Congressional History of Railways*, 2:56.

26. Fernon, *Hints and Facts for Railway Investors*, 3.

27. James Douglas Smith, "Virginia during Reconstruction," 238–39; *New York Times*, 15 Sept. 1865; Virginia House of Delegates, "Sale of the State's Interest in the Richmond and Danville . . .," 43.

28. Buford's wife (Emily Townes Buford) had a father (George Townes) and an uncle (William Pugh Tunstall) who were prominent in the Richmond & Danville before the war. Tyler, *Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography*, 4:330–31; Maury Klein, *Great Richmond Terminal*, 30–31; Siegel, *Roots of Southern Distinctiveness*, 157. For the significance of Buford's being a southern manager of a northern road, see P. A. Wellford to A. S. Buford, 26 Oct. 1871, in ARLET.

29. "Remarks of Mr Hensley, of Bedford," *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Mar. 1871.

30. They were George M. Pullman, Freeman Clarke, and Henry Bradley Plant. See Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 3–10.

31. Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:138–41; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 11–14.

32. *New York Times*, 5 May 1868. A thorough account of the constitutional convention can be found Currie-McDaniel, *John Emery Bryant*, 77–93. See also Joseph P. Reidy, "Aaron A. Bradley"; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 31–36; Wynne, *Continuity of Cotton*, 31–51; and Nathans, *Losing the Peace*, 56–69. On Bullock and the air line, see DeCredico, *Patriotism for Profit*, 188; and Wynne, *Continuity of Cotton*, 51.

33. Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 48; KKK hearings, Ga., 378–86; Drago, "Georgia's First Black Voter Registrars."

34. Currie-McDaniel, *John Emery Bryant*, 81.

35. Roberts, *Joseph E. Brown*, 52–58; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 41–42, 62–63. Hurlbert apparently suggested and defended Grant, Alexander and Company (Duncan, 105).

36. Indeed, it was Thomson who helped Grant get his first railroad contracts in Georgia before the war. Ward, *J. Edgar Thomson*.

37. Lichtenstein, *Twice the Work of Free Labor; Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:362–64; A. Elizabeth Taylor, “Convict Lease in Georgia”; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 104–5; James Russell, *Atlanta*, 133.

38. “Grand Finale of the Railroad War—The ‘Bucktails’ and ‘Bobtails’ at Dinner,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 27 Feb. 1871; KKK hearings, S.C., 234, 811, 828; “Daddy Cain’s Last Blast,” *Carolina Spartan*, 6 Apr. 1871.

39. If Scott had not bought the lines, then the upcountry feeders would have been direct competitors to him and would have charged excessive rates for the shipment of rails and construction equipment. On the northern part of the line, there was a conflict over the price of shipping an engine and flats. See S. P. Alexander to A. S. Buford, 2 Nov. 1871, ARLET. This practice had been common on southern railroads since before the war. On the Richmond & Danville in the 1850s, for instance, “iron, steel and castings” were eight times more expensive per ton than flour. Board of Directors’ Minutes, 10 Mar. 1851, Richmond & Danville Railroad, VTL.

40. G. Cannon to Col. A. S. Buford, 14 Dec. 1871, ARLET; Doster, “Vicissitudes of the South Carolina Railroad”; Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 76–77.

41. Buford had changed the gauge of the Piedmont Railroad to match the Richmond & Danville in early 1866. See A. S. Buford, Presidents’ Office, to W. T. Sutherlin, 18 Feb. 1866, in William T. Sutherlin Papers, SHC.

42. Piedmont Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1866, 12. The NCRR was 4 feet, 8½ inches while the R&D was 5 feet. During the war the gauge change was at Danville, but after the R&D regained control of the Piedmont Railroad after the war, they got the North Carolina legislature to change the gauge of the Piedmont Railroad to match the R&D. Piedmont Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1866, 9–11.

43. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1869, 371–72; Piedmont Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1867, 44–47.

44. Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 310–17.

45. After Scott’s Baltimore & Potomac replaced the Washington, Alexandria & Fredericksburg (forcing the B&O out of the alliance), Scott and Moncure Robinson agreed to share the line to Washington, D.C. Robinson’s Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac took the mortgage of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad. See Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 84.

46. Testimony of Mr. Green, of Alexandria, to the Senate Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation, *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Jan. 1871.

47. Ashe, *Cyclopedie*, 200. For Yancey’s connection to the SRSC, see *Charlotte Observer*, 6 and 20 Feb. 1873. Austell was a Spartanburg merchant who moved to Campbellton, Georgia, in the late 1840s or early 1850s and then to Atlanta in 1857. *Carolina Spartan*, 10 Aug. 1871; Garrett, *Atlanta and Environs*, 1:408. On the broad charter of this air line, see *Greensboro Patriot*, 15 Oct. 1868.

48. Thus none of the reports of the lines mention northern financial interests connected with the road, but see the *Carolina Spartan*, 5 Oct. 1871, which discusses land speculation by “Northern men connected with the Airline Road.”

49. Alfred Austell to Colonel Buford, 7 Nov. 1871, ARLET.

50. James Russell, *Atlanta*, 133.

51. The Penn's control of the bond issues of the Richmond & Danville was not relinquished until the late 1880s. Even when the controlling stock of the R&D was turned over to W. P. Clyde in 1880, the Penn required that Clyde issue no more mortgage bonds on the R&D unless he bought the Penn's remaining 1.5 million in R&D first mortgage bonds. See "Copy of Memorandum give[n] [to] WP Clyde by Assistant to the President DuBarry . . .," Pennsylvania Railroad, secretary, board files, BF Series, box 8, file 27, PRC; R&D capitalization figures in Switzler, "Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States," pt. 2, 26–28. By 1877, after a number of obligations were canceled by the Pennsylvania, the Atlanta & Charlotte still had a whopping first mortgage debt of \$4.75 million, with gross earnings of only \$416,000 and expenditures of \$356,000. The B&O, by comparison, had twenty times the gross earnings on its main stem with only 8.3 times bonded debt. *Poor's Manual of the Railroads of the United States for 1878–79*, 398, 403, 496–97.

52. William Johnston to AB Andrews, 23 Sept. 1872, ABAP.

53. These "collateral obligations" were finally forgiven in 1874. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1875, 329. Compare to Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 113.

54. The Georgia & South Carolina Air Line was consolidated under the name Atlanta & Richmond Air Line on 28 June 1870. See *Richmond Dispatch*, 4 July 1870. James Russell, *Atlanta*, 132, refers to the air line as one of the "turning points in the city's entrepreneurial history," but when Austell and others from Atlanta presumably called on Buford for help at a public meeting in Atlanta on 11 Nov. 1868 (Russell, 133) the line had already been proposed by Scott's men in Congress (see above), suggesting that the call for Buford was for appearances only. The original incorporator, Jonathan Norcross, explains what was common knowledge in Atlanta, that the Georgia Air Line was a plank-road charter, which was only later seized upon by others as a railroad charter. Garrett, *Atlanta and Environs*, 1:408–9.

55. *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Jan. 1871.

56. Southern merchants were attracted to New York wholesalers whose ties to New York banks allowed them to offer wholesale goods to southern merchants with twelve to fifteen months' credit and reasonable prices. Southern cotton factors knew that cotton shipped via New York to foreign ports could be sold on spot markets in New York, if prices happened to be higher there at the time. Shipping via New York thus let merchants sell on *two* markets with a single shipment. Moeckel, *Development of the Wholesaler*, 22–31. The easy credit and superabundant capital of New York had likewise pulled Mississippi Valley grain from southbound steamboats and put them in grain elevators, eastbound railway cars, and canal boats in the 1850s. George Miller, *Railroads and the Granger Law*, chap. 1; Rothstein, "Antebellum Wheat and Cotton Exports," 91–100.

57. Somers, *Southern States since the War*, 45; Carter, *When the War Was Over*, 96–146; Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party*.

58. Bank credit was needed to "facilitate the current exchanges of business, and lubricate the joints of industry." *The Southern Planter*, March 1867, 124. Merchants could no longer offer goods on twelve-month credit because they lacked their own capital stores. In ads in city newspapers, merchants announced, "We have to pay cash for our Goods.

Therefore we cannot afford to sell on credit. So do not presume on our good nature and ask for credit." *Edgefield (S.C.) Advertiser*, 8 Nov. 1865.

59. (*Philadelphia*) *Public Ledger*, 22 June, 9 Aug. 1866; Routledge, *Discoveries and Inventions of the Nineteenth Century*, 94–103. The American sail-powered merchant marine, long the envy of Europe and Canada, sank like a plummet, followed in a few short years by the New England shipping industry. The most proximate cause was a rapid rise in insurance costs relative to the safer steamships. The savings of fuel and labor were significant, but slight enough to allow the West Coast shipping industry to compete with steam travel through World War I. Sailing ships that did ply the East Coast after the Civil War were most often made in Halifax. See *Change and Adaptation in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century*, Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project, 1–3 Apr. 1982 (St. John's, Newfoundland: Maritime History Group, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985).

60. The New Orleans Tow-Boat Association contributed to the problem in New Orleans by purposely obstructing passage through the sandbar. This delayed ships by weeks while the associations' tow boats were paid to pull ships through one by one. *DeBow's Review* (After the War series) 2 (1870): 296. *Routes to the Seaboard*, pt. 1, 200–201; pt. 2, 870–72, 882–83. For Mobile, see Doyle, *New Men, New Cities, New South*, 14. For the problems of Charleston relative to Norfolk, see Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1867, 7. For a general study of the Eastern Seaboard, see "Report of the Committee of the National Board of Trade on a Continuous Waterline of Transportation through Virginia," *DeBow's Review* (After the War series) 2 (1870): 270–77.

61. Merchants did not disappear immediately, but the increase in staple tonnage after the war came less and less into the hands of merchants at small ports. Woodman, *King Cotton and His Retainers*, 269–94.

62. Matthew Brown Hammond, *Cotton Industry*, 284–85; Woodman, *King Cotton and His Retainers*, 269–94.

63. Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia, *Annual Report*, 1857, 80; Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1868, 7; Columbia & Augusta, *Annual Report*, 1868, 9; South Carolina General Assembly, "Report of the Special Joint Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report as to Compliants in Regard to Railroads, and Other Matters Concerning the Same," reprinted in *ibid.*, 60ff. Siegel, *Roots of Southern Distinctiveness*, 40–43. On the use of the concept of "foreign" companies before Justice Holmes's Supreme Court, see McCurdy, "Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations," 970–1005, and "American Law and the Large Corporation," 631–49.

64. W. T. Sutherlin, resolution to lower rates, 13 Oct. 1870, in Richmond & Danville, "Minutes Book of the Board of Directors," bound vol. R-2a, VTL.

65. Summers, *Gospel of Prosperity*, 87.

66. Often these roads were chartered by a connecting line to force its neighbor to forward freight at reasonable terms. North Carolina, "An Act to Incorporate the Central NCRR," November 1868, Public Laws, 562, SLAST. This line was parallel to the Richmond & Danville's Piedmont Railroad but had the same gauge as the North Carolina Railroad.

67. Summers, *Gospel of Prosperity*, 75–76.
68. For North Carolina's general law, see North Carolina, "An Act to Authorize the Formation of Corporations for Manufacturing, Mining, Mechanical, Chemical and Other Purposes," *Session Laws*, November 1868, Public Laws, 668–71.
69. Klein, *Great Richmond Terminal*.
70. James Tice Moore, *Two Paths to the New South*; Moger, "Railroad Practices," 423–57; Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*.
71. *Richmond Dispatch*, 5–7 Jan. 1871.
72. *Ibid.*, 25 Feb. 1871.
73. Quoted in Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*, 154.
74. Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 109.
75. "The Bribery Investigation," *Richmond Enquirer*, 3 Mar. 1871; "The Bribery Investigation Committee," *ibid.*, 6 Mar. 1871.
76. *Richmond Dispatch*, 2 Mar. 1871.
77. *New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1889, also cited in Moger, "Railroad Practices," 439.
78. *Richmond Dispatch*, 12 July 1870.
79. *New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1889.
80. U.S. Congress, 43d Cong., 1st sess., *Report of the Select Committee on Transportation-Routes to the Seaboard*, 8–17, 189–91, 440–41.
81. *Richmond Whig*, 5 Oct. 1866, 12 Mar. 1867, 2 and 19 Apr. 1867; Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*, 150–52.
82. Blake, *William Mahone*, 89.
83. Moger, "Railroad Practices," 438–39; Blake, *William Mahone*, 84–89.
84. *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Mar. 1871.
85. "Remarks of Mr Hensley, of Bedford," *Richmond Enquirer*, 6 Mar. 1871.
86. "The Spoliation Bill," *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Mar. 1871.
87. *Richmond Dispatch*, 27 Feb. 1871.
88. "Will Argument Prevail," *Richmond Enquirer*, 7 Mar. 1871.
89. James Tice Moore, *Two Paths to the New South*; Moger, "Railroad Practices," 423–57; Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*.
90. The termination of traffic in Richmond ended in World War I. See Mitchell, *Richmond's Transportation Facilities*.
91. Switzler, *Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States*, 37.
92. Mohr, *On the Threshold of Freedom*. On the role of railroad workers in particular, see page 165.
93. Ira Berlin et al., *Freedom*, ser. 1.
94. The provisional governor was Charles Jenkins. For Wallace's letter—his response to black workers—see Henson, "Industrial Workers in the Mid Nineteenth-Century South." For disagreements with Henson's claim that there were few black railroad workers in Georgia after the 1850s, see McLeod, *Workers in Reconstruction-Era Atlanta*; and Mohr, *On the Threshold of Freedom*, 160–70.
95. Wynne, *Continuity of Cotton*, 47–48.
96. *Ibid.*, 49–50.
97. The kind of corruption that Virginia Democrats opposed, political corruption, refers to public and private interests overlapping. In its simplest form, this is using pub-

lic works for private gain. The other kind of corruption that Hill intends is a kind of religious or racial corruption, which involves an overlapping of categories like black and white. This owes more to Leviticus than to legislation. On ideas of separation and contamination generally, see Douglas, *Purity and Danger*.

98. *Atlanta Constitution*, 25 July 1868.
99. *Ibid.*, 24 July 1868.
100. "Joseph Brought to Judgment," *Atlanta Constitution*, 25 July 1868.
101. Indeed Joseph Brown, while governor, had appointed his friend Dr. Lewis as superintendent of the Western & Atlantic in the late 1850s, even though Lewis appeared to know almost nothing about railroads. See Henson, "Industrial Workers in the Mid Nineteenth-Century South," 82–84; Decredico, *Patriotism for Profit*, 122; and Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 112.
102. On Hurlbert's operations in the registration of 1867, see Drago, "Georgia's First Black Voter Registrars during Reconstruction," 760–91. Drago argues in part that Hurlbert helped to cultivate accommodationist black leaders. Henson, "Industrial Workers in the Mid Nineteenth-Century South," 190.
103. *Atlanta Constitution*, 8 Aug. 1868; Nixon, *Henry W. Grady*, 69–79.
104. "The National Democratic Convention," *Atlanta Constitution*, 27 June 1868.
105. Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 64.
106. Duncan says it was the same coalition that opposed Bullock's choices for the Senate (*ibid.*, 62–63). But Currie-McDaniel says that John Emory Bryant was among the Republicans who opposed Bullock's choice for the Senate, but supported black legislators' keeping their seats. See Currie-McDaniel, *John Emery Bryant*, 94–98.
107. Georgia, "Session Laws," 1868, 105–7, 143–45, SLAST.
108. Rable, *But There Was No Peace*, 73–74; KKK hearings, Ga., 417–23; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 66–67.
109. Tift et al., *Condition of Affairs in Georgia*, 30–32.
110. Currie-McDaniel, *John Emery Bryant*, 98–107.
111. Georgia, "Session Laws," 1868, 138, SLAST; Nedon Angier was appointed either the first day of August or the last day of July 1868. KKK hearings, Ga., 150–65.
112. This was Foster Blodgett, formerly the treasurer of the Western & Atlantic Railroad. DeCredico, *Patriotism for Profit*, 122–23; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 112–14; Currie-McDaniel, *John Emery Bryant*, 88–92.
113. Duncan says that Bullock used the Western & Atlantic as "a subtreasury for his warrants." Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 113–16 (quote on p. 114). This is an important insight. Because Bullock paid for state activities directly from the funds of the Western & Atlantic, Bullock successfully bypassed state treasurer Angier, who refused to pay for bills he disapproved of. See KKK hearings, Ga., *fiche 176* (1868), 160–65. Because Bullock paid his bills directly from the W&A, the railroad appeared to generate no revenue for 1871. Many contemporaries and historians since then have pointed to the absence of revenue and assumed that this meant the railroad was mismanaged. For evidence that the road may also have been mismanaged, see Georgia Legislature, *The Evidence Taken by the Joint Committee*.
114. On the problems in building a strong state in Reconstruction, see Ayers, *Vengeance and Justice*; on the turn against state intervention and radicalism generally in

the Republican Party, see Montgomery, *Beyond Equality*; and Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 98–108.

115. DeCredico, *Patriotism for Profit*, 122; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 112.
116. Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:362–64; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 109.
117. Reidy, “Aaron A. Bradley,” 297.
118. Georgia, “Session Laws,” 1871, 25, SLAST.
119. For broad Democratic support for changes in the air line’s charter, see “Georgia Legislature,” *Atlanta Constitution*, 3 and 4 Sept. 1868; see also Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 62–63.
120. Alfred Austell, Atlanta, Ga., to Col. Buford, 7 Nov. 1871, Atlanta and Richmond Air Line Railway Company Letter Book, 1871–72, FLW.
121. Ibid. ; Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:39–40; Rabenowitz, “Continuity and Change,” 95–10; Henson, “Industrial Workers in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century South,” 4–10.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Nixon, *Henry W. Grady*, 51–52; Hill, *Speeches and Writings*, 309–11 (see also pp. 52–53, where Hill’s son said that there were twenty thousand men in attendance at the speech). For Hill’s relation to the Georgia Central and its subsidiaries, see Nathans, *Losing the Peace*, 208–11.
2. Roberts, *Joseph E. Brown*, 41–44.
3. Hill, *Speeches and Writings*, 312–14; Hill’s son makes it clear that Brown was the subject of attack (53–54).
4. Contemporaries asserted this as well. See reference to note by Brig. Gen. John Pope to U. S. Grant in U.S. Congress, 41st Cong., “Message of the President of the United States,” 13.
5. Toombs was more explicit in equating African Americans with republicanism, calling the Republican Party “a mass of floating putrescence which rises as it rots and rots as it rises.” Duncan, *Entrepreneur for Equality*, 54–55.
6. Wynne, *Continuity of Cotton*, 33.
7. Friedman, *White Savage*.
8. KKK hearings, Ga., 591–95.
9. The speech was delivered on 23 July 1868. Klan operations began in Atlanta on 11 March when former Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest visited the city. KKK hearings, Ga., 57, 591; Duncan, *Entrepreneur for Equality*, 47.
10. Wynne, *Continuity of Cotton*, 33; Duncan, *Entrepreneur for Equality*, 74.
11. Trelease, *White Terror*; Rable, *But There Was No Peace*; Joel Williamson, *Crucible of Race*.
12. Escott, *Many Excellent People*.
13. I have been most influenced in my thinking about corruption by Douglas, *Purity and Danger*.
14. Faucett’s operations are derived from U.S. Census, 1840, N.C., Orange County,

201, and 1850, N.C., Alamance County, 71; and *The South: The Southern Business Directory*. Faucett's store is given as Fawcett's in the business directory. On Outlaw's parentage, see H. S. Rike to Andrew Jackson Rike, 24 Dec. 1871, Andrew Jackson Rike Papers, SHC.

15. Auman and Scarboro, "Heroes of America in Civil War North Carolina," 348; Iobst, *Bloody Sixth*, app. 1; *Trial of Holden*, 491.

16. *Trial of Holden*, 619, 1133–34, 1198–99, 1363–68, 1917–18, 2051; OUTR, 270.

17. NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1868, 27–39; Payroll Records, 1862, 1864, Feb. 1871, North Carolina Railroad Collection, NCDA&H; Minutes, Dec. 1867, Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, Alamance County, NCDA&H. The other barroom was owned by J. T. Trollinger and stood within sight of the train. Trollinger would later be an officer in the Klan. Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 182; testimony of E. M. Holt, OUTR, 252.

18. On workingmen and liquor, see Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours for What We Will*. OUTR, 41, 87, 97–99, 132, 144–47, 269 (quote on p. 146); Auman and Scarboro, "Heroes of America in Civil War North Carolina." Faucett later renounced his membership (Auman and Scarboro, 348). "Red Strings" comes from the second chapter of Joshua in the Old Testament, in which a harlot hides spies from the king of Jericho and helps them escape by dropping a red cord out of her house and over the city walls. To repay the woman, the spies promise that when they return they will spare the houses of all those who hang a red string from their windows.

19. "Institution of a Pioneer," doc. 699, and "Ritual Constitution and Bylaws of the Union League of America," doc. 754, in AWT.

20. *Trial of Holden*, 1198.

21. "Ritual Constitution and Bylaws of the Union League of America," doc. 754, in AWT. On the question of integration of the LRL into the Union League, see the exchange of letters between Holden, Tourgee, and W. Dunn Jr., reprinted as docs. 713, 717, and 719 in AWT. For Outlaw's Union League commission, see Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 224–25.

22. LRL minutes, doc. 754, AWT. On manhood rituals in other nineteenth-century men's organizations, see Carnes, *Secret Ritual and Manhood*. A work that considers the freemasonry as a vessel of enlightenment principles is Steven Bullock, *Revolutionary Brotherhood*.

23. Through freight hovered around two-thirds of total freight from 1867 to 1872. See Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 370.

24. NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1868, 27–39.

25. Stokes, *Graham Presbyterian Church*, 7–8; minutes, 16 Apr. 1869, Mrs. F. A. Flagg et al. to Board of Directors, Oct. 1869, payroll records, Feb. 1871, North Carolina Railroad Collection, NCDA&H; *Trial of Holden*, 576–78, 593–94, 597–98, 1701–2, 1786–87. Accounts differ on whether the black person who accompanied Corliss was a man, a woman, or a crippled boy. The most detailed accounts of the incident describe the person as a man.

26. "Respectable Republican Convention," *Greensboro Patriot*, 8 Oct. 1868, 7 July 1870; *Trial of Holden*, 632; "For Commissioners for Town of Graham," 27 July 1868, Holden Papers, NCDA&H.

27. U.S. Census, 1870, N.C., Alamance County; Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 182; *Trial of Holden*, 575–76.

28. KKK hearings, N.C., 65–72.

29. Escott, *Many Excellent People*, 137.

30. *Trial of Holden*, 592–95, 611–19; OUTR, 316–18.

31. Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 257.

32. NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1865, 26–27.

33. Ibid., 1866, 31; Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 231.

34. Jas. Yancey to Josiah Turner Sr., 13 Nov. 1807, Josiah Turner Papers, SHC; Clausest, “Josiah Turner,” 66–74.

35. J. Devereux to Sophia Turner, 12 Feb. 1860, Josiah Turner Papers, SHC.

36. Special Order no. 262, 8 Nov. 1862, Josiah Turner to Sophia Turner, 11 July 1865, Josiah Turner Papers, SHC.

37. Josiah Turner to Sophia Turner, 11 July 1865, SHC.

38. Auman and Scarboro, “Heroes of America in Civil War North Carolina,” 348; Escott, *Many Excellent People*, 59–60, 64.

39. OUTR, 144–46; Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 181–82.

40. NCRR, *Annual Report*, 1868, 7; for Josiah Turner’s year as president of the NCRR, see Stokes, *Company Shops*, 54–61; Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, chap. 18.

41. Turner discusses the incident in *Raleigh Sentinel*, 24 Feb. 1870.

42. OUTR, 145, 269; “House of Representatives,” *Raleigh Sentinel*, 31 Mar. 1870.

43. *Raleigh Sentinel*, 16 Mar. 1870.

44. Hamilton, *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, 2:1273.

45. NCRR, *President’s Report*, 1868, 6.

46. Ibid., 6–7.

47. Reid, “Josiah Turner, Jr. and the Reconstruction Counterrevolution,” 55.

48. OUTR, 345.

49. KKK hearings, N.C., 83; OUTR, 352–56.

50. The charter simultaneously exposed Outlaw as the regional organizer of the Union League and Holden as its president. The commission was taken from a freedman in 1868, and its contents were reprinted in Turner’s *Raleigh Sentinel*. Susie Lee Owens, “Union League of America,” 110.

51. Reid, “Josiah Turner,” 59–60; Jacob Brandon to Governor Holden, 19 Sept. 1868, W. W. Holden Papers, NCDA&H. I am indebted to Laura Edwards for this letter.

52. E. R. S. Canby, military commander, Charleston, S.C., to W. W. Holden, 17 July 1868, W. W. Holden Papers, NCDA&H.

53. Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 289.

54. (*Raleigh*) *Daily Sentinel*, 18 Nov. 1868, cited in Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 257.

55. *Trial of Holden*, 1791–92; EG Rike to AJ Rike, 18 Apr. 1869, Andrew Jackson Rike Papers, SHC-UNC.

56. Reid, “Josiah Turner,” 68–69.

57. “Letter to Dr. Yates—Personal and Confidential,” (*Raleigh*) *Daily Sentinel*, 16 Mar. 1870.

58. On Andrews and Robinson, see Chapter 3, above; on their conflict with the NCRR, see Chapter 7.

59. Trelease, *White Terror*, 192–93.

60. (*Raleigh*) *Daily Sentinel*, 2 Mar. 1870.

61. *Ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1868, cited in Reid, “Josiah Turner.”

62. Reid, “Josiah Turner,” 69.

63. Josiah Turner to Sophie Turner, 26 Apr. 1861, 3 Feb. 1866, Josiah Turner Papers, SHC-UNC.

64. On the relationship between Gothic literature and political reaction, see Monleón, *A Specter Is Haunting Europe*. I am indebted to Ron Schechter for helping me understand how to think about Walter Scott’s literature.

65. (*Raleigh*) *Daily Sentinel*, 1 Jan. 1870.

66. *Ibid.*, 21 Mar. 1870.

67. On Scott, see Judith Wilt, *Secret Leaves*, 38–41. On Confederate camp readership, see Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism*, 10–11. On Turner, see Nelson, “A Manifold Mission,” chap. 3. Cf. “passionate manhood” and the military ideal in Rotundo, *American Manhood*, 231–39. Rotundo suggests that white middle-class men in the North recoiled from combat horrors immediately after 1865, and that they recuperated war as a tonic only by the 1880s. Scott’s romantic novels may have provided a more soothing way of imagining combat for veterans and nonveterans immediately after the war.

68. Alamance Klan members who were in Company F of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment include George Anthony*, Sergeant John T. Trollinger*, Cpl. William Kirkpatrick*, George Mebane, John A. Moore*, and James J. Younger. Alamance Klan members in Company K include Joseph McAdams* and Fred Blanchard. Names without a rank were privates. Blanchard was confined in Newport News; all members with an asterisk were confined at Point Lookout, Md., after surrendering at the battle of Rappahannock Station. This list comes from comparing confessions to the roster of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment printed in Iobst, *The Bloody Sixth*.

69. John G. Albright, merchant in 1860; Jonathan Newlin, trader in 1850; William B. Faucett, carpenter in Graham in 1870; James L. Hunter, merchant in 1860; William M. Thompson, son of blacksmith in 1850; John W. Long, brickmason in 1870; Thomas Gray, bootmaker in 1870; John T. Trollinger, barkeep (from testimony in Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 182); Joseph G. Ross, carpenter (for church) in 1870; William Fogleman, miller in 1870; John A. Moore, practicing physician in 1870; John S. Dixon, cabinetmaker in 1870; Archibald Lineberry, carpenter in 1860.

70. The average value of their land (before and after the war) was \$1,200, putting their holdings (very roughly) in the upper third of Alamance landowners, assuming land values of \$6 per acre and extrapolating from Paul Escott’s chart of Alamance landholdings in *Many Excellent People*, 14.

71. On whiteness generally, see David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*; and Lott, *Love and Theft*.

72. Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 55, 143–47.

73. *Ibid.*, 140, 154.

74. Confession of Jasper N. Wood in *ibid.*, 186–87.

75. *Ibid.*, 143, 145.

76. *Ibid.*, 10–12; C. P. McTaggart to Col. S. B. Hayman, 4 Mar. 1870, Detective Reports, General Assembly Session Records, 1870–71, box 10, NCDA&H; Stokes, *Company Shops*, 63.

77. Testimony of Col. Orlando Brown in U.S. Congress, *Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction*, 127; Testimony of Dexter Clapp, *ibid.*, 208–11; Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 155–56, 201–2.

78. Holden, *Third Annual Message*, 157, 179, 198–99.

79. OUTR, 78; *Trial of Holden*, 625.

80. William Campbell, Company Shops, to Honorable W. W. Holden, 26 Apr. 1869, R. T. Bosher to His Excellency, 25 Mar. [1869], Detective Reports, General Assembly Session Records, 1870–71, box 10, NCDA&H; *Greensboro Patriot*, 6 June 1870; “Recollections of Jacob Alson Long, Alamance County, North Carolina,” Jacob A. Long papers, SHC; *Trial of Holden*, 1895–97.

81. *Trial of Holden*, 1901–18.

82. *Ibid.*, 632.

83. Holden, ed., *Third Annual Message*, 86–90.

84. *Ibid.*, 212–14; C. P. McTaggart to Col. S. B. Hayman, 4 March 1870, Detective Reports, General Assembly Session Records, 1870–71, box 10, NCDA&H. Also see Olsen, “Ku Klux Klan,” 354–56; the mouth-widening is a detail in Thomas Dixon’s novel, *The Leopard’s Spots*. Dixon’s uncle had high rank in the Western North Carolina Klan, and may well have provided this detail to him from discussions with other Klansmen.

85. Massengill, “Detectives of William W. Holden,” 466, 473–74.

86. Thus W. W. Holden’s son Joseph W. Holden intercepted Josiah Turner at a train depot in Raleigh as Turner was returning from Smithfield. Massengill, “Detectives of William W. Holden,” 460; Raper, *William W. Holden*, 210. The best discussion of the Kirk-Holden War is in Harris, *William Woods Holden*, 287–99.

87. Raper, *William W. Holden*, 107; Massengill, “Detectives of William W. Holden,” 478–79. Apparently the railroads gave little or no discount for transporting the troops; see Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 245.

88. “For the Patriot, Jonesboro, Tennessee,” *Greensboro Patriot*, 14 July 1870.

89. “Voter Read,” *Greensboro Patriot*, 4 Aug. 1870.

90. “House of Representatives,” (*Raleigh*) *Daily Sentinel*, 31 Mar. 1870.

91. “Where Our Troubles Come From,” *Greensboro Patriot*, 11 Aug. 1870.

CHAPTER SIX

1. After the war, the names of the principal divisions in South Carolina were changed from districts to counties; after 1880, the boundaries of these upcountry counties also changed. I use the terms “upper piedmont,” “northern piedmont,” and “Broad River region” to encompass the counties of Spartanburg, York, and Union. Present-day Cherokee County was carved out of this region after the period discussed here.

2. See Chapters 2 and 3, above.

3. Griffith, *John S. Ezell*, 9.
4. Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 3, pt. 1, 63–71; Ford, *Origins of Southern Radicalism*, 61–62.
5. “Report of the Special Joint Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report as to Complaints in Regard to Railroads . . .,” in Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1868, 4. Compare to rates of transportation in Board of Directors’ Minutes, 10 Mar. 1851, Richmond & Danville Railroad, VTL.
6. Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 67–71, 80–88, 166–67, 227–28, 274. In 1859 the Spartanburg & Union Railroad connected Spartanburg to the South Carolina Railroad and Charleston. Landrum, *History of Spartanburg County*, 40–42.
7. U.S. Census Office, *Statistical View of the [1850] Census*; Franklin H. Elmore Papers (microfilm), SWM; Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 2, 80–88, 229–33, 240–43. On rice consumption, see Coelani, *Shadow of a Dream*.
8. A quantitative survey that combines the livestock-based upper piedmont and the cotton-growing lower piedmont can be found in Ford, *Origins of Southern Radicalism*, chap. 2. On upcountry farmers farther south, see Reidy, *From Slavery to Agrarian Capitalism*; and Weiman, “Economic Emancipation of the Non-Slaveholding Class.”
9. Green, *Recollections of the Carolinas*, 13–15, 27; De Forest, *Union Officer in the Reconstruction*, 54, 58; Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 11, 297–99.
10. See the letters and telegrams reprinted in “Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865.”
11. Eaton, *History of the Southern Confederacy*, 142.
12. U.S. Census Office, *Ninth Census [1870]*, 1:370; KKK hearings, S.C., 34; Eaton, *Southern Confederacy*, 106, 179.
13. “What South Carolina Has Lost,” *Edgefield (S.C.) Advertiser*, 20 Sept. 1865.
14. Bell, *Southern Railroad Man*, 30–31.
15. Columbia and Hamburg, *Annual Report*, 1865, 4–5.
16. Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 2, 69.
17. Glatthaar, *March to the Sea and Beyond*; Barrett, *Sherman’s March through the Carolinas*.
18. James Clark, *Last Train South*, 84.
19. De Forest, *Union Officer in the Reconstruction*, 11–24; KKK hearings, S.C., 946.
20. South Carolina Constitutional Convention, *Proceedings*, 1:114.
21. “Manufacturing in Spartanburg,” *Carolina Spartan*, 24 Aug. 1871.
22. “Christmas Address by the Spartan Carrier,” *Carolina Spartan*, 6 Jan. 1870.
23. “New Southern Railways,” *Charlotte Observer*, 19 Oct. 1869, 31 Mar. 1872; Tom Hanchett, “Sorting Out the New South City,” 66–74.
24. “The Senior Abroad,” *Greensboro Patriot*, 4 Mar. 1869; “North Carolina: The Great Through Route,” *Daily Carolina Observer*, 22 May 1869. On the Seaboard Inland Air Line’s strategy, see Chapter 3, above.
25. “Progress,” *Carolina Spartan*, 17 Nov. 1870.
26. “For the Carolina Spartan,” *Carolina Spartan*, 15 Sept. 1870. The article is otherwise extremely critical of Reconstruction.
27. On the changing relation between cotton buyers and sellers, see Woodman, *King Cotton. “Commercial,”* *Carolina Spartan*, 17 Mar. 1870.

28. Beginning 20 Jan. 1870, articles on cotton culture and fertilizer were on page 2, generally following the editorial. See also Ford, "Rednecks and Merchants."

29. U.S. Congress, 43d Cong., *Transportation-Routes to the Seaboard*, pt. 1, 8–17.

30. "Produce Market," *Daily Carolina Observer*, 29 May 1869. For advertisements for the "Brooks' Superfine Flour" at \$10 a barrel, see *Carolina Spartan*, 17 Mar. 1870; James Henry Hammond predicted this in [Hammond], "Railroad Mania."

31. Charlotte, Columbia, & Augusta Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1870, 7.

32. *Carolina Spartan*, 13 July 1871.

33. For discussions of fertilizer and cotton, see *Daily Carolina Observer*, 17 June 1869; and *Carolina Spartan*, 17 Mar. 1870. On corn and whiskey, see KKK hearings, S.C., 192; Grigsby, "Breaking the Bonds," 24–25. For a review of the debates over the effects of phosphate fertilizer in the upcountry, see Earle, *Geographical Inquiry*, 288–97.

34. KKK hearings, S.C., 191–92.

35. Ibid., 25–26.

36. Ibid., 192.

37. Jolley, "Ku Klux Klan in Rutherford County, NC," 17–30; Wilbur Miller, "The Revenue." Agent Poinier in South Carolina was originally a Democrat opposed to black voting. See KKK hearings, S.C., 25–26, 85.

38. KKK hearings, S.C., 892; Williams, *South Carolina KKK Trials*, 12; Thornton, "Fiscal Policy and the Failure of Radical Reconstruction in the Lower South."

39. Grigsby, "Breaking the Bonds," 8; KKK hearings, S.C., 775, 813–15.

40. Quoted in Williams, *South Carolina KKK Trials*, 12. On the Republican Party's attachment to free-labor ideology, see Eric Foner, *Reconstruction*.

41. South Carolina Constitutional Convention, *Proceedings*, 1868, 104–30.

42. De Forest, *Union Officer in the Reconstruction*, 49–68, 71–81.

43. KKK hearings, S.C., 968, 973; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 21.

44. Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, 14.

45. KKK hearings, S.C., 382, 410–11, 806, 969–70, 973; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 113, 126–27.

46. "Mass Meeting," *Carolina Spartan*, 6 Oct. 1870; Elsa Barkley Brown, "Negotiating and Transforming the Public Sphere"; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 145–83.

47. KKK hearings, S.C., 913, 927, 944.

48. Ibid., 1364, 1342, 1544–52.

49. Ibid., 371; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 185, 194.

50. "Spartanburg and Union Railroad," *Carolina Spartan*, 20 Jan. 1870; Charlotte & South Carolina, *Annual Report*, 1869, 44–45; KKK hearings, S.C., 36–41, 392–400, 786, 1078, 913–14, 943–44, 968–70, 1042–48, 1342–43, 1386.

51. KKK hearings, S.C., 683, 974–75, 1017.

52. Ibid., 890.

53. Nelson, "Livestock, Boundaries, and Public Space in Spartanburg"; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 183.

54. KKK hearings, S.C., 41–47, 303, 890, 1040.

55. *Charlotte Observer*, 28 Feb. 1873; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 128.

56. There are now many fine accounts of South Carolina during Reconstruction. The best source for the activities of the Reconstruction Congress is Holt, *Black over White*. A

superb analysis of political economy and mentalité in postwar South Carolina is Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*. A useful account of some of the central figures in the executive branch of government in South Carolina is Joel Williamson, *After Slavery*, though this account trusts conservative Democrats more than is warranted. Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, gives a useful account of the role of white militias in bringing about the end of Reconstruction in South Carolina. I differ with Zuczek about the ends white conservatives sought, but his account of the violence is careful and convincing.

57. KKK hearings, S.C., 968, 973–74.
58. Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, 59.
59. KKK hearings, S.C., 968, 973–74, 1011–12.
60. Because accepting cotton was hardly grounds for murder, the Invisible Empire claimed that Owens's relationship with freed people caused crime to increase, and that Owens beat his wife when she complained. KKK hearings, S.C., 975, 1017.
61. KKK hearings, S.C., 273–85.
62. Ibid., 247.
63. Ibid., 1342.
64. Ibid., 211.
65. Ibid., 1342, 1355–56, 1472, 1544–52.
66. Barrett, *Sherman's March through the Carolinas*, 104–5; KKK hearings, S.C., 999.
67. Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, 74.
68. "The Guns Have Come," *Union Times*, n.d., reprinted in *Carolina Spartan*, 1 Sept. 1870.
69. Because the South Carolina Constitution required that magistrates be elected, Republicans apparently changed the names of magistrates to trial judges so that the Republican governor could continue to appoint them after 1869. KKK hearings, S.C., 887.
70. KKK hearings, S.C., 99–100, 1008, 1013–17, 1186–90, 1364–66, 1386.
71. Ibid., 969–71, 975, 898, 989, 1008, 1013, 1018–19, 1032.
72. Ibid., 939; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*, 173–75.
73. Congressional Quarterly, *Guide to U.S. Elections*, 625; KKK hearings, S.C., 39, 331–33, 855–56.
74. For political explanations of how Republicans in the South lost the political center, see Summers, *Railroads, Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity*; and Michael Perman, *Road to Redemption*. For accounts that stress the role of violence, see Eric Foner, *Reconstruction*; and George Rable, *But There Was No Peace*.
75. "For the Carolina Spartan," *Carolina Spartan*, 29 Sept. 1870.
76. KKK hearings, S.C., 802–4, 970–75, 977, 990–1008, 1018–25, 1036, 1053, 1079–80, 1362–64.
77. Ibid., S.C., 36–41, 1041–62; Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 2, 121.
78. Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 2, 120, 250–51.
79. Hamilton, *Papers of Shotwell*, 3:385; Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2., pt. 1, 75.
80. Fewer than ten families had land worth over \$2,000. William Curtis, Limestone Springs, to Buford, 21 Dec. 1871, ARLET; U.S. Census Office, *Manuscript Census* (microfilm), 1870, Spartanburg County, Glenn Springs District.

81. KKK hearings, S.C., 29–30, 99–100, 245–46, 767, 874; Landrum, *History of Spartanburg County*, 209.

82. Alfred Austell to Col. Buford, 7 Nov. 1871, ARLET. For discussion of the intersection, see William Curtis, Limestone Springs, to Buford, 21 Dec. 1871, ARLET.

83. Surveys for the air line went from February to October 1870. See “Air Line Railroad Survey,” *Carolina Spartan*, 24 Feb. 1870; “The Air Line Railroad,” *ibid.*, 7 Apr. 1870; “Airline Railroad,” *ibid.*, 1 Sept. 1870, 6 Oct. 1870. The Land Commission purchases were made in the winter of 1870–71. KKK hearings, S.C., 813–15; Bleser, *Promised Land*, 25–46.

84. Gen. Benjamin Franklin Bates’s sale of poor land to the S.C. Land Commission is explored in Bleser, *Promised Land*, 47–65.

85. KKK hearings, S.C., 20–21, 58–59, 84, 95, 110–11, 1192–93.

86. The Land Commission surveyor is named in *ibid.*, 814. He explains his responsibilities in *ibid.*, 913.

87. “Spartanburg CH, SC, May 28 1870,” *Carolina Spartan*, 14 July 1870.

88. “For the Carolina Spartan,” *ibid.*, 15 Sept. 1870.

89. *Ibid.*, 15 Sept. 1870.

90. “An Unfortunate Occurrence,” *Carolina Spartan*, 20 Jan. 1870; KKK hearings, S.C., 298–303.

91. Griffith, *John S. Ezell*, 95–98.

92. KKK hearings, S.C., 245–46, 386–92, 400–402, 407–10.

93. “Another Outrage,” *Carolina Spartan*, 30 Mar. 1871; KKK hearings, S.C., 99, 245–46, 767. Winsmith denied this in KKK hearings, S.C., 622.

94. KKK hearings, S.C., 99.

95. *Ibid.*, 620–23.

96. *Ibid.*, 365–73, 380. The quotation appears on page 380.

97. *Ibid.*, 27, 349–65. The quotation appears on page 350.

98. “To the Independent Voters of Spartanburg County,” *Carolina Spartan*, 29 Sept. 1870; KKK hearings, S.C., 27, 392–400, 623–24.

99. Elaine Scarry has suggested that terror of this kind displaces the apparent evil of the terrorist, leading people to blame victims for having betrayed themselves. See *Body in Pain*, 27–59.

100. KKK hearings, S.C., 402–7.

101. *Ibid.*

102. *Ibid.*, 427–8.

103. Nelson, “Livestock, Boundaries, and Public Space in Spartanburg.”

104. McCurry, *Masters of Small Worlds*.

105. KKK hearings, S.C., 1403.

106. Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 2, 120.

107. The man attacked was also named Goode. This may be the same incident, though Shotwell identifies Goode as a gunsmith rather than a blacksmith. Hamilton, *Papers of Shotwell*, 3:385.

108. The progress of building can be found in “Airline Railroad,” *Carolina Spartan*, 1 Sept. 1870 and in *ibid.*, 6 Oct. 1870. For violence in Limestone district and its connection to railroad construction, see KKK hearings, S.C., 27–28, 897–914, 917–22, 930–36.

109. KKK hearings, S.C., 874.

110. Griffith, *John S. Ezell*, 96; “Schools at Limestone Springs,” *Carolina Spartan*, 27 Jan. 1870.

111. Griffith, *John S. Ezell*, 26–8; Hamilton, *Papers of Shotwell*, 3:366.

112. *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d ed. I rely here on Georges Batailles, *History of Eroticism*, 2:61–78. Thanks to Ronald Schechter for pointing me in the direction of the literature on corruption.

113. “Ku Klux Manifesto,” *Carolina Spartan*, 16 Mar. 1871; “Another Ku Klux Manifesto,” *Carolina Spartan*, 23 Mar. 1871; KKK hearings, S.C., 987–88, 991, 1002–8, 1092.

114. KKK hearings, S.C., 500.

115. For the significance of the term “countrymen,” see KKK hearings, S.C., 407; “Judge Carpenter’s Speech,” *Carolina Spartan*, 6 Oct. 1870.

116. G. Cannon to Col. Buford, 18 Oct. 1871, ARLET.

117. Delano had been a Whig senator and early member of the Republican Party before the war, seconding Lincoln’s nomination for president in the Republican National Convention in 1860. During the war he was commissary-general of Ohio. After being defeated for a post as senator in 1862, he moved into the state legislature of Ohio and then held a seat in the House of Representatives in 1865–69. Grant appointed him commissioner of the internal revenue in 1869, where he was associated with the Whiskey frauds (which had preceded his tenure). In 1870 he became secretary of the interior, a position from which he resigned later because of frauds related to his management of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of American Biography*, 5:217–18; *National Cyclopedias of American Biography*, 4:18.

118. This was a crucial turning point in the use of federal power in peacetime; the Justice Department emerged as a federal organization, with full-time lawyers given authority to issue subpoenas on behalf of the federal government and full-time detectives (later organized as the Federal Bureau of Investigation) authorized to infiltrate organizations that threatened federal power; President U. S. Grant was given broad authority to protect the civil rights of citizens. With advice from Attorney General Amos Akerman, Grant declared the upcountry counties around Spartanburg County in a state of insurrection and sent federal troops to the towns of Spartanburg and Yorkville.

119. Bradley, *Triumph of Militant Republicanism*, 314–19.

120. G. Cannon to Col. Buford, 18 Oct. 1871, ARLET.

121. Williams, *South Carolina KKK Trials*.

122. KKK hearings, S.C., 1465–66.

123. W. G. Atkinson, resident engineer, Limestone Springs, S.C., to Col. A. S. Buford, 18 Nov. 1871, ARLET.

124. Griffith, *John S. Ezell*, 99.

125. G. W. Cass to A. S. Buford, 18 Jan. 1872, ARLET.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Managing local proxies was taxing for men like Simon Cameron, who owned a number of Georgia banks. See Robert Coleman to Simon Cameron, 12 Oct. 1870 and 8 July 1871, Simon Cameron Papers, Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg, Pa.

2. The Pennsylvania bought \$588,000 in stock in 1871, bought \$196,000 worth in 1873, and “accepted” or added signatures for \$950,000 in 1873. They advanced an additional \$1.8 million in the last third of 1873. See Pennsylvania Railroad, secretary, Board of Directors Minutes, vol. 6, 232–33, PRC.

3. This account of the competitive dynamics relies mostly on Klein, *Great Richmond Terminal*, 18–21, 59–63. This study concentrates on the period after 1880. A systems analysis of freight traffic, competitive points, and capital ratios in the Reconstruction South still awaits the talents of a transportation historian.

4. Southern Railway Security Company, *Organization and Charter*, 1–3; Hillyer, *James Talcott*, 35–39.

5. Greenberg, *Financiers and Railroads*, 48–49.

6. Frederick Allen, *Great Pierpont Morgan*, 30–31.

7. Having Brown & Sons on the board was a coup for Scott, and a direct snub to one of his competitors in Washington, B&O president John W. Garrett. The Browns had been the B&O’s original corporators and were now estranged from the system. On the Brown brothers, see Stover, *Baltimore and Ohio*, 14–20, 34, 44, 48; *Dictionary of American Biography*, 3:101–3; and Kent, *Story of Alexander Brown & Sons*, 171–79. Drexel, Morgan was formally opened 1 July 1871, though its organization had been agreed upon before April 1870. Drexel was the listed stockholder in the SRSC. Chernow, *House of Morgan*, 33–35; Frederick Allen, *Great Pierpont Morgan*, 30–32.

8. *Dictionary of American Biography*, 3:561–64. For the stockholder list of the SRSC, see “Swindling the South,” *Richmond Whig*, 1 Feb. 1872.

9. This exclusive contract was a vice that would plague holding companies as they emerged in the United States through the next century: owned companies in the SRSC system like the Richmond & Danville or the NCRR would support exclusive franchises like the Southern Express and the Pullman Palace Car Company at a tremendous loss, secretly pushing revenue to the parent companies. Dillavou, “Desirable Legal Changes in Holding Company Legislation,” 43–50; Interstate Commerce Commission, *Annual Report*, 1888, 6–9. For exclusive relations between Pennsylvania-controlled lines and Pullman, see Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 98–99. For exclusive relations with Southern Express, see U.S. Census Office, *Tenth Census [1880]*, vol. 4: Transportation, 582–600. For Southern Express financing of locomotives see A. S. Buford to G. B. Roberts, [27 Feb. 1874], in Pennsylvania Railroad, secretary, board files, BF Series, box 8, file 27, PRC.

10. They bought North Carolina’s interest from the state school board. Testimony of R. R. Bridgers, *Richmond Enquirer*, 13 Mar. 1871; Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 73.

11. In the 1870s, more than 8,000 bales of cotton arrived by rail at Baltimore each year via Tennessee, but the largest single shipment from the Southeast was via Norfolk: 5,149 bales. See “The Trade of Baltimore with the South,” *Richmond Enquirer*, 2 Mar. 1871. But this Norfolk route did not particularly favor Baltimore merchants. See Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 116–17. By the summer of 1870, after the Penn moved decisively into the South, connections to Baltimore from the Southeast were vastly improved. From West Point (east of Richmond at the head of the York River), daily steamers were introduced. See “Richmond and York River Railroad Line,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 19 July 1870. From City Point (now called Hopewell, north-

east of Petersburg at the head of the James River), steamers favored the Baltimore route. Financial connections between the cities tightened as well. The reserve agents of the largest banks in Richmond were in New York and Baltimore in the 1880s. See Morrison, *Richmond and the New South*, 61–62.

12. Both quotes in *Biographical Cyclopedias of Maryland and District of Columbia*, 522.

13. Dillavou, “Desirable Legal Changes,” 43–50. In *Visible Hand*, 317–20, Chandler sees the holding company as an organization midway between a cartel (which is weaker and cannot close down less-efficient plants) and a trust (which is stronger and maintains price and production schedules). This taxonomy of corporations, which is implicitly evolutionary, misses questions of the public *status* of the corporation and its changing legitimacy over time. Accounting historians have generally paid more attention to these questions. See, for example, Bryer, “Accounting for the ‘Railway Mania’ of 1845.”

14. In fact, they did stall it. See Lowe, *Republicans and Reconstruction in Virginia*, 150.

15. Mahone actually needed a law from the General Assembly of Virginia before he could begin to consolidate. *Ibid.*

16. For a statement of the principle of local control and enforcement by contract, see testimony of John Lyon, *Richmond Enquirer*, 11 Mar. 1871.

17. Southern Railway Security Company, *Organization and Charter*.

18. Zaibatsus in Japan have a similar organizational structure: a central financial core with member companies. Negotiating upward in these organizations is made possible by weekly lunches between core directors and divisional managers. See Blackford, *Rise of Modern Business*, 80–84.

19. “Salisbury—Two Railroad Kings—One Scratches the Other Bald,” *Richmond Enquirer*, 12 July 1873.

20. *Ibid.*

21. For the differing interests of the two groups, see the testimony of Gen. William Mahone, *Richmond Enquirer*, 11 Mar. 1871.

22. Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 286–89.

23. Southern Railway Security Company, *Organization & Charter*, 14; Klein, *Great Richmond Terminal*, 104.

24. The insights from this section rely on Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Habermas argues that the public and private spheres increasingly collide in the nineteenth century. Following his core argument, I see the increasingly public power of private capital as a force that undermines the power of public utilities in the South.

25. Adler, *British Investment in American Railways*.

26. Robbins, *Railway Age*, 106–18.

27. Schotter, *Pennsylvania Railroad Company*, 72–73.

28. Chernow, *House of Morgan*, 29–31; Greenberg, *Financiers and Railroads*, 48–61.

29. Jenks, *Migration of British Capital*, 99–114, 326–27. By the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, only a state could sue a state, making it nearly impossible to sue for a bad debt; see Durden, *Reconstruction Bonds*.

30. Summers, *Railroads, Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity*, 141–42.

31. Trachtenberg, *Incorporation of America*, 80–88.

32. Newgate Calendar was an English book that gave the life stories of convicted felons who were held in Newgate Prison and executed at Tyburn.

33. Feron, *Hints and Facts for Railway Investors*, 4.

34. Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 113.

35. South Carolina Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1872, 5.

36. Part of this difficulty arose from reports that Scott circulated in England about problems on Mahone's road. See Blake, *William Mahone of Virginia*, 121–34; and Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 109–10.

37. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1875, 384, and 1876, 65.

38. When Samuel Spencer became president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in the 1880s, he tried to introduce this method of report. He was fired by the B&O and quickly hired by Drexel, Morgan as a railroad analyst. Spencer would be the first president of the Southern when it was reorganized in 1894. Samuel Spencer Papers, SHC.

39. *Richmond Enquirer*, 13 Mar. 1871.

40. *Ibid.*, 1 Mar. 1871.

41. *Ibid.*, 28 Feb., 1 Mar., 6 Mar., 7 Mar. 1871.

42. See the string of letters from James H. Robinson and George W. Grice to ABA, Sept. 1873, folder 50, ABAP.

43. The best example of this kind of thinking can be found in Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 60, 81–84.

44. Holders of coupon bonds would clip the coupons attached to their bonds to receive their payments.

45. Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 82–83.

46. William Johnston to ABA, 25 June 1871, ABAP; Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*, 81; “Raleigh and Gaston Railroad,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 24 July 1871.

47. Board of Directors’ Minutes, 25 Nov. 1870, bk. 2, Richmond & Danville Railroad, VTL. The R&D got support from stockholders on the Charlotte to Greensboro run because they feared that Andrews’s proposed Raleigh & Augusta Air Line would bypass the cities from Charlotte to Greensboro. *Ibid.*, 26 July 1870.

48. Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 321–23.

49. Board of Directors’ Minutes, 25 Nov. 1870, bk. 2, Richmond & Danville Railroad, VTL.

50. “Raleigh and Gaston Railroad,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 24 July 1871.

51. Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 323.

52. T. M. R. Talcott to ABA, 22 Feb. and 27 July 1872, E. G. Ghio to ABA, 30 July 1872, ABAP.

53. William Johnston to ABA, 23 Sept. 1872, ABAP.

54. The SRSC trapped the Western North Carolina Railroad; the SRSC had bought bonds in the uncompleted Western NCRR and then filed a bill in circuit court for the road’s foreclosure. The judge, known to be sympathetic to the SRSC, appointed a receiver who operated it in their interest. William Johnston to ABA, 23 Sept. 1872, ABAP.

55. M. J. O’Brien to ABA, 23 Oct. 1872, Nov. 1872, ABAP.

56. T. R. Darrell to W. J. Hawkins, 15 Feb. 1873, 25 Mar. 1873, ABAP. D. Willis James

was an SRSC director and a director of Phelps, Dodge. See *New York Times*, 14 Sept. 1907. Dodge was one of the largest stockholders of Western Union and regularly sat on the board of Western Union. See *National Cyclopedia of American Biography*, 3:174. G. D. Phelps also shows up on the small list of SRSC stockholders; he may have been the son of A. G. Phelps, who died before the Civil War. For list of stockholders, see “Swindling the South,” *Richmond Whig*, 1 Feb. 1872.

57. D. T. Ward to ABA, 30 Oct. 1872, ABAP.
58. D. T. Ward to ABA, 3 Nov. 1872, 10 Nov. 1872, 21 Nov. 1872, 13 Dec. 1872, ABAP.
59. Ashe, *Cyclopedia*, 2:641–43.
60. William Johnston to ABA, 9 Aug. 1873, ABAP.
61. *Charlotte Observer*, Feb. 1873.
62. This was surely for political as well as economic reasons; critics of the SRSC were associated with the Democratic Party “bolters”: Josiah Turner and Judge Merrimon. *Charlotte Observer*, 15 and 17 Jan. 1873.
63. *Charlotte Observer*, 1 Feb. 1872, 2 Feb. 1873.
64. Moger, “Railroad Practices,” 432; Blake, *William Mahone*, 112; Cappon, *Virginia Newspapers*, 27–28; *Richmond Dispatch*, 29 Mar. 1871, 4 July 1871, 8 July 1871, 10 July 1871, 9 July 1872.
65. Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*, 91; Pearson, *Readjuster Movement*, 28–29; Cappon, *Virginia Newspapers*, 27; Moger, “Railroad Practices,” 439.
66. Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*, 88–90. The *Dispatch*’s change in policy begins around the end of February 1871. See “The Grand Finale of the Railroad War . . .,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 27 Feb. 1871; “Through North Carolina,” *ibid.*, 6 July 1871; “Promise of a New Trade,” *ibid.*, 10 Aug. 1871. Ellyson & Taylor were general agents of the *Richmond Enquirer* by 28 Feb. 1871, in addition to the previous agents. See masthead of *Richmond Enquirer*, 28 Feb. 1871.
67. *Richmond Enquirer*, 11, 12, and 18 July 1873.
68. *Ibid.*, 8 Mar. 1871.
69. The only copy of the report that remains today is in the British Museum in London. See Virginia House of Delegates, *Sale of the State’s Interest in the Richmond and Danville*.
70. This is the newspaper that Moger uses in his analysis of the practices of Mahone and the Penn for the 1870s. See Moger, “Railroad Practices,” 433–40.
71. The Memphis paper’s control by an SRSC subsidiary was proved years later; with the other papers allegations were made frequently, but the cases were never proved. Nixon, *Henry W. Grady*, 102; Baker, *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 123–26; *Charlotte Observer*, 13 Feb., 7 Mar. 1873.
72. Baldasty, *Commercialization of News*, 85.
73. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1871, 583–84; *Richmond Dispatch*, 18 May 1872.
74. The U.S. Circuit favored northern stockholders in early February 1873, according to the *Charlotte Observer*, 12 Feb. 1873. This action gave the SRSC the opportunity to bid to control the Western NCRR; see *ibid.*, 16 Feb. 1873; and *Richmond Enquirer*, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19 July 1873. The Western NCRR was bought back by the state in 1875; see Morris, “Completion of the Western North Carolina Railroad,” 258–59.

75. *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 July 1871.

76. "What Shall We Do?", *Richmond Enquirer*, 28 Feb. 1871.

77. *Richmond Dispatch*, 10 July 1871.

78. Emphasis mine. "Grand Finale of the Railroad War—The 'Bucktails' and 'Bob-tails' at Dinner," *Richmond Dispatch*, 27 Feb. 1871.

79. For "obstruction," see "Virginia and North Carolina," *Richmond Dispatch*, 4 Mar. 1871. For "great barrier," see "Through North Carolina," *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 July 1871. For "disease," see "Railroad Schemes and Monsters," *Richmond Dispatch*, 18 July 1871.

80. *Richmond Enquirer*, 6 Mar. 1871.

81. "Government Theory and Practice," *Richmond Dispatch*, 18 July 1871.

82. "Railroad Schemes and Monsters," *ibid.*

83. "Railroad Scheming," *ibid.*, 5 Jan. 1871.

84. *Richmond Enquirer*, 13 Mar. 1871.

85. "Another War," *Richmond Dispatch*, 3 Mar. 1871.

86. *Richmond Enquirer*, 1 Mar. 1871.

87. "Commerce Will Triumph," *Richmond Dispatch*, 29 Mar. 1871.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.*

90. "The Southern Pacific Railway—Its Political Importance," *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 July 1872.

91. "Commerce Will Triumph," *Richmond Dispatch*, 29 Mar. 1871.

92. These issues are covered in detail in the next chapter.

93. Norton et al., *People and a Nation*, 299; Ross, "Expansion of Agriculture," 404.

94. "The Sentinel," *Charlotte Observer*, 3 Jan. 1873; "The Old Subject," *ibid.*, 13 and 22 Feb. 1873.

95. "Public Printing in Orange," *ibid.*, 13 Feb. 1873.

96. *Ibid.*, 8 Mar. 1873.

97. Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1874, 135; *Charlotte Observer*, 30 Jan., 9 Mar., 15 June 1873.

98. The advertisement for Atlanta & Richmond Air Line offers service without change from Charlotte to Richmond. See advertisement, *Charlotte Observer*, 30 Sept. 1872. For freight, see Richmond & Danville, *Annual Report*, 1869, 372.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Alan Conway calls this a "pocketbook alignment" in *The Reconstruction of Georgia, 191–95*; Roberts, *Joseph E. Brown*, 91–92; Nathans, *Losing the Peace*, 203–8.

2. Hill followed Delano's toast, thanking him for the implication that federal troops would not come to Georgia again. Ten years after the dinner, Hill told Henry Grady that by coming to the banquet (and thus assenting to the lease) he hoped to gain the confidence of Delano and Cameron. Hill, *Speeches and Writings*, 64.

3. Nixon, *Henry W. Grady*, 70; Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 114–15.

4. These friends were E. Y. Clarke and W. A. Hemphill. See *Atlanta Constitution*, 6 Aug. 1868.

5. Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 85–87, 248–53; Nathans, *Losing the Peace*, 209.
6. Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:138–41.
7. W. C. Morrill to Simon Cameron, 9 Nov. 1871, SCP.
8. Nathans, *Losing the Peace*, 211–27; C. A. Nutting to Simon Cameron, 21 Nov. 1871, and W. C. Morrill to Simon Cameron, 22 July 1872, SCP. Bullock made the lease three days after elections in Georgia had confirmed that Conservatives would dominate the 1871 legislature. Duncan, *Rufus Bullock*, 131–33.
9. *Richmond Dispatch*, 4 July 1870.
10. Foner, 542–43. The slow emergence of the Democrats in South Carolina is described in Perman, *Road to Redemption*, 144–70.
11. *Carolina Spartan*, 22 June and 10 Aug. 1871; W. K. Easley of Greenville had the town of Easley named after him. See map of South Carolina in *Poor's Manual of Railroads*, 1884; Gabriel Cannon of Spartanburg formed a bank in Spartanburg which would have been a depository for the air line's shipping business in the county. See “The National Bank of Spartanburg,” *Carolina Spartan*, 15 June 1871. For a list of the South Carolina directors of the air line, see “The Air-Line Railroad,” *Carolina Spartan*, 1 June 1871. These men were among the Conservatives of the South Carolina upcountry with whom Governor Scott met on 1 Mar. 1871 to stop Klan violence in the area; see KKK hearings, S.C., 106–7.
12. Rawick, *American Slave*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 201–3.
13. Derrick, *South Carolina Railroad*, 250–68. It is probable that the scaling back of state debt to the various railroads in South Carolina was to blame for this. Though Governor Hampton, a self-styled moderate, opposed any cancellation of debt, the Gary faction had the support of upcountry whites who resented Charleston bondholders. See Lander, *History of South Carolina*, 25–27.
14. Holden was impeached on 22 Mar. 1871; the midnight meeting was 11 Sept. 1871. Price, “Railroads and Reconstruction in North Carolina,” 558–87; Raper, *William W. Holden*, 216–18; Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 291–94; Stover, *Railroads of the South*, 111; Klein, *Great Richmond Terminal*, 60.
15. They started the suit with an NCRR stockholder in Baltimore and pressed for the case to be tried in circuit court because of diversity of residence. Price, “Railroads and Reconstruction in N.C.,” 584–87. This procedure was regularly used by interstate railroad companies to ensure that they got cases read by a sympathetic judge and to create regional, not just state, precedent. See Merkel, “Origins of an Expanded Federal Court Jurisdiction,” 336–58.
16. Price, “Railroads and Reconstruction in North Carolina,” 559; Holden’s statement of January 1876 is reprinted in Raper, *William W. Holden*, 307, n. 32.
17. For general discussion of Walker and the Pennsylvania Railroad, see Chapter 4, above. For the details of the arrangement, see Maddex, *Virginia Conservatives*, 60–88; Pearson, *Readjuster Movement in Virginia*; and Blake, *William Mahone*, 70–110.
18. The only copy of the investigation that I have found is in the British Library in London. Virginia House of Delegates, *Sale of the State’s Interest in the Richmond and Danville*.
19. Eric Foner, *Reconstruction*; Gillette, *Retreat from Reconstruction*; Perman, *Road to Redemption*.
20. Lichtenstein, *Twice the Work of Free Labor*; Saville, *Work of Reconstruction*.

21. For a discussion of a similar process that took more than a century to complete, see Linebaugh, *The London Hanged*.

22. See Chapter 4, above; Morris, “Completion of the Western North Carolina Railroad”; George Smith to ABA, May 1872, John Everitt to ABA, 23 June 1872, ABAP.

23. For a general discussion of this community of reformers, see Faust, *A Sacred Circle*. On Edmund Ruffin’s efforts to support self-sufficiency with local manures, see Speck, “Evaluating Edmund Ruffin as an Organic Intellectual.”

24. Virginia State Agricultural Society, “List of Premiums Offered at the Third Annual Exhibition,” 1855; Virginia State Agricultural Society, “Constitution, Register of Life and Honorary Members,” 1871; Piedmont Agricultural Society, “Fourth Annual Fair of the Piedmont Agricultural Society.” The debate is printed in the 1870 and 1871 issues of *The Southern Planter*.

25. I rely here in part on Harvey’s idea of the built environment. See Harvey, *Limits to Capital*.

26. Jaynes, *Branches without Roots*; Ransom and Sutch, *One Kind of Freedom*; Higgs, *Competition and Coercion*; Hahn, *Roots of Southern Populism*; Wiener, *Social Origins of the New South*; Wright, *Old South, New South*.

27. Thus if a merchant bought cotton in Spartanburg at \$4 a bale, he “hedged” his purchase by buying a futures contract from a buyer who would promise to pay \$4 for it in the two months it takes the cotton to arrive. The bill of lading together with the futures contract is then “hedged” cotton, and can be used as collateral for a loan. Lipartito, “New York Cotton Exchange,” 50–72.

28. For James, see Southern Railway Security Company, *Organization and Charter*, 1–3; On Austell and Inman, see Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:39–40, 505–6; and Klein, *Great Richmond Terminal*, 39–40. For the early connection between Austell and Pennsylvania Railroad projects, see “An Act for Completing a Direct and Continuous Line of Railroad from Washington City to Mobile,” [March 1868], in general papers, folder 7, Board of Public Works Papers, LOV.

29. *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, 3 Aug. 1872, 140.

30. Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:505–6.

31. In 1870, Maryland was sixth in number of employees in tobacco industries after Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Georgia. See “Collections from Manufactured Tobacco in Virginia,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 19 July 1870; “Illegal Traffic in Manufactured Tobacco,” *ibid.*, 26 July 1870; “Virginia and North Carolina,” *ibid.*, 4 Mar. 1871. Tobacco factors in the SRSC were the Brown Brothers of Baltimore and R. T. Wilson of New York. See Kent, *Story of Alexander Brown & Sons*; and *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, 3 Aug. 1872, 140.

32. *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 July 1872 (new tobacco tax); “Virginia and North Carolina,” *ibid.*, 4 Mar. 1871, in which Baltimore sees the benefit from SRSC reorganizations. Reynolds’s Baltimore sponsor was probably Benjamin Franklin Parnet. It is likely that William T. Walters and B. F. Newcomer, Baltimore merchants and SRSC directors, were connected with other enterprises from the beginning. Tilley, *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company*, 48–59. Local residents say that Reynolds met with A. S. Buford of the Richmond & Danville to get the R&D to put its main line through Winston. *Ibid.*, 59.

33. Ward, *That Man Haupt*, 21–201.
34. Trelease, *North Carolina Railroad*, 217–20.
35. Old Dominion Granite Company, *Report of Gen. H. Haupt*.
36. *Ibid.*, 13.
37. Richmond & Danville Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1873, 138–39.
38. *Ibid.*, 1874, 323.
39. Penitentiary, Board of Directors, “Report . . . with Accompanying Documents,” 1871/1872, in Virginia, *Annual Reports of Officers, Boards & Institutions of the Commonwealth of Virginia*; *ibid.*, 1872/1873.
40. Coleman and Gurr, *Dictionary of Georgia Biography*, 1:119–21.
41. This comes from the only report critical of the Dade Coal Company, issued in 1881 to the Georgia House. A. Elizabeth Taylor, “Convict Lease System in Georgia,” 116–23.
42. Obituary, *New York Times*, 14 Sept. 1907.
43. Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*.
44. *Ibid.*; D. T. Ward to A. B. Andrews, 3 Nov. 1872, 10 Nov. 1872, 21 Nov. 1872, 13 Dec. 1872, ABAP.
45. “The Danville Railroad,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 12 Sept. 1867; Tilley, *R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company*, 40–52.
46. Intense midwestern railroad competition and technological advances in the storing and forwarding of grain in the Midwest were making wheat and flour incredibly cheap in these cities. Miller, *Railroads and the Granger Law*, chap. 1; Rothstein “Antebellum Wheat and Cotton Exports,” 91–100.
47. Virginia Senate, *Proceedings on the Application of Mr. Reuben Ragland*.
48. Derry, *Georgia*, 156.
49. Reidy, “Slavery, Emancipation, and the Capitalist Transformation of Southern Agriculture,” 245; Earle, “Price of Precocity.”
50. KKK hearings, S.C., 41–47, 303, 890.
51. Derry, *Georgia*, 44–45.
52. “Air-Line Railroad,” *Charlotte Observer*, 11 Mar. 1873; “The Railroad Tax,” *Carolina Spartan*, 8 June 1881.
53. Richmond & Danville Railroad, *Annual Report*, 1873, 139.
54. “Remarks of Mr Hensley, of Bedford,” *Richmond Dispatch*, 6 Mar. 1871.
55. *Richmond Enquirer*, 12 Nov. 1875; Morrison, *Richmond, Virginia and the New South*, 48, 126–28.
56. This probably explains the greater productivity of the upcountry cotton, which Robert Brooks falsely attributed to “the superiority of white farming.” See Brooks, *Georgia Studies*, 96–98.
57. U.S. Census Office, *Tenth Census [1880]*, Report on the Manufactures of the United States, 945.
58. *Ibid.*, 499. This map shows water and steam power in 1880.
59. *Ibid.*, 945.
60. *Ibid.*, 946.
61. Eugene Clyde Brooks, *The Story of Cotton*, 320–22; Ayers, *Promise of the New South*, chap. 4.
62. “Improved Cotton Ginning,” *Carolina Spartan*, 8 June 1881.

63. Martin, *Chesapeake and Potomac Country*.
64. Carlton and Coclansis, "Capital Mobilization and Southern Industry, 1880-1920," 73-94.
65. For discussion of car delays, see "Special Notice," *Charlotte Observer*, 16 Mar. 1873. For problems shipping goods besides cotton, see "About Dried Fruit," *Charlotte Observer*, 8 Feb. 1873.
66. Other lines, however, were quite successful forwarding truck crops quickly. See McCorkle, "Moving Perishables to Market," 42-62.
67. Weiman, "Economic Emancipation of the Non-Slaveholding Class"; Ford, "Red-necks and Merchants."
68. U.S. Census Office, *Tenth Census [1880]*, Report on the Manufactures of the United States, 946.
69. *Ibid.*

CONCLUSION

1. Keasbey, *From the Hudson to the St. Johns*, 2-12.
2. *Ibid.*, 15, 55, 80.
3. *Ibid.*, 30-31.
4. C. P. Mackie, secretary SRSC, to Joseph Lesley, secretary Pennsylvania Railroad, 20 Jan. 1874, Pennsylvania Railroad, secretary, board files, BF Series, box 8, file 27, PRC.
5. "Copy of Memorandum Given W. P. Clyde by Assistant to the President DuBarry . . .," Pennsylvania Railroad, secretary, board files, BF Series, box 8, file 27, PRC.
6. "Scrapbook of Newspapers Clippings on North Carolina Railroads."

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